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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines how morality is corporately appropriated in the context of new
managerial discourses. The theoretical argument focuses on the relations between the fashion
for business ethics in the academy and current attempts to reconstruct 'corporate culture'
within companies.
The argument begins with questioning the notion of "shared values" as a tenet of corporate
culturism. This scepticism over values being shared arises from the epistemological difficulties
of researchers, or anyone else, going beyond the position that expressions are shared. The
argument suggests that if a sharing of expressions can be directed and narrowed, then this is a
condition of possibility for the social manipulation of morality. The importance of this
argument is that it allows for power effects to be asymmetrical and stabilised without recourse
to assumptions of a totalitarian state. Indeed, in the present analysis, forms of resistance to
"values" may become power effects, provided expressions are monitored and directed.
The thesis argues that the shared expressions are appropriated for the imperatives of
corporate strategy. Entrapped in the mixed messages of corporate strategy, managers
become engaged in a complicity to mobilise and narrow the circulation of shared expressions.
The thesis suggests that the managerial work to re-present the imperatives of corporate
strategy is dominated by a corporate manipulation of expressions.
The thesis proceeds to analyse the empirical material drawn from the transcripts of interviews
with a cluster ofmanagers in a financial services company based in U.K. As a typical insurance
company, Edinso (a pseudonym) is keen to implement the popular business strategies,
"Corporate Culture" and "Quality Agenda". What is going on in Edinso is identified as an
attempt to engineer a shift from a 'family' metaphor to a 'corporate' metaphor. However, it is
pointed out that these metaphors are not new 'expressions', but only their uses are different. It
is theoretically argued that management is partly done by surveillance over 'expressions' or the
use of expressions. Surveillance through "accounts" is an intelligent monitoring to the extent
that it checks when and where expressions related to the metaphors of quality and profit are
'displayed'. By this device, the attempt is made to manipulate values from 'family' to
'corporate'. Detachment of morality is also illustrated using the example of 'Ethical Trust'
which is currently popular in the British financial services companies.
The thesis concludes that a current status of most of business ethics discourse remains an
'apology' for a new managerialism. The moral prescriptions are peripherally directed at the
"other", rather than centrally internalised into the moral subjects' subjectivity. The tenet of
shared moral values is fractured as is implied in a very meaning of 'share': unite and divide.
Managers, as employees, also partake in a complicity to exploit morality through the medium
of shared expressions such that they become trapped in a vicious circle of moral cynicism and
dependence.
The present study has opened up a space in which a current focus on shared values in business
ethics can be questioned. The present analysis shows how a discourse of 'sharing' in modern
companies helps the social construction and distribution of inequalities of power relations.
Further research could develop these themes.
INTRODUCTION
Stages ofMoral Concerns in the Business Arena
The aim of this thesis is to delve into the ways in which moral concerns in the
business arena are diversely represented and problematised. Indeed, a considerable
number of moral and ethical issues are gradually emergent in modern business firms.
Bribery, corruption, insider trading, exaggerated advertising, discrimination in
employment and the like, are increasingly attracting the public's attention. For instance,
it is reported that the CWS, Britain's biggest co-operative retailer, is adopting an
"ethical retailing" stance in its 700 stores in a move that puts pressure on other big
grocers to follow suit. In what CWS believes is the biggest-ever independent survey of
ethical concerns, carried out on its behalf by Gallop, 33 % of 30,000 consumers
interviewed said they had boycotted stores or products in the past because of concerns
about their ethical standards. 60 % said they were prepared to boycott in the future
{Financial Times, 24 Apr. 1995). An interesting point of these moral and ethical issues
is that these issues are constructed across differing stakeholders' interests. They are
differently perceived and interpreted by such moral subjects as owner, employed
managers, manual workers, shareholders, and also the public. It is these differences of
interpretation that make the debates about business ethics both complicated and
intriguing.
The main strand in business ethics can be characterised to be normative. This
normative approach to business ethics is mainly composed of an investigation of the
relevance of philosophical principles for the practice of business transactions. On top
of these basic ethical principles, the inquiries of whistle blowing (Miceli and Near,
1992) on unethical behaviours in the context of subspecialised expertise like
accounting practice, marketing strategy, production procedures, personnel and so on,
are a major part of the discourse of business ethics. On the basis of this combination of
a pre-defined set of ethical guidelines and the detective practices ofwhistleblowing, the
prescriptive measures are also taken to enhance the level of ethical climate in a
company.
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I suggest that such normative approaches to business ethics can be conceptually
classified according to Kohlberg's (1981) theory of moral development. In brief,
Kohlberg identified three levels ofmoral development. He characterised the lowest, or
preconventional, level by self-interest; the next, conventional role-conformity level, by
an emphasis on loyalty to a prevailing social and institutional order and its dominant
norms; and the highest level, that ofpostconventional or autonomous moral reasoning,
by the ability to decide to challenge existing norms on the basis of personal principled
judgement (cf. Maclagan and Snell, 1992). The ethical level of the conduct of
companies which is equivalent to a preconventional, punish/reward, stage may pertain
to cases in which the companies themselves enforce unethical practices. Wahn (1993)
suggests that individuals who are more compliant with their employing organisations
are more likely to obey organisational pressures to behave unethically. Competition is
one of the first major factors contributing to increased pressure on people to engage in
unethical practices (Fraedrich, 1992). Given that if their unethical practices are not
publicly detected and punished, they are not stopped, this level of ethical awareness is
assessed to be preconventional. Another category of ethical conduct assumed to lie at
a bit more advanced level is 'whistleblowing'. Whistleblowers have usually been treated
as outcasts by private-sector employers. However, legal, ethical, and practical
considerations increasingly compel companies to encourage employees to disclose
suspected illegal or unethical activities through internal communication channels. In a
survey of 295 human resource executives, those from companies with internal
disclosure policies and procedures reported a significant increase in the number of
internal disclosures by employees after implementation (Barnett et al., 1993). Contrary
to this surface encouragement of employee whistleblowing, it can be the case that
many corporations continue to treat its whistleblowers poorly. The notion persists that
it is disloyal and irresponsible to criticise one's employer, notwithstanding the fact that
the company has done wrong. Other than outright dismissal, retaliation can and does
include demotion, false complaint about job performance, reassignment and relocation,
and assignment of unsympathetic co-workers or supervisors (Ettorre, 1994). Though
business ethics consultants recommend the instituting of a hotline or safe reporting
system that allows employees to report problems or violations (Rogers, 1994), it is
questionable whether employees blow the whistle on their own misconduct as well as
other persons'.
The corporate code of ethics is a device which is meant to meet the
managerial need to induce employees to blow the whistle on their own misconduct. I
suggest that the institutionalisation of the corporate code of ethics is in accord with the
conventional level of role-conformity by an emphasis on loyalty to a prevailing social
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and institutional order and its dominant norms and values. The corporate intent to
publicly devise a set of rules is at once to regulate and moralise the collective activities
and to, by doing so, avoid the disadvantages of government regulation (Beauchamp
and Bowie, 1979). By investigating 75 Canadian corporate codes of ethics, Lefebvre
and Singh (1992) found that the focus of these codes was the protection of the firm.
They are principally concerned with employees' conduct against the firm. Very few of
the codes refer to issues concerning product safety, product quality, relations with
consumers, or environmental affairs. This skewed content of ethical codes is indicative
of a nature of compliance-based ethics programmes that focus on preventing legal
violations which may do harm to a firm. The instrumentality of ethical codes is
manifest in the condensed form of abstract ethical norms. This is likely to marginalise
the necessarily competing interpretations of ethical norms. The encapsulation of ethical
norms separates the codes from the day-to-day practices, and confines the members'
competence of ethical reasoning to a narrowed range of compliant actions. Another
ethical conduct of a company which exemplifies the conventional level of role-
conformity is the notion of 'corporate social responsibility'. This is in accord with a
social desirability to meet the prevailing social norms because it is launched in order to
satisfy general expectations that companies have to associate themselves with the
needs of the public society. Simultaneously, companies might themselves benefit by the
economic development attending business-like philanthropy, particularly philanthropy
intended to provide training. Training would improve the local workforce for the firm
at the same time as it attracted public recognition (Sorell and Hendry, 1994;30).
In contrast to these modes of ethical conduct and practices
which can be characterised to be heteronomous, the postconventional level of moral
development presupposes the moral subjects' capacity for moral reasoning and
autonomy. I argue that such new managerial ideas as HRM (Human Resource
Management), Corporate Culture and Quality Agenda imply the postconventional level
of moral competence of employees. For instance, a contrast between personnel
management and human resource management brings into relief the shift in behaviour
referent from norms and customs and practice to 'values' and 'mission' (Storey,
1995;24). At face value, the endorsement of values and mission pretends an allowance
of opportunities and discretion for the employees to autonomously develop and apply
their moral views in conjunction with their attachments to the values and mission.
Openness, delegation, family values, individual rights, objective impartiality and the
like are among a list of moral choices which are seemingly guaranteed by a new
managerialism. However, the everyday reality experienced by the employees in a
company may be, to a large extent, contrary to these ostensibly proclaimed icons of
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moral autonomy. Indeed, the invariably business-dominated dyeing of the authentic
morality is not without its ethical problems. This recognition leads us to a main
argument of this Chapter.
Problematising Moral Prescriptions in a New Managerialism
The main concern of this thesis is to reflect upon the ways in which morality is
corporately appropriated in the context of new managerial discourses. I suggest that
morality is problematised where a new managerialism comes into effect. In line with
this position, the theoretical argument in this thesis focuses on the relations between
the fashion for business ethics in the academy and current attempts to reconstruct
'corporate culture' within companies. Because the corporate attempts to reconstruct
corporate culture revolve around the agendas of a new managerialism, 'quality agenda'
as a corporate strategy under the regime of a new managerialism is also critically
reflected in this thesis. For this purpose, the focus of this thesis is on moral and ethical
implications embedded in such new managerialist discourses as "Corporate Culture"
and "Quality Agenda".
The importance of this thesis seems to consist in its capacity to reflect upon the
mainstream normative stance in the discourse of business ethics. The thesis pinpoints
that such a normative stance confines itself to a narrow aspect of moral and ethical
implications in the business arena. Its limitedness lies in its lack of attention to the
effects of new managerialist discourses by ignoring the mechanism by which employees
are brought into the labour process under the managerial regimes of 'corporate culture'
and 'quality agenda'. Recognising that morality is espoused by the designers and
implementers of such regimes, the thesis problematises the moral prescriptions
conveyed by the new managerialist practices. That which characterises a thrust of such
moral prescriptions is a notion of 'shared values' which corporate management are
eager to enact in the name of corporate culture. Quality is one of the crucial values to
be shared. Most importantly, morality is enacted as part of the shared values. The
corporate management intend to enhance the level of corporate performance and
legitimise the regime of new managerialist practices by virtue of shared moral
legitimacy. However, the thesis casts a doubt on the actuality of shared values and
raises questions about its ethical problems. The main thrust of this scepticism is to
argue that 'expressions' rather than 'values' are shared by both corporate management
and employees, and as a consequence morality is socially manipulated through the
medium of shared expressions. To explicate this argument, I feel a need to discuss the
discourse of corporate culture with a focus on its prescriptive nature.
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The prescriptive nature of the discourse of corporate culture is represented in
diverse ways and the critical literature is incisive in pointing out the problems
embedded in the prescriptions. It has been pointed out, for example, that the corporate
attempts to engineer 'corporate culture' take on a mainly purposeful, instrumental
character (Willmott, 1993). Such examples lead to moral questions about the
genuineness and authenticity of the values enacted by the discourse of corporate
culture. When the ethos of 'shared values' as a tenet of corporate culture is
intentionally engineered for a higher degree of performance and profitability, any
morality advocated by corporate culture is bound to be subjected to such corporate
mandates as all-encompassing performances or profitability. The notion of 'shared
values' advocated or assumed by the protagonists of 'corporate culture' is most
characteristic of the prescriptive nature of the new managerial discourses because it is
intended to serve the preservation of the sense of belonging, participation and even
practical autonomy (Peters and Waterman, 1982) among employees. As most of the
critiques of corporate culturism argue (Willmott, 1993; Dahler-Larsen, 1994) however,
an ethos of 'shared values' is likely to result in an incipient totalitarian state,
marginalising and excluding space in which competing views from the employees can
be constituted. This effect of the ethos of shared values burgeons from its attempts to
manoeuvre the corporate stuff as comprehensively as possible. For example, when
Kilmann et al. (1985:5) try to define 'corporate culture' as 'the shared philosophies,
ideologies, values, assumptions, beliefs, expectations, attitudes and norms', its
totalising nuance is conspicuously perceived. Moreover, the managerial intent
embedded in the artificial definition of corporate culture is obviously detected when
Deal (1985:301) tries to define it as 'the human invention that creates solidarity and
meaning and inspires commitment and productivity' (emphasis added). Indeed,
corporate culture protagonists have promised the top managers that it is rewarding to
manage culture in order to improve the degree of social integration and commitment of
employees for the company, thereby ultimately gaining innovativeness, productivity
and competitive advantage (Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Peters and Waterman, 1982).
However, behind the issue over whether values should be shared lies a further
matter. The questioning that is critically reflected on in this thesis is the assumption
that values can be shared in the mechanism of corporate culture. The descriptive
question of whether values can be shared has been obscured by debate over the
normative question of whether they should be shared. The normative prescription that
values should be shared has been questioned in various ways and these are discussed
first. Already a number of scholars object to the promises issued by corporate culture
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protagonists. Some argue that the link between corporate culture and performance
cannot be demonstrated empirically in a convincing way (Siehl and Martin, 1990).
Others argue that culture is more complex and more difficult to control than claimed
by corporate culture protagonists (Berg, 1985; quoted in Dahler-Larsen, 1994). Case
studies demonstrate that underneath the surface of famous, apparently 'excellent'
cultures, bottom-level employees live in different realities, 'going robot' or engaging
themselves in a number of unofficial practices (Van Maanen, 1991) or, from time to
time, investing energy in manifest conflict (Smith and Eisenberg, 1987). Recently,
researchers have demonstrated a need to capture conceptually in its own right, the
cultural differentiation (Van Maanen and Barley, 1984), ambiguity and fragmentation
(Martin and Meyerson, 1988) found in organisations.
As Dahler-Larsen (1994) argues however, while the criticism of corporate
culture is rich and varied, there has so far been relatively little focus on analysing the
moral aspects of corporate culture (Willmott, 1993), and challenges to investigate the
societal significance of corporate culture have not been fully mounted, although
analyses have indicated how corporate culture reflects the instrumental mentality of
Western managerial thinking (Alvesson, 1989), how it moves the frontier of control to
include the emotional realm (Ray, 1986; Hochschild, 1983) and how it affects the
autonomy of employees (Willmott, 1993). Dahler-Larsen (1994) continues to elaborate
on his critique of corporate culturism in the light of Durkheimian morality. This
contrast between corporate culturism and Durkheimian morality illuminates, in its own
right, the limits of moral prescriptions embodied in corporate culturism. As
Dahler-Larsen (ibid.) argues, an ethos of shared values as a tenet of corporate
culturism tends to circumscribe the boundary of application of morality within the
individual company. Its prescriptive strength is celebrated and legitimated by the
protagonists of corporate culturism insofar as it can afford to respond to a wider crisis
of 'meaning' in society. Thus, the morality enacted by and within the individual
company in the name of corporate culture supposedly takes a binding force over
employees by posing the company as 'us' against the society as 'them' and presenting
itself as a haven where to skilfully adapt to the uncertainties of social 'environments'
suffering from a crisis of 'meaning'. As a result, it is most likely that such corporate
morality is amenable to the corporate appropriation through directing and narrowing
the ways in which the morality is corporately interpreted and applied.
As a counter to this contracted image of morality, Durkheimian morality
posits that society itself is seen as the ultimate source and object of morality. Though
Durkheimian social theory of morality is certainly arguable, the Durkheimian-inspired
morality seems so illuminating as to highlight the likelihood that a moral legitimacy
sought by corporate culturism will turn into a myopic narcism. Reflected in this line of
contrasting, corporate culture implies thus, to follow Durkheim, an attempt to use the
sacred for profane purposes, thereby running the risk of undermining the former
though it is justified with reference to its positive effects on effectiveness, innovation,
performance and ultimately, profitability (Dahler-Larsen, ibid.). This leads to a number
of contradictions unnoticed by corporate culture protagonists. For instance, employees'
competing views of the morality espoused by corporate culture may be marginalised
simply because they are harmful for profitability, which is itself in violation of 'fairness'
as a basic standard of corporate morality. Indeed, the moral prescriptions of corporate
culture are limited in that they do not have society as the source and objective
especially when they are reflected by Durkheimian proposition that without linking
itself to imagery wanted by society, corporate culture as a moral power will remain
weak. In relation to this argument, Kunda (1992:225) warns of the effects that the
strength of a moral order based on the assumption and the promise of the members'
commitment to the all-encompassing performance will have on society in general. As
Kunda frames the matter;
Such a perspective is, arguably, suitable for economic activity in times
of prosperity. But shaping citizens by such an ethos might, in the long
run, undermine the foundations of collective action. How, we must ask,
will these corporate products behave in different arenas of social
action and association - family, community, politics - if their
fundamental conceptions of themselves and their relationship to others
are shaped in the corporate image? And, more crucially, what will
happen to the theatre of reality and its elaborate props when, or if,
times change and assumptions no longer hold? (p.225)
However, Kunda's ethnography widens the discussion by, implicitly,
questioning whether values can be shared. More than one manager in the Tech (the
company as a site ofKunda's study) has found himself facing the "costly consequences
of employees' distancing from official versions of corporate imagery", either in terms of
overt conflict or in terms of passivity and neglect. Whichever form the members'
resistance against the official versions of corporate imagery takes on, that which is at
stake is the possibility of 'resistance' to strengthen power relations under the regime of
'strong' corporate culture. As will be discussed in detail later (cf. Chapter 4), autonomy
bestowed upon the resisting members functions to mitigate their inclinations for
resistance and in turn make them rely upon the more powerful authorities in the form
of corporate membership, parenthood, or other anxiety-assuaging icons of individual
'success' or collective ethos of shared values. In this sense, the regime of 'strong'
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corporate culture is understood to have a penetrating influence on the members'
conduct and soul (Rose, 1990). Thus, the means involved in 'managing culture' and
'gaining control of culture' (Kilmann et al., 1985) are inherently technical and
manipulative, and the goals are, ultimately, commercial (Dahler-Larsen, 1994). In line
with this argument on the problems of moral prescriptions of corporate culturism, a
question should be raised about how the ethos of shared values is sustained within
corporate culture companies and how members respond to any degree of corporate
imposition of the ethos of shared values. Indeed, it is important to consider more
carefully the question of whether values can really be shared if something else is going
on in everyday practice. This question seems to require 'descriptive ethics' as compared
with managerialist prescriptions of a new managerialism.
Managerialist Prescriptions and Descriptive Ethics
This thesis is mainly concerned with criticising the moral limits and
contradictions of managerialist prescriptions of a new managerialism in the form of
'corporate culturism' and 'quality agenda'. In so doing, its analytic strategy is
conceptually focused on a critique of the social act of 'sharing' and its ethical
implications. It is to be noted, however, that this analytic concept is an epistemological
one. I do not assert the absolute impossibility of shared values, but merely point out
the ethical problems embedded in the myth of shared values. Insofar as members do
not commit to the values which are corporately espoused to be shared, and accordingly
deflect responsibility for the unintended consequences of the presumed myth of shared
values, what is to be assumed for an explanation of the members' social act of sharing
is that they share only the "expressions". Thus, an exploration of speech exchange is
crucial because language in use can be observed (e.g. in the members' accounts). Ifwe
assume that only expressions are shared, then any appearance of sharing values has to
be explained. The possibility follows that if a sharing of expressions can be directed
and narrowed, then this is a condition of possibility for the social manipulation of
morality. For instance, such ethical notions as 'consensus' and 'mutuality' represented in
the act of sharing can be directed by the ideology of the dominant class and narrowed
by the arbitrarily managerial interests of that class.
In recognition of these ethical biases brought about the managerialist
prescriptions, this thesis is aimed at providing a rich description of how the corporately
espoused morality can lead to other moral issues. Thus, I sustain some moral positions
from time to time with regard to the instances where managerialist prescriptions are
problematised. This stance of 'descriptive ethics' is an effort towards a dialectic of
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moral disputes. In denouncing the hypocrisy of managerial prescriptions, a dialectic of
moral disputes is incisive to pinpoint the truth effects embedded in the managerialist
prescriptions (Foucault, 1980). At the same time, it is reflective on any moral
prescriptions while it presents itself as an array of ethical judgements. In this sense, a
dialectic of moral disputes is congruent with Derrida's (1982) concept of 'difference' in
that ethical judgments are put to continuous reflections.
Accordingly, the moral stance of this thesis focuses on a critical reflection of
the process whereby the managerialist prescriptions are collectively conveyed through
the operation of the ethos of shared values. Relatedly, the thesis is also aimed at
contributing to a critique of the discipline of business ethics currently promulgated in
the U.S. and U.K. (Stark, 1993; Jones, 1994; Collier, 1994). A basic stance of this
thesis on 'ethicality' as a frame of reference for moral subjects' conduct is not fixed on
the conventional framework of unreflectively (or, directly) referring to such moral
constructs as utility, justice and right (Velasquez, et al., 1983). Rather, the stance is
centred on how they are corporately engineered in the managerial package of a new
managerialism. Indeed, the managerialist prescriptions are based upon the conventional
practice of unreflective recourse to a priori established ethical principles which reifies
ethics to fixed values. This conventional practice may result in the members' impotence
to apply ethical reasoning to the problems emerging from the day-to-day experiences in
the company, by displacing sensitivity to the critical moral issues with obedient
compliance to values fixed in power settings (Sturdy et al., 1992; 1-10).
Consequently, the critical and reflective competence to raise the competing
(ambivalent) views is marginalised from the moral subjects' authentic capacity for
moral reasoning. Recognising that consent is manufactured by the values fixed in
power settings requires a deeper analysis of the notion of sharing as an ethical




Shared 'values' or Shared 'expressions'
The notion of 'sharing' is indispensable to the conceptualisation of corporate
culture especially by culture 'pragmatists' (Martin, 1985) because it is believed to be
adequate for inducing employees' consent in virtue of its implied moral appeal.
Basically, the social conduct of sharing is quintessential to sustaining organised
activities in the company. For instance, in Marx's terms, the basic exchanges in work
organisations between labour power and wages are grounded on the social act of
sharing each partisan's resources in a reciprocal way. It is also implicative of'ethicality';
as soon as we question what is to be shared and how it is to be shared, it can be
ethically contested. Different views on what is to be shared leads to different ethical
claims. Moreover, different views on how the relations of sharing are constituted also
bring about different ethical claims. When this complex nature of 'sharing' and its
subsequent ethical claims are disregarded, an ethos of shared values as a tenet of
corporate culturism is degenerated into being totalitarian so as to ignore the other side
of sharing.
The mechanism of 'sharing' espoused by corporate culturism is geared to
engineering 'values'. As Willmott (1993) notes, a range of values to be engineered is
limitless so long as it is contributory to all-encompassing corporate performances
(efficiency, effectiveness, profitability, top-quality). This limitlessness of values has to
be efficiently controlled and hence the idea of 'corporate core values' come into play.
These values are principally initiated by top management and become to be
cornerstones for maintaining 'strong' corporate culture. The core corporate values are
given the power to guide employees' constitution of meanings through their working
lives. As Peters and Waterman (1982) articulate,
a set of shared values and rules about discipline, details and execution
can provide the framework in which practical autonomy takes place
routine.... The institution provides the guiding belief and creates a
sense of excitement, a sense of being a part of the best, a sense of
producing something of quality that is generally valued.
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The prescription above pretends to provide members with a supreme level of
autonomy as if a set of shared values can guarantee perfect freedom. But it conceals a
hazard of homogenised meaning in the name of'shared values'. As Willmott (1993)
argues in view of George Orwell's Nineteen Eight-Four, shared by the worlds of
newspeak and corporate culture is a totalitarian remedy for the resolution of
indeterminacy and ambiguity: thought control through uniform definition of meaning.
The implication is that employees are being subjugated to the uniformity of corporate
culture such that they are selected and promoted on the basis of their (perceived)
acceptance of, or receptivity to, the core values (ibid.; 525). In addition to such core
corporate values, the values sustained by employees are also the targets of corporate
culture programmers. The ways to engineer employees' sustained values are
understood to follow two steps. After imposing the corporate core values on the
employees' collective mind, corporate culturism seeks to exploit this consensus in
virtue of its legitimacy which is conferred in the name of 'culture'. Willmott (ibid.)
explicates this,
corporate culturism expects and requires employees to internalise the
new values of'quality', 'flexibility' and 'value-added' - to adopt and
cherish them as their own - so that, in principle, their uniquely human
powers ofjudgment and discretion are directed unequivocally towards
working methods that will deliver capital accumulation.
The employees' uniquely human powers of judgment and discretion are not
only their imputed values but also can control other values which they may cherish at
the same time. Because of this relation between the employees' imputed values,
corporate culturism is keen to direct such strategically significant values sustained by
employees. Along with the employees' powers of judgment and discretion, a moral
resource of responsibility is also used as a means for capital accumulation when, as
Thompson and McHugh (1990) argue, employees are encouraged to perceive their
performance and utility to the enterprise as their responsibility. Autonomy is also an
important value imputed to employees, which is seductive enough to be exploited by
corporate culturists and accordingly regarded as a good asset for their moral
prescriptions. Peters and Waterman (1982) emphasise the employees' value of
autonomy when they assert,
There was hardly a more pervasive theme in the excellent companies than
respect for the individual.... These companies give people control over
their destinies; they make meaning for people. They turn the average Joe
and the average Jane into winners. They let, even insist, that people
stick out.
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However, a 'politics of autonomy' is apt to make employees bewildered in a
mechanism of handling autonomy. Basically, corporate culture invites employees to
understand that identification with its values ensures their autonomy (Willmott, 1993).
At stake here is a capacity of employees to handle the autonomy bestowed upon them.
The 'politics of autonomy' is manifest when a strong culture is deemed to provide each
employee with the security of the 'sacred canopy' (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) by
establishing a few core values and hence minimizing the bewildering, anxiety-laden
experience of having to cope with an excess of autonomy (Willmott, ibid.). Indeed, a
few core values serve to guide the ways in which employees can handle their
autonomy. In turn, the employees are obliged to discipline themselves in controlling
their autonomy mainly in tune with such a few core values. This self-discipline is
geared to ensuring that the practical autonomy of employees is dedicated to the
realisation of core corporate values (Willmott, ibid.).
In summary, the corporate culturism seeks to engineer a range of values from
both corporate management and employees so long as the values are recognised to
contribute to differences in corporate performance. Whereas such values as efficiency,
productivity, profitability are the direct and tangible values to determine corporate
performance, such ethical values as autonomy, responsibility, judgment, discretion are
indirect and intangible values. Insofar as ethical values are calculated to be a good
asset for managerial prescriptions, they are attractive enough for corporate culture
programmers to harness them in a sophisticated way. In this vein, the mechanism of
self-discipline is expected to enable the employees to constitute their subjectivity by
efforts to identify with corporate core values. However, a question still remains
whether employees' efforts to identify with corporate core values are genuine or
instrumental. If employees consent to the corporate imposition of core values only to
maintain their membership and avoid excommunication, an explanation should be given
to the employee's strategic conduct of 'sharing' as compared with an acquiescent act of
sharing. As Willmott (ibid.) argues, instead of producing committed, enthusiastic,
self-disciplining subjects, a possible effect of corporate culturist programmes is a
reinforcement of instrumentality amongst employees who comply with corporate
demands without internalising their values.
The conduct lacking a deep identification with corporate core values may be
understood as selective, calculative compliance. In which case, employee behaviour is
(minimally) congruent with 'realising' the values of the corporation, but only insofar as
it is calculated that material and/or symbolic advantage can be gained from managing
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the appearance of consent (Willmott, ibid.)- Indeed, the corporately legitimated tenet
of'shared values' in the name of corporate culture is a discursive practice which may be
socially exploited both in an intended managerial prerogative and a calculative
employee consent (Sturdy et al., 1992). This claim is echoed by the sense that 'sharing'
has two essentially opposing concepts in one word: unite and divide. The Oxford
English Dictionary (1989) shows the following explanations of the word, 'share': (1) to
participate in (an action, activity, opinion, feeling, or condition); to perform, enjoy, or
suffer in common with others; to possess (a quality) which other persons or things also
have (2) to cut into parts, divided, cloven. This line of double-meaning is partly
endorsed by Bauman (1991: 6) when he says that belonging entails the awareness of
being together or 'being a part of; belonging, inevitably, contains the awareness of its
own uncertainty, of the possibility of isolation, of the need to stave off or overcome
alienation.
It is, therefore, conceivable that employees in the company, when they are
induced to share those corporately initiated values, employ their own strategic conduct
to confront them. Though the methods of strategic conduct may vary according to the
degree of perceived compulsion accompanied by the imposition of corporate core
values, the generally expected mode of reaction will be to share only 'expressions'
rather than the 'values' enacted upon them by corporate management. In the sense that
this strategic conduct is meant to evade the punitive sanction on the employees' failure
to commit to the 'values', the conduct of sharing 'expressions' is viewed to be a
measure for their existential needs. In the extreme case that the values are not
acceptable to them, their act of sharing 'expressions' deems to demonstrate their will
to resist the corporately espoused values. This contrasting act is more of a general
social action. As Cohen (1985:15) explicates this tension in terms of the contrast
between shared 'meanings' and shared 'symbols':
Such categories as justice, goodness, patriotism, duty, love, peace,
are almost impossible to spell out with precision. The attempt to do so
invariably generates argument, sometimes worse. But their range of
meanings can be glossed over in a commonly accepted symbol ~ precisely
because it allows its adherents to attach their own meanings to it.
They share the symbol, but do not necessarily share its
meanings. Community is just such a boundary-expressing
symbol. As a symbol, it is held in common by its members; but its
meaning varies with its members' unique orientations to it. In the face
of this variability of meaning, the consciousness of community has to be
kept alive through manipulation of its symbols, (emphasis added)
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It is a common social phenomenon in our social practices that social actors find
themselves remaining ambivalent on the values which are demanded to be shared. For
example, a social anthropologist who is eager to learn an alien language in a
premodern land and appreciate a variety of different customs and artifacts can find
himself/herself reluctant to actively identify with his/her research field. In this case, it is
not 'values' but 'expressions' such as language, customs, artifacts etc. which the
anthropologist can and do share. In the business firm in particular, such 'expressions' as
uniform, lip service, an appearance of observing a corporate code of ethics are likely to
be shared as a means to maintain the employees' membership for their self-preservation
in the company. As Willmott (1993) puts the matter, the distancing of self from
corporate values may be mediated by the strategic conduct of shared expressions as a
preferred means of preserving and asserting self-identity. Importantly, the strategic
conduct of sharing expressions can also be deployed even by the corporate
management. As is specified in the ethical value of 'autonomy' discussed above,
corporate management are not committed to securing the employees' job rights,
protectable by autonomy in organisational practices, such as discretion in decision
making etc. But, the corporate management's main concern is more likely to engineer
autonomy so that the employees' lack of capacity to handle their autonomy is
complemented and steered by the determinate power of the corporate management. To
the extent that corporate management as agents of corporate culture programmes are
not authentically committed to the ethical value of autonomy, all they share with their
employees is the moral expressions of autonomy. Here, it is of crucial importance,
therefore, to spell out that a yardstick by which to distinguish 'shared values' from
'shared expressions' is the extent to which social subjects do commit to their conduct of
sharing in terms of being both accountable to the consequences of sharing and
responsible even for the unintended consequences of sharing. This way of
conceptualising the conduct of sharing is to embody 'ethicality' embedded in the
conduct of sharing itself in that accountability and responsibility are of the essential
ethicality in the social conduct of sharing (Bauman, 1993; 250).
The notion of sharing 'expressions' may concern a broad range ofmatters from
the objects of sharing to the behaviour pattern of sharing itself. A uniform, badge,
official documents, corporate codes of conduct may pertain to the examples of objects
to be shared as expressions. These are connected with the specified ways of
engineering 'corporate culture': making presentations, sending "messages", running
"boot camp", writing papers, giving speeches, formulating and publishing the "rules",
even offering an "operating manual" (Kunda, 1992:7). More crucial is a notion of how
employees deploy the strategic conduct of sharing 'expressions' as a behaviour pattern.
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The employees' identity work, to maintain their self-identity as a refusal of being
identified with the corporate values, is a basic behaviour pattern of sharing
'expressions' to the extent that they are at least not committed to the imperatives of
'strong corporate culture'. The efforts to constitute their own unofficial culture (or
subculture) are expected to lead to a successful identity work. This is related with the
employees' own ways of defining the reality. As Kunda (1992:227) argues, the struggle
between organisations bent on normative control and individuals subjected to it is over
the definition of reality. Against the preponderance of the powerful to provide
employees with the means to interpret reality with reference to 'corporate core values',
the employees may attempt to develop their own ways to interpret reality.
Among the ways to interpret the reality is the circulation of phrases as shared
expressions. Given that 'accounts' other than the observable behaviours are the
important means by which to represent employees' competing value-standpoints, a
consideration of some particular mode of verbal accounts is of significance. It may take
on a form of idiomatic phrases by which the employees' collective attitudes to the
"company values" is aphoristically conveyed. Just as the employees are seduced to
minimise the anxiety-laden experience of having to cope with an excess of autonomy
by complying with a few core values (Willmott, 1993), so some core phrases may be
selectively coined and circulated by the members. Of significance is that these phrases
convey the members' ambivalence. The content of the phrases may carry an ethos of
shared core values, but simultaneously and markedly can imply a pejorative nuance.
More importantly, it may contain the elements of the members' inmost aspirations
which are banned under the totalitarian regime of monocultural values. Consequently,
the phrases are bound to be embroidered with mixed messages. This is, in a sense,
inevitable since the regime of corporate culture as the context for the constitution of
phrases is itself a sourcefiil arena of contradictory practices. As Willmott (1993)
explains,
Like the market that allows sellers of labour to believe in their
freedom, corporate culture invites employees to understand that
identification with its values ensures their autonomy. That is the
seductive doublethink of corporate culture: the simultaneous affirmation
and negation of the conditions of autonomy.... In Orwell's Oceania,
'freedom is slavery' and 'ignorance is strength'. In the world of
corporate culture, 'slavery is freedom' and 'strength is ignorance'.
The willingness and ability to circulate 'chosen phrases' is to confirm the
employees' belief that they have autonomy to define the reality according to their
competence. Contrary to this self-affirmative aspect of constituting the chosen phrases,
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it should be highlighted that the 'divisive' nature of sharing is accomplished through a
very intricate work of iteration and circulation of phrases through production and
reproduction of languages. That is, words are selected for rendering appropriate for
validating corporate core values. As a result, some expressions are allowed, and some
are not allowed to be shared or circulated. For instance, the managers in Watson's
(1994) ethnographic study were not allowed to share the word 'job'. Employees, in the
new scheme of things, were in 'skill grades' instead of 'jobs' and could be required to
carry out any task appropriate to their skill level. Hence, nobody 'owned' a job. To use
the term 'job' was to be slapped down by the injunction to 'wash your mouth out' (ibid.;
115). This practice of seclusion leads the managers to be passively complying with the
corporate values in the situated practices by marking off corporate identity as against
personal values. Surveillance over the use of words repeated in the managers'
day-to-day practices is to reinforce the top executive level's imposition of corporate
values upon the managers. In effect, management is partly done by surveillance over
the accounts through which the ways members share the corporate values are
monitored. Consequently, the surveillance mechanism becomes to be a more intelligent
monitoring to check when and where expressions related to the core corporate values
of quality and profit are 'displayed'.
The other behaviour pattern of shared 'expressions' is related with the effects of
the reification of roles. Role refers most generally to sets of prescribed activities
associated with particular institutionally defined positions. However, as Berger and
Luckman (1966:77) suggest, "To learn a role is not enough to acquire the routines
immediately necessary to its "outward" performance. One must also be initiated into
the various cognitive and even affective layers of the body of knowledge that is directly
and indirectly appropriate to this role". It follows that the reification of roles may have
tremendous influence on employees' subjective value judgment to the extent that it may
confine a range of the employees' action to a prescribed set of expectations upon the
role. Thus, the employees can legitimate their lack of concerns about the source of
unexpected consequences by recourse to such reified roles. Significantly, the reification
of roles can result in individuals abdicating responsibility —"I have no choice in the
matter, I am the ..." , "It is none of our department's business"— and taking action in
ways which are contrary to what they might, as moral subjects free from the bondage
of roles, feel are ethically right. This attitude of abdicating responsibility as the effect of
the reification of roles may hamper the company-spread plan of 'corporate culture' and
it becomes a structural limit of engineering 'strong corporate culture'. Especially when
the corporately espoused values are enacted chiefly through a strategic department of
the company, it may be the case that these values are not shared, but only the
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expressions are shared by the rest of the members in the company to the extent that
they are aware of, but not actively appreciative of, those values. As a result, the
estranged members' attitude to their work may be represented through a diversity of
particular behaviour patterns. For instance, the manufactured clerical consent in an
insurance company is reported to have led to the act of 'shifting' work which was
construed as 'escape into work' (Sturdy, 1992). The existential condition that the clerks
had to accomplish the target of work, irrespective of their competing views of the
company policies, resulted in such a passive behaviour pattern of adaptation. In which
case, the degree to which they shared only the expressions of the company policies was
exactly represented as a conduct of 'escape into work'. Eventually, role reification
brings about diverse behaviour patterns of sharing expressions.
Finally, employees' strategic conduct of sharing 'expressions' can be formed
around the pretense of 'as if as a behaviour pattern. Because the employees cannot
survive in the company while completely resisting the corporate core values, they can
pretend to share the values as if they are actively committed to those values. The
negative effect of this mode of conduct is self-deceptive. The excess of instrumental
compliance makes the employees lose the competence to criticise or resist the
prevailing system of cultural logic and accordingly acquiesce in it. As a consequence,
they are habituated to taking the reality defined by corporate cultural programmes for
granted as if it could be legitimated in every respect. This fetishism is likely to paralyse
the employees' competence of ethical judgment (Bauman, 1993).
In summary, a question of how the employees' efforts for identity work are
secured and obscured in the process whereby corporate values are enacted is central to
a reflection of moral prescriptions of corporate culturism. Simultaneously, the
possibility should also be recognised that if a sharing of expressions is directed and
narrowed by both corporate management and employees, then this is a condition of
possibility for the social manipulation of morality. For instance, the members can
accommodate an ethically relativistic attitude for the 'unintended consequences' on the
excuse of not sharing the values. Corporate culturism thus reproduces the conditions
of demoralisation and degradation for which it is presented as a remedy (Willmott,
1993). This subversion of 'moralisation' into 'demoralisation' as an outcome of cultural
engineering is meant to reveal some crucial discrepancies between front and backstage
where reciprocal interactions of subjects and social institutions are multifariously
represented in a political economy of sharing. As Law (1993) puts:
"The political economy of representation in enterprise has certain
peculiarities: in particular, it generates a deep division -- a
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particular expression of dualism -- between backstage and front.
Enterprise is a strategy that turns around a concern with results, with
what appears on stage. In the first instance it isn't too concerned with
how that performance is produced. But ~ there is a but ~ since agents
are said to be opportunistic, performances may dissimulate. Which means,
in turn, that it tends to become important to look backstage to see what
is 'really' going on. So it is that in enterprise a deep moral (epistemological)
division grows up between backstage and front. And so it is that mistrust
tends to fuel that division (p. 27)."
A questioning of how a moral division is constructed between official culture at
front and unofficial culture at backstage in a company leads to our next arguments.
The importance of next arguments is to help explicate the mechanism by which shared
expressions are corporately used in the context of new managerial practices.
Fragmentation, Distancing and Detachment
As was suggested in the prior section, the practice of 'division' as the opposite
side of sharing as unity was crucial in understanding the mechanism of sharing. The
practice of breaking off the united relations and practices is a common social act. As
Lyon (1994) contends, it is technologies that distance, and it is surveillance that divides
our social relations and practices. Detachment as a prevalent social phenomenon is also
discursively embedded in our social practices to the extent that the post-structuralists
problematise 'detachment' as an everyday feature of social conduct. It is salient
especially in the context of a business company in which the mode of managerial
practices to potentiate situations of coercion and domination is structurally produced
and reproduced. Accordingly, a critique of corporate culturism should be centred on
what has been displaced, excluded, made absent or silenced by corporate culturism
enacted in the business company in which the principle of 'divide and rule' is
dominant. This is so because the ironical self-contradiction of 'corporate culturism'
consists in the incompatibility of its espoused value of 'wholeness' with its resultant
actuality of 'fragmentation'. The discursiveness of this contradiction in the capitalist
mode of social production is endorsed by Bauman (1991) when he contends that
modernity prides itself on the fragmentation of the world as its foremost achievement.
Fragmentation is the prime source of its strength as he notes:
The danger inherent in present-day industrial society is a process of
becoming accustomed to moral indifference in regard to actions not
immediately related to one's own sphere of experience - the danger to be
traced to the capacity of that present-day industrial society to
extend inter-human distance to a point where moral responsibility and
moral inhibitions become inaudible (p. 64).
18
Arguably, the most organised form of fragmentation in industrial society seems
to be 'division of labour'. Braverman (1974: 82) pinpoints how the practice of
separation is brought about in a process of commodification of labour power. The uses
of labour power are no longer organised according to the needs and desires of those
who sell it, but rather according to the needs of its purchasers who are, primarily,
employers seeking to expand the value of their capital. When such whole personhood
of labour as implied in their needs and desires is reduced to the rational aspect of the
needs of employers, the irrational aspect of desires of labour becomes marginal. The
employers are likely to legitimise their rational choice of action by recourse to their
existential conditions to cope with the external challenges like market pressures. They
tend to assert that the irrational desires of labour is neither legitimate nor competent in
adapting to the power of uncontrollable variables; a subjection to the employers'
rationality of evil (Bauman, 1989: 202). The social division of labour has not only
fragmented the behavioural aspect of labour but, it can be argued, created conditions in
which desires attributable to labour's capacity of moral judgment are marginalised.
Consequently, the labour's capacity of moral judgment is simply regarded as 'amoral'
desires, being subject to the employers' expedient tactic of adiaphorising (to render the
consequences of actions incompatible with moral claims or judgments) the desires
(Bauman, 1991).
The mechanism of 'corporate culture' is also to undertake such fragmentation
when it organises the use of labour power according to the needs of its implementers,
disguising its organisation according to the needs and, particularly, the desires of
employees. In the name of expanding practical autonomy for employees and improving
organisational effectiveness, corporate culturism systematically suppresses ideas and
practices that might problematise the authority of core corporate values (Willmott,
1993). The competence ofmoral judgment, buttressed by the desires of the employees,
is also endangered to be made absent by the dominant authority of core corporate
values. As is illustrated in Kunda's (1992) study at Tech company, attempts to define
"company values" may well act to fragment and splinter and excite conflict both within
groups and within persons, rather than engineer a common culture. The formation of
such fragmentations may bring about a massive scale of the mediation of action, and of
the intermediary man - one who 'stands between me and my action, making it
impossible for me to experience it directly'. Indeed, an ethos of collective wholeness
endorsed by corporate culturism is fractured into the individuation of work
arrangement which is fuelled by a massive scale of the mediation of action. As Bauman
(1989:194) argues, the effect of this fracture is that minute division of labour, as well
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as the sheer length of the chain of acts that mediate between the initiative and its
tangible effects, exempt most - however decisive - constituents of the collective
venture from moral significance and scrutiny. Indeed, the distance caused by minute
division of labour through technologies escalates the deflection of moral responsibility
and increases the exemption of most constituents of the collective venture from moral
significance and scrutiny. This is a representative effect of demoralisation brought
about by a new managerialism in which the collective ethos of sharing, espoused by
corporate culturism, is in conflict with the distance caused by a surveillance mechanism
of'quality agenda' (Wilkinson and Willmott, 1995) which also espouses the collective
ethos of sharing.
I suggest that the practice of fragmentation is a social performance mediated by
the opposing actions of inclusion and exclusion. Organisation is the outcome of
strategic conduct of inclusion and exclusion. The engineering of 'strong' corporate
culture is also done in the mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. Though it deliberately
proclaims an ethic of commonality in virtue of shared values, there always remains the
possibility that only the corporately screened values are included and other competing
views are excluded. Douglas (1975) shows how notions of society need not rely on
'shared values' or 'shared meanings'. Instead Douglas points to the effects which are
sustained as a consequence of people's beliefs about shared values. Of principal
importance here is the effect of exclusion. The 'naturalness' of exclusion has also to be
asserted for its legitimacy. Whenever exclusion is operated to define a category of
outsiders, the segregated category tends to be accredited with a different nature.
Exclusion is always 'natural' as outer connections of action are effectively removed
from the field of vision (Munro, 1991). This 'naturalness' seems to be applicable to the
discourse of corporate culture. The companies of 'strong corporate culture' do not
qualify as moral mediators between the external society and the internal members
because they do not view themselves as part of a societal project. Instead corporate
culture turns inwards, mobilising against hostile environments by creating a feeling of
'us against the world' (Deal and Kennedy, 1982). The inner order is seen as a 'natural'
defence against the outer disorder to the extent that corporate culture significantly
seeks to substitute the company for a general society as the sacred realm. The tendency
of the company to turn inwards itself in a search for sacredness is symptomatic of a
lack of belief in any moral qualities of'outer environments', i.e. the complex social,
technical, economic and ideological web of which the companies are a part
(Dahler-Larsen, 1994). This symbolic separation of companies from societal projects is
indicative of coercive domination as Bauman (1990:2) argues that such an operation of
inclusion and exclusion is an act of violence perpetrated upon the world, and requires
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the support of a certain amount of coercion. Indeed, the moral prescriptions of
corporate culture which is characterised by normative control are crippled because
their legitimacy is pursued on the basis of coercive practices to include the corporate
values as sacred and exclude the competing societal values as profane.
Though the social practice of separation is mostly initiated and propelled by the
institutional power, the individual employees in the company may also be active in such
a practice of separation. As compared with the governance of the practice of
separation by the institutional power, the individual employees' practice of separation is
more likely to be congruent with the efforts to maintain their membership in the
company. Role distancing is a way of strategically preserving the individual employees'
identity apart from the demands of identification with the corporate core values. The
concept of role distance provides a sociological means of dealing with one type of
divergence between obligation and actual performance (Goffman, 1961). To the extent
that the person must play roles that contradict his self-conception, these roles will be
assigned 'role distance', together with mechanisms for demonstrating the lack of
personal involvement that the person feels when playing these roles. Goffman (ibid.)
argues that although the subordinate is careful not to threaten those who are, in a
sense, in charge of the situation, he may be just as careful to inject some expression to
show, for any who may care to see, that he is not capitulating completely to the work
arrangement in which he finds himself. Sullenness, muttering, irony, joking, and
sarcasm may all allow one to show that something of oneself lies outside the
constraints of the moment and outside the role (ibid.; 115).
However, the act of distancing role performers from the roles they play is a sort
of self-defensive device in that it is, in the end, another limited and passive strategy
which tends to confirm existing organisational structures and separate the individual
from the possibilities of reform inherent in social relations (Thompson and McHugh,
1990:336). This passivity is embodied in the role performers' defensive moral
arrangements in which they try to make a distance from the 'unintended consequences'
of their role distancing. They are entitled to make excuses for the unintended
consequences by claiming that they did not actively embrace the role because they did
not share the corporate values imposed on the role. Here the ethical issue becomes at
stake when the employees take intentionally the conduct of role distance to such an
extent as to delude their conscience by seriously distancing themselves from work
involvement. If that is the case, then their strategic conduct of role distance is ethically
unsound because it violates the minimally required level of loyalty to work specified in
the employment contract. In this extreme case, the intentionality of role distance is to
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be appropriating an ethic of employee right for identity work which is hoped to be
protected, at a minimum, by role distance. Given that 'role distance' arises out of
uneasy symbiosis between management and labour, it is conceivable that management
may also operate to distance themselves from labour.
'Expertise' is a method used by management to keep distance from labour and
simultaneously it is the effect of a corporately espoused ethos of shared values. For
instance, under a regime of sharing 'quality' as a corporate core value, the middle
management may try to create distance by enrolling 'quality' as an expertise to protect
themselves and their status (Munro, 1995; 146). Such a method is indeed a specifically
modern form of authority. Bauman (1989: 196) argues that the essence of expertise is
the assumption that doing things properly requires certain knowledge, that such
knowledge is distributed unevenly, that some persons possess more of it than others,
that those who possess it ought to be in charge of doing things, and that being in
charge places upon them the responsibility for how things are being done. Bauman
goes on to note,
In fact, the responsibility is seen as vested not in the experts, but
in the skills they represent. The actors serve as mere agents of
knowledge, as bearers of the 'know-how', and their personal
responsibility rests entirely in representing knowledge properly, that
is in doing things according to the 'state of the art', to the best of
what extant knowledge can offer. For those who do not possess the know-
how, responsible action means following the advice of the experts. In
the process, personal responsibility dissolves in the abstract authority
of technical know-how.
Only the values congruous to technical know-how are legitimately moralised by
the claim that they are capable of providing the followers with the advice of the
experts. The senior managers as agents of corporate culture are obliged to serve its
inculcation by including the expressions acceptable for the credo of corporate culture
and excluding the unacceptables. As Willmott (1993) argues, such technical
know-hows of management as from human relations and theory Y are fused in
corporate culturism by advocating a systematic approach to creating and strengthening
core corporate values in a way that excludes (through attention to recruitment) and
eliminates (through training) all other values. In this process, the essence ofmanagerial
expertise intrinsic to the management ideas is detached and in turn is extrinsically
transformed into authority of technical know-how in which personal responsibility
dissolves. When faced with the contingencies of unintended consequences, the
non-experts are bound to make excuses by claiming that they only had to follow the
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advice of the experts. Excuses are conveniently produced and reproduced as distanced
from a fair level of personal accountability.
In short, the core values of corporate culture are detached from their intrinsic
nature and, in turn, are extrinsically exploited as a means for extracting the surplus
from labour and for flexible accumulation (Harvey, 1989). This move brings about the
detachment effect in that the intentionality of such core values is questioned and
resisted by employees. Detachment of core values is facilitated by the medium of
shared expressions. The detachment effects tend to be structurally fortified within a
frame of'moral man and immoral society' (Niebuhr, 1946). Because the employees are
ordered to comply with the utilitarian ethic represented through corporate core values,
their subjectivity as moral beings is bound to be constrained by the institutional power
which obscures the individual employees' personal morality. Indeed, morality is so
vulnerable as to be in diverse ways distorted and manipulated.
Social Manipulation of Morality
The arguments advanced in the prior two sections highlighted the dual nature
of 'sharing'; its front of 'unity' and its backstage of 'division'. I pointed out the
conditions of possibility that morality is appropriated by all the stakeholders like
corporate culture programmers, labour, managers, and intermediate experts to
implement the programmes. Expertise was seen to mediate this corporate
appropriation ofmorality, bringing about the fragments ofmorality. This understanding
raises a need to make a contrast between the conventional normative stance to business
ethics and the ways in which morality is engineered for subjection to the specific
purposes of the stakeholders, viz. manipulation. The notion of 'manipulation' which is
deployed here is defined in the Oxford dictionary:
(1) to control, manage, or play upon by artful, unfair, or insidious means esp. to one's
own advantage;
(2) to change by artful or unfair means so as to serve one's purpose; to adapt or
change (accounts, figures, etc) to suit one's purpose or advantage.
These definitions indicate that the ends can rationalise the means used to
acquire the ends. In this vein, the discourse of corporate culture is also recognised to
be a means to serve the ends of enhancing a level of corporate performance and
managing the corporate image to the public. However, the tension arises from the
inconsistencies between the employees' perception of fairness associated with
corporate culture within the company and the public's recognition of the corporate
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image as a moral crusade. That is, the company's reputation for maintaining highly
integrated moral standards within the company can be exploited as impression
management tactics to win the external constituents' favours. This contradictory
disguise is disputed by Willmott (1992) when he criticises the dual nature of
'excellence' literature which strengthens corporate culture by selectively deploying such
postmodernistic qualities as 'playful', 'anarchy', 'indeterminacy'. He goes on to contend
that postmodern values would be celebrated as ends rather than deployed and
evaluated primarily as means (ibid.; 66-7). For instance, corporate culture protagonists
allege that practical autonomy is granted to employees by virtue of shared values. But,
if the practical autonomy is deployed as means rather than as ends, it can amplify the
chances to manipulate morality compared with the situations where a hierarchical order
is strictly in control.
Bauman (1991:7) argues that existence is modern insofar as it is effected and
sustained by design, manipulation, management, and engineering. In relation to the
discourse of corporate culture, these four conceptual entities may be re-assembled with
locating manipulation in the centre. Design, management and engineering are all
susceptible to manipulation. As Kunda (1992) argues in his ethnography of the strong
corporate cultures in a high-tech company, designs of 'strong corporate culture' by the
management experts of culture engineering eventually brought about the manipulative
forms of normative control. Indeed, the practice ofmanipulating morality can take on
diverse forms. Because manipulation of morality is basically predicated on the moral
subjects' expedient attitude to the authenticity of morality, it is important to explore
more tacit ways in which morality is marginalised and made absent in its due course of
presence. As distinct from moral manipulation, these ways can be construed as "moral
neutralisation" but it is important to note that they are also conducive to the moral
manipulation in an indirect way.
The attitude of "moral neutralisation" is to treat actions as incompatible with
moral concerns and is thus an implicit way in which morality is silenced and
marginalised. Vitell and Grove (1987) investigate the tools which are prevalently
employed by unethical marketing practitioners to justify their norm-violating behaviour
in special circumstances. This tool, labelled the techniques of 'neutralisation', provides
how individuals soften or eliminate the impact that their norm violating behaviour
might have upon their self-concept and social relationships. In the arena of business,
the techniques of neutralisation concept offers a vehicle for understanding how
corporate executives, line employees, sales representatives and local merchants
develop and utilise arguments to exonerate themselves from self and social criticism
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concerning "unethical" business practices. Vitell and Grove list four techniques of
neutralisation as follows. Denial of Injury — wherein individuals contend that their
norm violating behaviour is not really serious, since no party directly suffers because of
it; for example, one might comment, "What's the big deal? No one was hurt." Denial
of Victim — wherein individuals counter any blame for their actions by arguing that the
violated party deserved whatever happened; for instance, one might relate, "If they're
foolish enough to believe that, it's their own fault they were taken advantage of'. This
could be said about the consumers who bought a company's product. Condemning the
Condemners — wherein individuals deflect moral condemnation to those ridiculing
them by pointing out that they engage in similar disapproved behaviour; a typical
example might be, "I was only doing what others do all the time". Appeal to Higher
Loyalties — wherein individuals argue that their norm violating behaviour is the
by-product of their attempt to actualise a higher order ideal or value; here, a typical
comment might be, "I did it because it was better for all concerned". An important
idea to keep in mind with respect to the techniques ofmoral neutralisation is that they
are learned and socially reinforced responses which are capable of making one's
inappropriate behaviour seem acceptable or excusable. A 'norm of evasion' which
exists for nearly every norm mediates the techniques of neutralisation, which one may
call upon in order to avoid the moral imperatives associated with the norm and/or the
reproach that can be expected from its violation (Akers, 1977). The techniques of
neutralisation are a means of utilising generally but covertly accepted arguments to
justify one's norm violating behaviour in special circumstances. In short, they are no
longer 'neutral'.
Arguing that all social organisation consists in neutralising the disruptive and
deregulating impact of moral behaviour, Bauman (1990; 29) provides for sociological
accounts of the people's act of neutralising morality. He contends that this effect is
achieved through a number of complementary arrangements taking place in the process
of modernisation which the growing separation between reason and morality
characterises. These complementary arrangements seem to be helpful in understanding
the ways in which moral subjects cannot but divest themselves of the capacity ofmoral
judgment. Drawing heavily upon Bauman's (1990) argument, I discuss the
complementary arrangements below.
The first arrangement is made possible by stretching the distance between
action and its consequences beyond the reach of moral limit. The fragmented labour in
the assembly lines illustrates this case of distance between action and its consequences.
In this regime, the major achievement of action is assessed in the hierarchy of
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command and execution. Once placed in the 'agentic state' and separated from both the
intention-conscious sources and the ultimate effects of action by a chain of mediators,
the actors seldom face the moment of choice and gaze at the consequences of their
deeds. More importantly, they hardly ever apprehend what they gaze at as the
consequences of their deeds. As each action is both mediated and merely mediating,
the suspicion of a causal link is convincingly dismissed through theorising the evidence
as an 'unanticipated consequence', or at any rate the 'unintended result' of a morally
neutral act — as a fault of 'reason' rather than 'ethical failure'. This implies that the
'unintended result' could have been predicted by adherence to ethical guidelines.
The second arrangement could be best described as the 'effacing of the face'.
Whereas the first arrangement to neutralise moral behaviour focuses on the
consequences of action, the second arrangement focuses on the objects of moral
judgment. It consists in exempting some 'others' from the class of potential objects of
moral judgment, of potential 'faces'. That is, it evicts them from the class of beings that
may potentially confront the actor as a 'face'. This effect is brought about through the
classifying of selected groups among the subjects of action which can be evaluated
solely in terms of their technical, instrumental value. For instance, a core group of
technicians involved in a crucial project of technology can be protected to the extent
that the resources of their action are evaluated solely in terms of their technical,
instrumental value. This leads to the removal of the core group of technicians from
routine human encounter in which their face might become visible and glare as a moral
demand. In which case the limiting impact of moral responsibility for the other is
suspended and rendered ineffective.
The third arrangement concerns the attitude with which one acts upon the
other. It is recognised to destroy the object of action as a self. The object has been
dissembled into traits; the totality of the moral subject has been reduced to the
collection of parts or attributes of which no one can conceivably be ascribed moral
subjectivity. Actions are then targeted on specific units of the set, by-passing or
avoiding altogether the moment of encounter with morally significant effects. It had
been this reality of social organisation that was articulated in the postulate of
philosophical reductionism promoted by logical positivism: to demonstrate that entity
P can be reduced to entities x, y and z entails the deduction that P is 'nothing but' the
assembly of x, y and z (Bauman, ibid.). No wonder morality was one of the first
victims of logical-positivist reductionist zest as Law (1993; 12) argues that
reductionism often, perhaps usually, makes distinctions that may come to look
strangely like dualisms. For example, when the employees of a company address
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themselves as businessmen to their clients, they are likely to reduce the clients to the
collection of attributes which will bring profits to the company. Or when the board of
directors address themselves to the shareholders, they tend to reduce the shareholders
to the collection of attributes in terms of investing their money in the company and
expecting the dividend as a reciprocal reward. In both cases, that which is missing is
the moral subjectivity of clients and shareholders with a deep concern about whether
the company is running their money in an ethically acceptable way or not. This
impersonal, fragmented nature of share ownership is the case of destroying the object
of action as a self.
In contrast to "moral neutralisation", the act of "moral manipulation" suggests
that morality is intentionally 'engineered' and 'exploited' by certain interest groups or
individuals for their supposedly amoral interests. Because meaning is by nature
alienable, movable, manipulable (McCracken, 1986), moral values as meanings can
function instrumentally for the utilities like corporate performance, impression
management, etc. As Burrell and Morgan (1979) put when classifying the
organisational action in terms of organisation theory and anti-organisation theory,
'purposive rationality' enshrined in the organisation theory is the dominant and most
valued mode of cognition within organisational contexts. The traditional organisational
rationale has fostered the instrumental value of any action to attain pre-established
purposes. Contra this instrumental rationality, the anti-organisation theory celebrates
and espouses 'value rationality'. In this vein, any ethical conduct within the terrain of
organisational theory is to be directed at some utilitarian purposes. Ethical conduct is
not respected for itself; rather it is appropriated in a corporate way.
The agents' interest in manipulating morality can also be expressed in their
concerns about 'impression management'. The study of social mechanism by which
people manage their impressions on the others in social relations has been done mainly
in the field of organisational psychology. An appreciation for impression management
influences on justice behaviour followed in the 1970s as theorists began to conceive of
justice as a social norm. Writing on this topic, Greenberg and Cohen (1982) argue that
many acts performed in the name of fairness actually may be motivated by the desire to
attain other goals - what may be called instrumental acts. Drawing a parallel to
prosocial behaviours which are not necessarily motivated by an underlying concern for
altruism, Greenberg and Cohen posit that ostensibly fair behaviours may not
necessarily be motivated by an ultimate concern for justice. Justice may be a
penultimate state on the way to an ultimate goal (Greenberg, 1986). Leventhal (1976)
articulates this point clearly when he asserts;
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it is likely that an allocator who distributes rewards equitably does so
more because he desires to maximise long-term productivity than because
he desires to comply with an abstract standard ofjustice. His decisions
are based on an expectancy that equitable distributions of reward will
elicit and sustain high levels ofmotivation and performance.
As such, he distinguishes between acts motivated out of a concern for justice
per se, "fair behaviour" and those derived from other motives, "quasi-fair behaviour"
(Leventhal, 1980). The possibility that the justice-restoring effects of an action may be
epipehnomenal, motivated apart from moral or ethical considerations, is basic to the
argument of impression management that people may internalise expectations about
the effects of behaving fairly, and do so in order to meet these expectations. In other
words, justice may be "used" as a mechanism for attaining other goals. Given the
general tendency for people to attribute desirable characteristics to themselves (Miller
and Ross, 1975), such self-serving perceptions of one's own fairness may be taken as
evidence of the social desirability of fair identities. The most direct evidence of fairness
as a desired identity in organisations is provided by Greenberg's (1988) survey of 815
managers. The result is a clear indication of a degree of sincerity of the managers'
current attitude on an ethic of fairness. Participants were asked two sets of questions:
one set inquiring how concerned they were about actually being fair on the job, and
another set asking how concerned they were about appearing to be fair on the job. It
was found that the managers expressed greater concern about appearing to be fair than
actually being fair. Moreover, the two sets of questions were not significantly
correlated with each other, suggesting that managers distinguished between "looking
fair" and "being fair". If this attitude of managers was socially learned at their work,
an appreciation for the structural causes for "looking fair" invites a critical reflection on
the sham of capitalist social relations of production. For instance, the case that
'fairness' is engineered as a shared moral value in the name of corporate culture must
have impelled the managers to "look fair" at least so that they appear to share the
moral value of'fairness'.
The impression management studies contribute to a broad understanding of
people's moral conduct by positing that people may strive to attain the benefits ofbeing
recognised as fair, but without actually behaving fairly. Such self-promotions of
fairness lacking in substance may be referred to as 'hollow justice'. Any mere "veneer
fairness" may function as effectively as any more deeply-rooted concern for moral
righteousness as long as it is not officially perceived to be manipulative. Indeed,
fairness is a socially constructed reality which is a desired label that people seek to
attach to their behaviours (Greenberg, 1990; 139). The pervasiveness of people's
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pursuit for 'looking fair' induces them to partake of a collective complicity by
appearing to share 'fairness' or employing impression management tactics. This is
salient especially in the scheme of corporate culture where normative control is
harmonised with a readiness of members who maintain a moral attachment (Kunda,
1992:243). Consequently, the effect of this collective complicity is to produce a
hypocritical culture amongst the members, inducing their moral cynicism.
The other typical mode ofmanipulating morality is to resort to 'norms' as the
obligatory force. As Kunda's (1992) study of Tech corporate culture illustrates, the
elements of corporate culture agenda are aimed at a normative control by elevating
them as norms within the company. To the extent that the ethos of corporate culture is
generated within the company and preserved in distinction from the influence of a
general society (Dahler-Larsen, 1994), the obligatory force of the ethos of corporate
culture can be an impetus for manipulating moral values. Insofar as it is considered by
members to be a unique set of norms for governing their conduct and soul (Rose,
1989), a replacement of general social norms with a particular corporate morality
engineered by corporate core values becomes effective for managing the members.
However, if the norms are destined to serve the preservation of the identity of any
particular company which sustains its binding force through socialisation and punitive
sanctions, the realm of democratic individuality (Gilbert, 1990) will be relatively
narrowed and inflicted by the predatory power of norms. In this vein, the sovereignty
of corporate culture over its members as well as its contenders is legitimised on the
premise that the sovereignty of corporate culture is more powerful than that of society
in general because corporate culture is enforced by its differentiation from the society
(Dahler-Larsen, 1994).
However, legitimising the sovereignty of corporate culture as the norm may
produce self-contradictory traps. When individuals are content with relying upon the
sovereignty of corporate culture as a reliable greater power, the moral hazard is that
they are indulged in the habitual practice of attributing the outcome of personal
wrongdoings not to themselves but to the sovereignty of corporate culture. Indeed, a
normative control by recourse to engineering a corporate culture is most likely to
result in unintended consequences which are in turn morally problematic in terms of
the members' collective egoistic attitude to the unintended consequences. Here,
Kelley's (1967) attribution theory is more than illuminating. According to Kelley,
'consensus' as an attributional cue indicates whether all the persons engaged in
behavioural responses to a certain situation respond in the same manner or not. When
the degree of consensus is high, they tend to attribute the unintended consequences to
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external factors rather than internal factors. This indicates that a construction of
'consensus' by means of corporate culture (Willmott, 1993) may lead members to
partake in a complicity to exploit an ethic of consensus in the name of corporate
culture in order to secure a 'safe haven' where they are exempted from any
responsibility for the unintended consequences.
Manipulativeness of morality can also be instantiated in the contingencies of
delineating boundaries. Indeed, the social act of'sharing' is a social mechanism used as
a means by which to set the boundaries to effectively maintain the organised activities.
However, as Bauman (1991: 14) argues, the act of'sharing' is an exercise of power and
at the same time its disguise. As in most of the social mechanisms to be used for
ordering the organised activities, 'sharing' is also imbued with and buttressed by a
certain degree of moral calculations. Though no act of'sharing' would hold without the
power to set apart and cast aside, it creates an illusion of symmetry. The sham
symmetry of results conceals the asymmetry of power that is its cause. The ethos of
'sharing', espoused by corporate culture, represents its members as equal and
interchangeable. However, this representation may only be an artificial appearance of
egalitarianism which conceals the reality of 'fragmentation' and 'inequalities' (and
'injustices'). This is particularly important for the circumstances which make it
necessary for people to behave as if they were equal and the values were equally
shared. Cohen (1985:33-36) contends that the pragmatic egalitarianism becomes also a
rhetorical expression of the integrity of the community. It is the presentation to the
outside world of the common interests of the members of the community. As such, it
bears the characteristic hallmark of communication between different levels of the
community; namely, simplification. Thus, when a simplified position is stated 'on behalf
of a community - 'we want...' 'we think...' - it implies a generality of view tantamount
to the expression of sameness, of equality. The myth of egalitarianism functions as a
symbolic means through which communities contrive communal boundaries with the
product of seclusion behind them. As Cohen (1985:35) puts:
Further, the expression of egalitarianism across the boundary may often
also be a means by which the community expresses its difference from
those elsewhere. Its members may denigrate the disparities ofwealth and
power, or the competitiveness which they perceive elsewhere, to justify
and give value to their espousal of equality. This, also, is a way of
giving vitality to the boundary.
An ethic of egalitarianism may be degenerated into a dogma by which the
members' competing views are to be silenced. I argue that the moral limit of corporate
culturism consists in a contradictory process whereby the ethos of 'shared values' is
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disguised in the name of egalitarianism. A sham egalitarian practice of sharing is
appropriated for the purpose of maintaining the pragmatic distinctiveness of a 'strong'
corporate culture from other competitive firms. It is characteristic of communal
boundaries of a company with 'strong' corporate culture. Given that the silencing of
members' competing views is legitimised by the 'excellence' in terms of
all-encompassing corporate performance, a sham ethic of egalitarianism is likely to be
endorsed by utilitarianism. For, as Poole (1991 ;9) notes, utilitarianism strictly enjoins
us to count all subjects of happiness and pain as equal, and not to give particular
consideration to those near and dear to us. Utilitarian morality is as impersonal as the
market in its distribution of rewards and punishments. So long as such new
managerialist discourses as corporate culture (and FIRM/TQM) programmes seek to
'immerse employees in the "logic" of the market' (Wilkinson et al., 1991), the
managerial intentions to enact morality for utilitarian purposes should be contested
against a critique of'social manipulation ofmorality'.
In summary, morality is socially manipulated by a mechanism to produce
social conformity and obedience to a prevailing system of inequalities and existing
power relations. Power is, thus, understood to come more from the mechanism that
morality is socially manipulated than from the distribution of knowledge (cf. Barnes,
1988). For power can be substantially exerted, in the long run, on the basis of'consent'
and 'approval' from the part on which power is exerted. Given that, those in power can
obtain the legitimacy in exerting power on the grounds of mutually recognised
morality; that is, power comes from the mutual admittance of moral grounds between
the subjects engaged in the exertion of power. However, a problem arises from the
situation that those who are conferred the legitimacy to exert power are so greedy for
more power as to make attempts to manipulate morality for other purposes. This is
most salient in the business firms where morality is systematically susceptible to the
corporate appropriation.
Conclusion
The social act of sharing is indeed a complicated mechanism which
incorporates the opposing aspects: untity and division. Though the front of shared
values endorses 'unity' between corporate management and employees, the reality at
the backstage of sharing is full of division between them. The strategic act of sharing
expressions is seen to mediate the work of division because the expressions are volatile
and thus vulnerable to arbitrary appropriation. The expressions are typical of corporate
appropriation of morality because they are shared only insofar as they contribute to
the implementation of corporate core values. Though the other aspect of the strategic
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act of sharing expressions is anticipated to serve the members' identity work grounded
on their competing views, this aspect of shared expressions is more likely to be
subdued by the imperatives of new managerial discourses in the capitalist relations of
production. A recognition that the corporate appropriation ofmorality is harnessed by
the sustained myth of shared values requires a deeper reflection on the notion of shared
values at both conceptual and empirical levels, to which we now turn.
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CHAPTER 3
REFLECTIONS ON SHARED VALUES
Introduction
Chapter 2 discussed a main tenet of a new managerialism, epitomised as an
ethos of 'shared values' which is espoused by corporate culturism, in particular. I
suggested that the notion of shared values was problematic in that employees might be
ambivalent on the corporate core values and consequently reluctant to assume
responsibility for the unintended consequences of appearing to share values. Thus, it
was noted that only expressions of values might be shared in diverse ways. This
recognition is viewed to be complementary for an epistemological difficulty in knowing
the extent to which the corporate values are shared. Thus, any appearance of sharing
values has to be explained because it may convey a considerable extent of ethical
implications. Especially, it is significant that if a sharing of expressions can be directed
and narrowed in particular ways, then this is a condition of possibility for the social
manipulation of morality. Importantly, both corporate management and employees are
understood to partake in a complicity to direct and narrow the shared expressions such
that the shared expressions are detached from the properties associated with the values
and attached to such extrinsic purposes as all-encompassing corporate performance.
In this Chapter, the notion of shared values is critically reflected in its
conceptual and empirical levels. I suggest that the corporate core values direct
employees' activities and consequently compress their range of action. I also argue that
the members' moral conduct is affected by the ways in which the consensual feature of
cultural manifestations of a company are exploited by corporate management. This is
so because the collective beliefs formed through the 'consensual' feature of corporate
culture may have a crucial influence on individual members' moral choice. This
argument is predicated on the fact that organisational factors often create impediments
to individual ethical behaviour. Socialisation processes, environmental influences, and
hierarchical relationships collectively constitute a "stacked deck", which impedes
individual ethical behaviour (Smith and Carroll, 1984).
The notion of shared values is also reflected with respect to the discourse of
business ethics. I argue that moral prescriptions of business ethics are seriously
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problematic when they are encapsulated in the corporate culture programmes. These
prescriptions are not substantial at all because they do not recognise the corporate
pressures which are in force within a company. Indeed, the sham of shared values is
problematic especially in respect of its ethical problems which might emerge in the
process through which the ethos of shared values is enacted. To understand the ethical
problems embedded in the collective beliefs of shared values requires primarily a
recognition of the use of 'culture' concept in the business arena and its ethical
implications.
Use of'the Culture Concept' and Ethics
There have been many controversies over the academic associations between
anthropology and organisation studies. Wright (1994;2) summarises them in four ways.
First, it refers to problems of managing companies with production processes or
service outlets distributed across the globe, each located in a different 'national culture'.
Second, it is used when management is trying to integrate people with different
ethnicities into a workforce in one plant. Third, it can mean the informal 'concepts,
attitudes and values' of a workforce; or fourth, 'company culture' can refer to the
formal organisational values and practices imposed by management as a 'glue' to hold
the workforce together and to make it capable of responding as a body to fast
changing and global competition (Deal and Kennedy, 1982). However, this kind of
functional importation of 'the culture concept' is largely confined to the managerial
facility and the claim to 'culture' in companies is itself for managerial ideology. The
intrinsic nature of culture is detached and appropriated for other extrinsic utilities like
'impression management' (Greenberg, 1990) and 'corporate performance' (Kunda,
1992). That is, the notion of shared values as a central attribute of the culture concept
is open to diverse ways of being appropriated mainly for managerial prerogatives.
These diverse ways are also bound to be ethically problematised because the social act
of sharing implies essentially such ethical claims as distributive justice, employees' job
rights, discrimination and so on.
It is common that organisation theorists conceive of culture as symbols of rules
and decisions and take culture to be a 'deeper' system of meaning 'underlying' and
'informing' these surface interactions. For example, Morgan (1986;133) argues that
the slogans, evocative language, symbols, stories, myths, ceremonies,
rituals, and patterns of ritual behaviour that decorate the surfaces of
organisational life merely give clues to the existence of a much deeper
and all pervasive system ofmeaning.
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However, the conventional concepts of culture lose sight of the ways in which
culture as a 'deeper' system of meaning is used by culture programmers. They also
overlook the ways in which the use of meanings is ethically problematised because
meaning is manipulable (McCracken, 1986). Though most of organisation theorists
conceptualise organisational culture principally as shared values, they tend to disregard
the moral and ethical implications involved in the effects of the imperatives of shared
values. To the extent that individual members seek to share the legitimacy conferred
upon cultural properties in order to justify their conduct, the individual members'
strategic conduct to draw upon cultural properties comes to entail ethical import. That
which marks a difference from Giddens' (1984;288) argument for actors' drawing upon
structural properties consists in the fact that social actors' drawing upon cultural
properties is deep-rooted and more pervasive such that its effects take on a binding
force on the actors' subsequent actions. As distinct from the structural properties
changeable from time to time, the use of cultural properties is likely to be taken for
granted in individual members' everyday practices in the organisation by virtue of the
pre-legitimation conferred upon the cultural properties. This indicates two crucial
points; a reason why the use of 'culture concept' is so appealing to the corporate
management that are preoccupied with developing effective ways to manage labour
power, and a context in which the practices associated with the use of the culture
concept are put to moral scrutiny.
In this vein, among a diverse range of ways to conceptualise "culture", some
peculiar features which I highlight are considered as epistemological aspects of
"cultural dynamics". They are aimed at clarifying the ethical import embedded in the
notion of shared values as a tenet of corporate culturism. First, a particular attention is
given to the collective meaning which is expected to be shared by people in
organisations in the name of culture. It is usual that the collective meaning is
institutionally enforced by reference to societal meaning systems. For instance, a
cultural feature of 'patriarchy' in organisations is likely to be reinforced as a collective
meaning because it is socially protected and endorsed at a societal level. Likewise,
sharing the collective meaning can often take on a compulsive characteristic. Thus,
when the collective meaning is so compelling as to impinge on individual rights, the
cultural justification of collective meaning becomes ethically contested by the
individuals whose rights are abridged. Second, culture is likely to be treated as
taken-for-granted. Because it is generally assumed to be shared by members of a
community, its truthfulness is a priori defined and is hardly challenged. As a result, any
serious reflection on its naturalised cultural premise is refused. This is doomed to
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suppress the opposing views of the naturalised cultural premise and neutralise the
competing moral claims by privileging a priori defined truthfulness of cultural premise
ahead of any competing moral claims.
Third, cultures are not so much what they are as what they are believed to
6e...(Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992;96). That is, cultural properties are internalised in the
members' minds and reified as thought patterns. This makes the interpretations of
culture vary according to their beliefs. Once the interpretation of cultural properties is
fixated at one way, the actions accompanied are taken as if it were the right way of
defining the reality. However, an ethical reflection should be made on the process in
which the members' belief in, and interpretation of, the cultural properties are
constituted. For the members' belief system in the cultural properties is most likely to
induce ethical issues because their irrational belief system may make them lose a
balanced sense of judgment. The unethical judgments are often due to the members'
disposition to stick to their beliefs in the cultural properties. Fourth, the meanings
constituted through the members' interpretation of cultural properties are eventually
bound to have a binding force to dominate the members' conduct. It is the case that
the power of dominant culture is concretised in its compelling ways of defining a
reality and driving the members' conduct. Consequently, each member's individual
difference is obliged to be subjected to the cultural collectivity. The surrender of
individuality to cultural collectivity comes to problematise the ethical import embedded
in cultural dynamics. For instance, each employee's job right can be divested because of
the pressure of group concomitance. Central to my argument of culture is, therefore,
the power of culture which imposes its collective meaning on individuals and exerts a
binding force. This can be referred to as "cultural effects". Because these cultural
effects are seen to stem from the myth of cultural integration reified in the name of
corporate ethos, an appreciation for the myth of cultural integration seems at stake.
Myth ofCultural Integration: Manipulated Consensus
Various efforts have been made to classify a vast body of literature on
organisation (or, corporate) culture into a framework. For instance, Smircich's (1983)
framework concerned with meta-theoretical assumptions and Allaire and Firsirotu's
(1984) framework focused on anthropological school are oriented to the classification
of ideational aspects of culture. By contrast, Filby's (1989) framework concerned with
Habermas' cognitive human interests and Parker's (1995) framework revolving around
Burrell and Morgan's (1979) typology of'sociological and organisational paradigms'
are more oriented to the practicalities of culture emerging from the social class
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confrontations. Though Deetz (1985) suggests the importance of ethical considerations
in cultural research on organisations, most of the frameworks do not delve into the
moral and ethical import of cultural manifestations in organisations. However, it is safe
to say that moral and ethical issues underlie most of the frameworks at least in their
implicit assumptions and classificatory rationale. Filby's (1989) struggle for
emancipatory capacity of organisational culture and Parker's (1995) building up of a
theory of organisational culture in alignment with such organisational paradigms as
'radical humanism' and 'radical structuralism', are recognised to imply the concerns with
how inequalities in the social relations of production are constructed. This is so partly
because the radical humanist thought presents an approach for understanding and
confronting the moral codes which underwrite modes of organisational life, posing
organisational choice as as much a problem of moral principle as it is of technique
(Morgan, 1990;23). Indeed, among a diversity of approaches for 'understanding' and
'confronting' the moral codes which underwrite modes of organisational life, what is
highlighted in this Chapter is the moral problems of corporate culturism which is in the
main based on the 'consensual' feature of cultural dynamics.
It is plausible that members in a company acquire some motivating forces from
the common features by which they can identify with their colleagues and even the
company itself. When the members organise their working lives, the consensual
features in their organisational experiences are frequently referred to. Thus, the
commonality is regarded as an organising principle. It is this integrative function that
has attracted the corporate management's attention to a concept of culture as an
unfailing management tool. The merit of corporate culture which allured the interests
of corporate leaders is a synergy effect drawn upon the collective nature of culture.
This aspect of allurement is not nascent in the corporate culturism. As Parker (1995)
traces the origin of'in search of culture' back to Weber, Taylor, Human Relations, the
origin can be found even in Marx. Marx (1972) recognised that one source of surplus
value was hidden in supra-individual level: 'What the capitalist pays is the values of the
separate labour powers of a hundred individuals, not the value of their combined
labour power'. In his view, the severity of the problem of exploitation was complicated
and compounded by its collective nature (Knights et al., 1994). Given that the
capitalist can reap the surplus value from the combined labour, he becomes eager to
deploy every way to collectivise the separate labour power. And the way of
engineering culture fits nicely with the capitalist's demands. However, as much as it is
managerially fascinating, so it leaves a good deal of ethical problems.
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Apparently, the culture concept has been necessarily employed to accord the
significance of integrating the conflictive interests in social system like business firms.
However, as Archer (1988) contends, the strategic manoeuvre of the concept of
culture as a means of social integration and system integration should be seriously
problematised. Pointing out that culture has rarely been viewed as something
susceptible to malintegration, she argues that instead there has been a pervasive myth
of cultural integration, appropriated by sociology from early anthropology, which
perpetuates an image of culture as a coherent pattern, a uniform ethos or a
symbolically consistent universe. And the myth created an archetype of culture(s) as
the perfectly woven and all-enmeshing web, the intricate construction of which only
added to its strength. The myth portrayed culture as the perfectly integrated system, in
which every element was interdependent with every other - the ultimate exemplar of
compact and coherent organisation. However, in contrast to a front insistence that
coherence is there to find, a discovery of cultural inconsistencies in the backstage is of
significance.
To present an analytic perspective from which to dissect the myth of cultural
integration, Archer (ibid. :4) posits that what remain inextricably confounded in the
myth of cultural consistency are;
- Logical consistency, that is the degree of internal compatibility
between the components of culture.
- Causal consensus, that is the degree of social uniformity produced
by the imposition of culture by one set of people on another
through the whole gamut of familiar techniques - manipulation,
mystification, legitimation, naturalisation, persuasion and argument.
The logical consistency concerns the consistency of the culture programmers'
attempts to impose ideational order on experiential chaos; the causal consensus
concerns the success of attempts to order other people. Logical consistency is a
property of the world of ideas; causal consensus is a property of people. Causal
consensus is thus intimately allied to the use of power and influence, whereas logical
consistency is entirely independent of them since it exists whether or not it is socially
exploited or concealed or, to clinch the point, regardless of its even being recognised
(Archer, ibid.). This analytic frame is usefully applicable to the enterprise of corporate
culture. The degree of internal compatibility between the components of corporate
culture is a crucial issue in the assessment of ethical standards which are necessary
even for securing the 'strong' corporate culture in its authentic sense. If the degree of
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internal compatibility is low enough to invoke scepticism and thus the components of
corporate culture are recognised to be contradictory by the members of the company,
the degree of social uniformity will become low. However, the high degree of logical
consistency cannot guarantee a proportionate outcome in the degree of causal
consensus as Archer (ibid.: 4-5) explicates:
Thus it is perfectly conceivable that any social unit, from a community
to a civilisation, could be found the principal ideational elements
(knowledge, belief, norms, language, mythology, etc.) ofwhich
do indeed display considerable logical consistency - that is, the
components are consistent not contradictory - yet the same social unit
may be low on causal consensus. For example, this may be especially true
where the 'culture' in all its logical coherence is the prerogative of
an elite (top executives, intelligentsia, estate or ruling class).
Because of this, the non-elites may behave differently (absence of social
uniformity), given that they only have access to more restricted ideas.
Equally, the opposite situation can be found in society; causal consensus may
be high while logical consistency is low. When such high causal consensus was
achieved by coercion rather than conviction, there remains a potential for tensions in
the minds of members of the society. This logic of situation can also be applied to the
relations between management and labour. Logical consistency is pursued at the level
of management to maintain its hold on the labour power whereas causal consensus is
separately formed around the level of labour in the situation that the components of
corporate culture are coercively imposed on labour by corporate management. What is
missing in this separate course of cultural dynamics is the interplay between the
components of culture advocated by management and the competing voices of labour
who react to those components. As Archer (ibid.) puts it,
Fundamentally what is wrong with the conflationary theorising of the
cultural system is that it prevents the interplay between 'parts'
(organisational or ideational components of culture) and 'people' (who
hold positions or ideas within them) from being the foundation of
cultural dynamics. This is because in every version of the fallacy of
conflation, the elision of the two elements withdraws any autonomy or
independence from one of them, if not from both. Power relations lie
deeply in the mechanism to deter any autonomy or independence from
'parts' or 'people'. Power relations existing in social networks make it
possible for some cultural code or central value system to impose its
choreography on cultural life and agents are reduced to bearers of its
properties, whether through oversocialisation or mystification.
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This process in which power relations are managerially produced and
reproduced is propelled by the conflationary theorising of the cultural system which is
salient at the collective ethos of shared values in corporate culturism. This
reproduction of power relations purports to silence labour's power consciousness in
the capitalist relations of production and this silencing is perpetuated by virtue of the
illusory ethos of sharing. The illusion that everything is and can be shared is eventually
the effect of manipulated consensus and it is fabricated as to be called 'the myth of
cultural integration'.
This mythicism is epitomised at some definitions of organisational (or,
corporate) culture by corporate culture protagonists. Schein's (1986) definition of
organisational culture seems to be comprehensive in conceptualising it in terms of a
dynamics of internal and external activities. He defines the notion of organisational
culture as
"a pattern of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members
of an organisation — invented, discovered, or developed by a given
group that operate unconsciously, and that define in a basic
"taken for granted" fashion an organisation's view of itself and its
environment. These assumptions and beliefs are learned responses to a
group's problems of survival as it learns to cope with its problems of
external adaptation and internal integration — that has worked well
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to
those problems".
Here, it is noteworthy that for Schein basic assumptions are essentially a set of
values to which a given group cannot but commit as it learns to cope with challenges
from both inside and outside. And it is also noteworthy that he assumes that those
basic assumptions are developed into shared values and solidified into organisational
norms or rules as they are taught to new members as the correct way to perceive,
think, and feel in relation to those challenges. Under all the constituents of
organisational culture lies a claim of efficiency that a reworking of shared values can
contribute to organisational effectiveness by relatively reducing transaction costs.
However, two points should be checked out in relation to this way of conceptualising
the notion of organisational culture. First, how those basic assumptions are socially
derived and constituted has to be identified. The process whereby basic assumptions in
organisations (e.g., patriarchy in employment) are derived may be prejudiced and thus
ethically problematic. Second, if those basic assumptions are managerially made and
arbitrarily integrated into the so-called shared values, then corporate culture is likely to
be characterised as totalitarian enough to compel employees to silence their competing
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views in preference for utilitarian corporate core values such as profitability and
growth.
There is another fallible notion with regard to conceptualising the
representations of sharing. For instance, Watson (1994:111) suggests that we can
define an organisational culture as
'a set ofmeanings to be shared by all members of the organisation which
will define what is good and bad, right and wrong and what are the
appropriate ways for members of the organisation to think and behave.'
This definition implies that the things which cannot be shared by all members
of the organisation cannot be defined as good. That is, ethics is judged by a culture of
collective consensus of which 'quantity' is characteristic. However, a proposition that
the already-chosen 'shared' values or meanings will define what is right and wrong
neglects the fact that reservations, reflections and contrasting opinions in organisations
already exist. As Knights and Willmott (1987;41) contend,
We shall here argue that research on organisational culture and
symbolism has tended to abstract its subjects of study from the
relations of power and domination that are both a condition and a
consequence of the existence of culture and symbols in organisation.
This oversight is reflected in the tendency to regard culture as a
product of consensus rather than as the precarious outcome of continuous
processes of contestation and struggle.
When the consequences are the yardstick of right and wrong, such utilitarian
ethic is deficient in an element of moral autonomy by means of which moral rules and
values themselves become objects of intelligent and reflective social scrutiny
(Dahler-Larsen, 1994). An understanding of organisational culture has generally been
limited to perceiving it as founded upon mutuality and consensus, not upon coercion
and compliance (Knights and Willmott, 1987:42). This requires a consideration of the
aspects of exploitation and oppression through which cultural realities are constructed
and reproduced. As Martin and Meyerson (1988) argue, corporate culture does not
encourage a focus on the processes by which several brains in a living system may or
may not interactively construct similar cultural interpretations; instead, by definition,
corporate culture is already defined as 'shared meanings' leaving cultural phenomena
that are not 'shared' in the company out of focus.
Brunsson (1989:234) argues that it is by presenting itself as a coherent entity
that the organisation can handle qualities which have traditionally been assigned to the
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human being. The members' anticipation of their organisation as a coherent entity
makes it possible for them to endow the organisation with legitimacy. As a result, the
corporate culture can have a binding force on members' conduct and entrench its moral
legitimacy by professing a set of moral standards. However, problems arise from the
stage that the corporate culture is officially set up and given its binding force as a
corporate rule. Given that the establishment of corporate culture is aimed at a higher
level of efficiency and attuned to all-encompassing performances, the legitimacy of
corporate culture as a corporate rule comes to be sought in accord with rule-
utilitarianism by which the principle of utility is applied to general rules rather than to
particular acts (Boyce and Jensen, 1978). If, therefore, the competing views of any
member do not conform to the corporate rule, they are to be marginalised and
excluded out in the process whereby the corporate values espoused by a culture of
coherence are entrenched and embodied in the corporate rule.
Though there might be a causative relationship that a tight culture can lead to
economic success (Kunda, 1992), such questions should be raised about the ethical
dispute of shared values as "what values are shared and what are the values not to be
shared?", and "how the shared values are chosen and by whom?" Or, the process of
selecting or including the values allowed to be shared does not exclude or marginalise
other competing values on the excuse of external conditions like recession, market
pressure, global competition? What is the ethically acceptable rationale of inclusion
and exclusion for the shared values? How can we ascertain that the values are really
shared? Isn't it the case that the values are expediently allowed to be shared only
insofar as they are calculated to be contributory to corporate performances? Aren't the
values shared only by members, not shared by corporate management? These
questions lead to an ethical issue about who are the subjects to control the manoeuvre
of shared values and who are the subjects to be responsible for the outcomes of shared
values, to which we now turn.
Controlling values vs. Being responsible for outcomes
The aspect which pinpointedly evidences the dual nature of sharing in
corporate culturism is a divisive distinction between the subjects who control the
shared values and the subjects who are responsible for the outcomes. The 'unity' side of
sharing is characteristic of the stage at which the values are enacted for sharing
whereas the 'division' side of sharing is characteristic of the stage at which the
outcomes of the enacted values are assessed in terms of assuming responsibility. The
ethical problem is exacerbated especially when moral values are explicitly enacted to be
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shared, or the shared values are legitimated by recourse to their implied morality. This
means that morality is so vulnerable as to be fractured in the process whereby values
are enacted in the name of a corporate ethos of sharing. Some empirical studies
illustrate this dynamics of fractured morality.
An empirical study of corporate culture presents a case that some of the moral
values are directly engineered at the foreground of the company's creed of corporate
culture. Kunda (1992:80) illustrates a Tech company where "Overview of Corporate
Culture" was designed by an internal consultant:
'Corporate culture is the essence of the personality of the corporation.
Without facing this fact and managing it many important assets to the
corporation are lost. There is much research in this area which
currently supports this. Culture is established by the founder and
maintained by the executives of the corporation. Culture must be
managed. Excellent corporations already know this and have taken steps
to manage and control their culture'.
The official statement above is indicative of the paramount of managerialistic
attributes of corporate culturism. A notable thing is that the founder and the executives
of the corporation are credited with establishing culture as the personality of the
corporation. It means at once that the ethos of shared values is initiated by the
founders and executives and that all credits of successful management of culture are
given primarily to them. This suggests that a dominant theme of corporate culturism is
that the value of individual spirit within capitalism should be championed. A quote
from another "excellence" text illustrates this point:
"Individual leaders, not organisations, create excellence. With their
unique skills they lead others along the pathway to excellence,
carefully cultivating those who will later assume the controls. To
groom future leaders successfully, the mentor makes sure he passes on
both his gift for strategy and his flair for building a strong corporate
culture" (Hickman and Silva, 1985:25)
Hence, for capitalism to work it must allow for the free expression of the
individual but it must also ensure that those who cannot lead be happy in following.
Berry (1989:5), in commenting on another management textbook, makes an important
point about the -
"...heavy Anglo-Saxon male individualism that lies in these authors'
conceptions ofmanagement. For all their ideas of people mattering,
they only matter as elements of the leader's will. And leader lies in
the singular."
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What emerges here as ethically contestable is the tension between the
manager-hero and the people in following. The tension between the individualism of
manager-hero and the collectivism of shared values is noted by Binns (1993; quoted in
Parker, 1995) who elaborates this in Weberian terms as an oscillation between
charismatic and legal, rational legitimations of authority. In terms of functional
effectiveness, it might be argued that following charismatic leaders or common
normative framework might actually impede rapid response to environmental
turbulence rather than encourage it (Binns, ibid.). However, in terms of an ethical issue
of the tensions, it can be argued that the individual executives' overriding dominance is
geared to the expediency of the heroes' self-centred moral justification. When the
outcomes of organised activities through the espousal of 'shared values' meet the
expected level of excellence, the heroes are credited with the merits. By contrast, when
the outcomes fall short of excellence, the blame is distributed to the employees who
were at least nominally assumed to partake in the collective ethos of shared values.
The diffusion of responsibility in this way makes the heroes get away without any
responsibility. This inequity deems to be serious in consideration of the espoused tenet
of shared values as part of 'new commercial agenda' which claims a lateral
accountability (Munro and Hartherly, 1993). The seriousness of inequity lies in the fact
that an interest in lateral accountability may represent less a switch from hierarchical
accountability, than an attempt to extend hierarchical accountability (Munro,
1995; 129). This inconsistency between a nominality of shared values and the moral
expediency of 'excellence' may lead employees to a state of moral anomie in that the
credit is attributed to the heroes of excellence but the blame is unjustly laid upon
themselves. As Munro (1995, ibid.) argues,
Yes, staff are to be incited by feelings ofbelonging, the inclusiveness
of "we" is all-embracing, but the responsibility is to be all "theirs".
In being extended laterally, responsibility is being distanced
hierarchically: accountability equals "we" minus "me".
The employees' self-awareness of this inequity may lead themselves to distance
from the corporate ethos of shared values by increasing a degree of 'as if mode of
involvement in the values; that is, sharing expressions. As a result, even in the cases
that corporate management induce a sharing of moral values, employees may remain
sceptical of the genuineness of the engineered moral values for sharing. This is
endorsed by Alvesson (1987) when he contends that the dominant trend of the
pragmatic genre of organisational culture is moulded by a technocratic interest that
seeks strategies to shape enduring norms and values. Kunda's (1992) exemplar in Tech
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Company also illustrates this point. Though moral values such as "We are all one
family", "People are creative, hard working, self governing and can learn", "Truth and
quality come from multiple viewpoints, free enterprise", "Do what's right", "Individual
freedom" (ibid. :71 -2) are characteristic of all assumptions of Tech Company's
corporate culture, it is reported that such moral components of corporate culture are
treated as assets to be managed for normative control of human resources. This leads
to a question as to the authenticity and substantiality of the moral values which are
calculatively enacted through the members' everyday activities in the company. Indeed,
it is likely that members do not understand what the moral values actually mean in
association with their job experiences and how they reflect such moral values in their
job situations; for instance, in the cases of internecine competition between the
colleagues over their value for capital (Smith and Willmott, 1991). The tenet of "Do
what's right" also raises a question of "right from whose eyes?". The members may feel
confusion when facing up to a choice between doing 'right for company' and 'right for
justice'. The managerial intentionality of establishing corporate culture by the founder
and maintaining it by the executives is most vulnerable to the corporate appropriation
of morality within the very inequalities of power relations which are sustained by the
culturally reified relations between the individual heroes and the collective employees.
Given that diverse ramifications of conceptualising 'culture' (Allaire and
Firsirotu, 1984) clearly show a broad range of possibilities to link the abstraction of
culture with its material aspects, the central feature found in the discourse of corporate
culture is the reificcition of the abstraction of culture. The management's tenacious
attempts to subordinate labour's non-material capacities of production culminate in its
endeavour to incorporate as comprehensive units as possible to be drawn from the
concept of culture into the stringent material conditions which are possibly secured by
the reification of culture. Regarding the constitution of the stringent material
conditions by means of exploiting the mental capacities of labour, Marx (1978) argues
that the ideas of the ruling class are hegemonic insofar as the ruling class dominates the
means ofmental production. As he puts it:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e.
the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same
time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of
material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over
the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the
ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to
it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the
dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships
grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class
the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance.
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The strategy of the ruling class to legitimate the ideas of its dominance and
accordingly reproduce its domination is linked to its tactics to normalise its control
over the means of mental production like the ethos mechanism of corporate culture.
Sakolsky (1992) contends that normalisation as a non-repressive form of power
involves a variety of 'consent games'. Once the abstraction of corporate culture is
reified in 'participatory management' schemes like quality control circles as
'normalising' devices which are designed to manufacture consent by gaining the
commitment and loyalty of workers to the labour process, they become to be fortified
by the mechanism of neutralisation. Neutralisation refers to the processes by which
value positions are hidden and value-laden activities are treated as if they were
value-free and exempted from the class of potential objects of moral conduct. For
example, once the corporately defined norms for behaviour, beliefs, and feelings
through the inculcation of corporate values are established as the criteria for
objectively evaluating the members' activities, the criteria for evaluation are no longer
open to discussion. "Just give me the data" implies agreement on the criteria used for
evaluation. The presumed neutrality prevents a new investigation of how agreement
was reached on the criteria and whether these criteria are appropriate at all for any
particular contingency. An objective decision based on the available data appears to
be a decision that anyone who shared the same valuing process would make. As a
result, disagreement with such a position would appear unreasonable and irrational, or
at least time-consuming or merely philosophical. Indeed, claiming that everybody
shared the same valuing process and joined 'participatory management' schemes is
central to the manager-hero's moral expediency in diverting the blame for falling short
of excellence to the people in following.
To recapitulate, much of the literature on corporate culture is full of accounts
of cultural extravaganzas that function to develop a sense of community through a
form of compulsory sociability (Thompson and McHugh, 1990:239). Even within
those organisations that do implement cultural controls, they are intended to
complement not eliminate the need for bureaucratic, technical or other systems. This is
echoed by Ray (1986) who argues that while bureaucratic control may prompt
individuals to act as if the company is a source of meaning and commitment, that is an
entirely different matter from seriously believing it. In other words, control remains
externalised rather than internalised. The myth of cultural homogeneity which is to be
inevitably accompanied by an emphasis on the strong corporate culture becomes
evident in the fact that the ultimate purpose to inculcate the tenets of corporate culture
is to create a performance-conscious culture or environment (Kunda, 1992:226).
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Within the overall process of managing a cultural change, performance-related pay is
often seen as a key element in transforming employee attitudes. However,
performance-related pay is also ethically implicated with an ethos of 'excellence' in
terms of distributive justice in rewarding. When the company of 'strong' corporate
culture attains an excellent level of performance, it tends to credit the manager-hero
with ill-proportionate amount of remuneration. In contrast, when the company can not
reach the planned level of excellence, the stringent performance-related pay is forcibly
applied to the people in following. This lack of fairness in rewarding is clearly
indicative of a sham of sharing as the espoused tenet of corporate culturism. A
plausible result is that people in following seek only for instrumental rewards without
taking an ethos of shared values (even moral values) seriously. Thompson and
McHugh (1990: 240) incite the increased use of staff development as an example
which is exploited by the company so that the employees find the best way to make
themselves more manageable, essentially a form of management by objectives by
stealth. The limits to such systems lie in employee unwillingness to take them seriously
or invest effort unless instrumental rewards are forthcoming, therefore contradicting
the aims of the system. Indeed, loyalty, obedience and goal identification are not easy
to sustain when companies are, in the extreme case, scrutinising their policy manuals to
remove implied promises ofjob security or even termination benefits (ibid: 241).
In summary, the rosy adornment of corporate culture with fancy words
conceals a thorn. For instance, the ZTC managers in Watson's (1994) study complain
about the inconsistency or confusion within the company's culture of 'guns and roses';
the company encourages the personal development scheme and simultaneously
dismisses the workforces unsparingly. The extreme case of rebutting the very concept
of corporate culture is shown at some ZTC managers' scepticism on the use of the very
term, "culture":
"why does it have to be the word "culture"? It always amazes me when you
get team briefs and they come in with these big words and half the
people don't understand what they mean. Why don't they put it in
layman's terms that everybody can understand? I don't understand half
the words myself. I am sure they come across these fancy words and say,
"Oh I must use that".
The fact that the managers do not understand what the big words mean casts a
serious doubt on the genuineness of the mandate of shared values. Moreover, the
company's mixed culture of 'guns and roses' is tantamount to an essential contradiction
of corporate culturism. At the front of the corporate ethos of shared values, the culture
of 'roses' pretends an equal reward for all people devoted to the goal of 'excellence',
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but at the backstage of unintended consequences all the blames are given to the people
in following with a residue of severe inequity perceived by the people in following - a
circle of moral cynicism and dependence. This contradiction as a moral limit of
corporate culturism is succinctly summarised in Watson's (1994:67) observation of the
ZTC managers' ambivalent attitudes:
They were positive quite often about what they were doing day to day,
but becoming increasingly negative about what they believed they were
doing it for. These growing doubts were partly the outcome of doubts
engendered by a growing awareness of newer management ideas stressing
strong cultures, focus on customers, continuous improvement and the rest.
Newer management ideas stressing focus on 'customer' and 'continuous
improvement' are specifications of Total Quality Management (TQM). Strong cultures
go hand in hand with the method and aim of TQM (Wilkinson and Willmott, 1995).
The mangers' increasing negativity about such management ideas suggest that they are
skeptic of the genuineness of the moral values espoused by those business strategies
within the fold of a new managerialism. Because the notion of uniformly shared values
seems to receive neither theoretical nor empirical support, only normative, the gap is
serious between the front feature of sharing as a corporate norm and the backstage
feature of estrangement from it. As Bauman (1991) argues, actors are moralised by the
inculcation of corporately enacted moral values but their actions are adiaphorised,
which is also typical of the discourse of business ethics to which we now turn.
Criticism on Discourse of Business Ethics
The ethos of shared values is assumed to have more binding forces when the
values are specified as conveying moral and ethical import directly or indirectly. For
moral and ethical values are capable of appealing to a universal agreement and hence
manufacturing consent from employees. As has been discussed so far, the corporate
ethos of shared values is reified as a mandate of shared corporate core values such as
rapid growth, efficiency, and profitability. If the ethos of shared moral values is
calculated by corporate management to contribute at least indirectly to the corporate
core values, the formula of "good ethics is good business" is too attractive to be eluded
by the corporate management. Importantly, the pressure to drive down costs ahead of
the so-called globalisation may well have urged the corporate management to have
recourse to moral values even as a means of saving the costs.
To be sure, corporate management are willing to make a design to infuse moral
values into the collective mind ofmembers and accordingly resort to 'prescriptive' ways
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to encapsulate morality into the tenets of corporate culture. These ways are
characterised as an integrity-based approach to ethics management that combines a
concern for the law with an emphasis on managerial responsibility for ethical
behaviour. The emphasis on autonomous moral reasoning and responsibility is
congruent with Kohlberg's (1981) postconventional level of ethical conduct by the
ability to decide to challenge existing norms and values on the basis of personal
principled judgment. The assumption is that the members' moral instincts are latently
predisposed and hence can be cultivated through appropriate educational programmes.
The discourse of corporate culture is recognised by the ethics education programmers
to fit well with this assumption. The tenet of shared core ethical values and beliefs is
assured as a managerial means to induce the members to internalise the core ethical
values espoused by the company and hence intensify an expected degree of
identification with the company. As Rose (1990; 117-8) puts it,
Experts in personnel management claimed that what made Japanese
companies competitive, efficient, and the like was their 'consideration
for the self-esteem of employees'. Hence the need to establish a
corporate culture of'mutual trust, cooperation and commitment' in which
all employees can identify with the aims and objectives of the company
and which encourages and recognises the individual contribution of
all... The new vocabulary of team-work, quality consciousness,
flexibility, and quality circles thus reconciles the autonomous
aspirations of the employees with the collective enterpreneurialism of
the corporate culture.
The assumed belief that core ethical values can be effectively shared among
the members is calculated by the corporate management to bring about a synergy effect
of autonomous collective policing and thus reduce the cost of heteronomous,
managerial policing. Indeed, the core tenets of corporate culturism, shared values and
beliefs, are seductive enough to appeal to the corporate ethicists who are preoccupied
with enhancing an ethical climate of a company, which is in turn intended to serve the
corporate objectives like impression management, efficiency, profitability. The efforts
of these corporate ethicists bore fruits in the form of literature on business ethics
centered on the discourse of corporate culture. The literature on corporate culture
approach to business ethics takes on two types. I would characterise one as 'extreme
right' that is strongly supportive of instilling ethical values into the core values of
corporate culture. The other is characterised by me as 'skeptic-right' that anticipates
the seemingly effective moralisation through corporate culture but, at the same time, is
conscious of the feasibility that corporate culture is itself the source of ethical issues.
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The extreme right is discussed first. This is focused on the prescriptive attempt
to infuse moral and ethical values into the employees' collective consciousness. This
nearly coercive moralising is geared to the morally 'strong' corporate culture. In
1989-1990, the Centre for Business Ethics at Bentley College conducted a survey of
the Fortune 1000 industrial and service companies to find out what they have done to
build ethical values into their corporate structure and culture. The survey indicates that
large corporations are more likely now than they were 5 years ago to be instilling
ethical values in their corporations. Having ethics committees and in-house training in
ethics seems to be a more common practice. In accordance with this enthusiasm in
corporations, Baglini (1992) endorses a quality service programme in which core
ethical values include honesty, integrity, respect, trustworthiness, and fairness. He
contends that a commitment to ethics and quality must begin with top management and
must become part of the corporate culture. He presents the means to accomplish this:
1. emphasising ethical values and a positive attitude towards quality service when
recruiting and promoting, 2. developing and communicating corporate policies to
guide ethical decision-making, and 3. committing to continuous training in ethics and
quality. As will be discussed in the next chapters, however, 'quality initiatives'
themselves imply some problems in terms of innate ethical issues. Thus, Baglini's
prescriptions fall short of more accurate diagnoses of the moral limits of corporate
culture approach to business ethics. Sims (1991) presents several ways to encourage
ethical standards: Develop organisational policies that specify ethical objectives and
formal procedures for addressing unethical behaviour; Develop a systematic training
programme for all employees explicitly concerned with ethical principles and relevant
cases. Such behavioural science techniques like behavioural modelling, corporate
ethical models (Knouse and Giacalone, 1992) are also presented. Most typical is an
emphasis on the role of the founder's values and the role of leadership (Brenner, 1992).
However, a question as a rebuttal against all these prescriptions still remains; how do
those prescriptions work for the practitioners?
Indeed, Stark (1993) suspects that the field of business ethics is largely
irrelevant for most managers. The moral vacuum of 'corporate moral leadership' leaves
confusion on the part of managers when they are urged by the business ethicists and
business journalists to employ ethics as a management tool with an assumption that
"strategic ethics" increases the net present value (NPV) of the firm. More generally,
managers are being told that "good ethics" is "good business" and is therefore in the
best interests of the firm and its shareholders. That is, instrumentally ethical managers
might do what is morally proper, but they do so to increase shareholder wealth. The
context where this instrumental rationality (Weber, 1968) is produced and reproduced
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is that an agent's obligations to shareholders in the Western business settings is legally
protected and encouraged. Quinn and Jones (1995:31) explain that part of this
mentality follows from the tradition in corporate law: Ford v. Dodge Bros, settled the
issue that shareholder wealth was the appropriate aim of the corporation.
Subsequently,
case law on managers' fiduciary duty of care can fairly be read to say
that the manager has an affirmative, open-ended duty to maximise the
beneficiaries' wealth, regardless ofwhether this is specified in any
actual contract. (Clark, 1985:73 Quoted in Quinn and Jones, 1995)
This situation raises an important point that, for the instrumentally ethical
manager, ethical conduct is situationally determined. In the current "ethicised" U.S.
business environment, the long-term benefits of a reputation for ethical behaviour
usually outweigh any short-term gains from, for example, taking advantage of
consumers or suppliers. Enlightened self-interest leads managers to "ethical"
behaviour. In those business settings, however, with either short-term time horizons
(e.g., strong quarterly profit pressures) or information asymmetries (e.g., some
international markets), instrumentally ethical managers might behave very differently.
Here, the benefits of unethical behaviour might exceed the costs. Accordingly, the
instrumentally ethical managers might reasonably hope to "get away with" unethical
behaviour (Quinn and Jones, ibid.). This is more so because the corporate moral
leadership characterised as a top-down approach is based on the assumption that
corporate culture is something handed down from 'on high', and that values are
attributes of the corporation rather than beliefs held by those who work there.
Consequently, this type of moralising like the instrumentally ethical managers results in
the effect that corporate core values legitimated by the inculcation of moral values are
insulated from the competing views of the employees. The corporate ethos of shared
moral values eventually conveys a Janus-like nature: a front moralisation of 'unity' and
a backstage expediency of'division'.
The other type, "skeptic-right", is to look to the corporate culture as the
source of ethical problems. For instance, Sinclair (1993) queries the existence of
organisational culture at all, arguing that organisations are nothing more than shifting
coalitions of subcultures. This stance seems to acknowledge a diversity of competing
views arising out of the different voices of subcultures, doubting a totalising
moralisation through a monolithic, dominant corporate culture. However, he does not
argue that shifting coalitions of subcultures may themselves be the source of ethical
issues. For instance, the occupational ideology within a subculture of a particular
occupational group may exert a dominant influential power to shape a subculture and
can be a binding force to keep order within the subculture and its distinctiveness from
other subcultures within the company. When this occupational ideology works to
support the individual group's self-interests, it may inevitably cause some difficult
grey-area situations which are described as "conflicts of right versus right" among the
different subcultures (Stark, 1993). In presenting another case of corporate culture as
the source of ethical problems, Barker (1993) pinpoints the dual objectives of ethics
programme at General Dynamics Corp. which was implemented with an intention to
impact the corporate culture. The programme was found to have met its specific
objectives which require employees to follow rules and standards of conduct.
However, the programme did not apparently meet its implied objectives which would
have created a more humanistic work environment for employees. Barker (ibid.)
argues that this result stemmed from programme planners' intention to use the hope for
better working conditions as a motivation for employees to follow company standards.
That is, the ethics programme was designed mainly for improving the company's public
image and legal liability rather than meeting the employees' expectations of fair,
humanistic treatment of them by their superiors. Barker's (ibid.) conclusion that
humanistic treatment of employees should be considered as a cultural phenomenon
indicates at once how hard it is to change a culture at the workplace and how facile it
is to conflate ethical values with a cultural change which pursued a fair and humanistic
treatment of employees in the case of General Dynamics Corporation. Meanwhile, it is
of importance to test the genuine effects of the enactment of ethical values in the
corporate culture. Perry (1992) contends that the conduct of layoffs and reductions in
force especially in a recession is one of the strongest tests of whether ethics has truly
become imbedded in the corporate culture. The credibility of this test seems to lie in
unveiling the mask which the ethical prescriptions of corporate culturism wear.
But, both of the two types presuppose that ethical values should be enacted in
a company through the officially espoused corporate culture. This externally imposed
inculcation of ethical values seems to lose sight of other dark side of inequalities
indigenous to a company. The cultural dynamics is not as simple as the corporate
culture programmers' prescriptions assume. A diversity of cultural properties has
already been existing, informing the way members have structured the organisation, the
type of hierarchy, the style ofmanagement as well as the type of accountability (Munro
and Hartherly, 1993). The ethical issues are interpenetrated with this cultural process
of meaning-making, negotiating and organising through the minutiae of daily life in
specific social, economic and historical contexts surrounding a company (Wright,
1994). Given that the corporate core values are included and the employees' competing
52
views are excluded in the process of decision making, the culture of decision-making
implies an innate issue of how the competing views are structurally eliminated, and this
elimination brings about a new space for ethic-relevant contestations. In recognition of
the culture of decision-making intertwined with corporate strategic planning and
implementation, an ethical reflection of corporate strategy is at stake. However, this
approach is also endangered to fall into a myth of cultural integration by means of
infusing moral values into the corporate strategies. For example, Hosmer (1994)
contends that ethics must be brought back into the strategic planning process in order
to build trust on the part of all of the stake-holders of the firm. He goes on to put,
Trust generates commitment. Commitment ensures effort, and effort that
is cooperative, innovative and strategically directed is essential for
success in a competitive global economy. Ethics should be central, not
peripheral, to the overall management of the firm.
However, if the incorporation of ethics into the content of strategic planning is
one thing, a question over what other unintended ethical problems are brought about
by the implementation process of corporate strategy is another. As has been discussed
so far, the emergence of these unintended ethical problems depends on how employees
perceive at their work the authenticity of such ethical prescriptions contained in the
corporate strategies. Importantly, the process whereby corporate strategy is
implemented in the context of capitalist economies requires a deeper appreciation of
social relations of production in the conflictual arena between capital and labour.
Conclusion
This chapter has so far problematised the corporate ethos of shared values as a
tenet of corporate culturism. I argued that members might possibly not share the
values, but only expressions are shared in diverse ways. In accordance with this
tension, employees can take a double posture onto the corporately espoused core
values. As far as corporate culture as a strategic agenda is practiced in conjunction
with other compatible agendas like TQM, HRM, Business Process Restructuring etc,
the gaps between shared values and shared expressions become more serious. Not only
because the gaps may deepen the employees' self-estrangement from their works
(Sturdy, 1992) but because they are likely to enlarge a range of conditions of
possibility for manipulating morality through the medium of shared expressions.
In this vein, I suggested that the attempt of business ethics as a discourse to
translate moral ideals into moral actions should be critically reflected. It seems safe to
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say that insofar as the genuine intent of inculcating morality is not distorted for
managerialist gaze, an emphasis on the ethical training of members (Maclagan and
Snell, 1992) is partly desirable. However, as Stark (1993) argues, business
practitioners are reluctant to adopt the prescriptions made by business ethicists. It is
not only because a current status of discussion on business ethics is too theoretical and
impractical but because those prescriptions lose sight of the real practicalities of the
labour process whereby employees are entrapped in the imperatives of the corporate
strategic discourses mainly geared to the owners' capital accumulation. Conflicts
arising from the real situations are felt to be serious by the employees such that the
prescriptions of business ethics are only regarded as 'language as referents', which are
degenerated into moral expediency. Employees are bound to think that the ethos of
shared moral values is considered to be valid only insofar as they are contributory to
corporate performances. The espousal of shared ethical values brings about the
unintended consequences of fragmented attitudes to the very ethical values in the
minds of members; namely, sharing as unite and divide. As a result, the members are
rendered cynical of the espoused morality. Rather than present a facile set of moral
prescriptions made by new managerial discourses, a deep understanding of 'ethicality'
in the capitalist labour process requires an appreciation for the social relations of
production between capital and labour, to which we now turn.
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CHAPTER 4
CORPORATE STRATEGY AND MANAGERIAL LABOUR
Introduction
The arguments advanced in the preceding chapters suggest that the discourse
of corporate culture gives rise to moral and ethical problems in diverse ways. Given
that the ethos of shared values as a tenet of corporate culture is intended to
disseminate accountability among the different levels of control, the implementation of
the corporate culture agenda takes on a strategic nature. By inculcating a team spirit of
sharing the corporate core values (even the moral values), corporate management
intend to secure a hierarchical structure of control systems within management, which
leads eventually to the imperatives of capital accumulation. In opposition to these
imperatives, employees are understood to deploy an act of sharing expressions as their
own strategic conduct for identity work. Importantly, corporate management share the
expressions too while they may profess an ethos of shared values. The reason for both
corporate management and employees to share expressions is because the 'strategic'
nature of corporate culture obliges them to distance from commitment to the values.
Such turbulent environmental pressures as flexibility, legal changes, technological
innovations, etc. are the causes for their expedient attitudes to the corporate ethos of
shared values.
Therefore, I pointed out that the managerial prescriptions based on an ethos
of shared moral values are monolithic by silencing the members' competing views and
bracketing the discourse effects of corporate strategy implemented in the capitalist
labour process. Though the individual member wants to raise his competing views onto
the company situations in light of his own moral and ethical standards, it may be the
case that he should succumb to the corporate pressures which are culturally legitimated
in virtue of corporate culture. As a result, the members partake in a collective
complicity to manipulate morality through the medium of shared expressions. Though
individual freedom is to be warranted even in the business arena, the reality of power
relations in the labour process makes the members' range of action subjected to the
corporate strategic discourses.
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In the light of a basic stance of the labour process analysis, the arguments in
this Chapter focus on a critique of corporate control strategy as a discourse and its
discourse effects in view of ethical implications. Insofar as corporate strategy is
peculiarly concerned with its 'allocative control' over strategic corporate
decision-making (Pahl and Winkler, 1974), the role of 'justice' in allocation decisions is
disputable especially in relation to the perceived justice by members in the company. If,
as Pahl and Winkler suggest, a subtle form of manipulative collusion between
directors, senior managers and middle-level experts takes place by means of
information manipulation and control, its impact on the perceived injustice by the
supervisors in charge of 'operational control' over the production process becomes
significant. For operational decisions and mechanisms are formulated and implemented
within the allocative parameters (Reed, 1990;79). This indicates that the corporate
ethos of shared moral values through corporate culture (as endorsed by business
ethicists) is most likely to stop at hollow justice if the concern with 'distributive justice'
(Homans, 1961) at the level of 'allocative control' over strategic corporate
decision-making is not central to the discourse of corporate strategy.
Meanwhile, as Parker (1995) argues, capitalism must engineer actors' consent
in order to operate, whether through economic coercion or ideological smoke screens.
Hence, an understanding of organisation necessarily involves an appreciation of the
various ways that co-operation is ensured and these must be cultural as well as
structural. This explains why the cultural tenet of shared values is so frantically
propagated by corporate management. Such ethical mandates as social audit, corporate
social responsibility and so on are also expected by corporate management to be
appealing to members enough to be mobilised as a means of corporate control. Here
the managers' intermediate status between capital and labour should be a focus of
attention. Undertaking the mediating role of re-presenting the ethical mandates of
corporate strategy to their subordinates, managers remain "undecidable" not only in
terms of a range of tasks carried out but in terms of a scope of their responsibilities for
unintended consequences of corporate activities. In recognition of the surveillance
mechanism which aggravates the angst ofmanagers, an appreciation for the managerial
labour process is indispensable to understanding the conditions whereby managers'
ethical subjectivity is constituted. To the extent that managers perceive the ethical
mandates to be informal forms of control (Littler and Salaman, 1984) for exploitation
of surplus from labour, they are doomed to be trapped in moral cynicism with a residue
of being skeptic of contradictions inherent in the discourse of corporate strategy, to
which we now turn.
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Corporate Strategy and Its Discourse Effects
One of the contributions labour process analysis has made is to identify how
labour is constrained in the scope and capacity of choices for such ethical claims as
'freedom' and 'responsibility' in their workplace. The analysis suggests that labour is
conditioned to be alienated in the structural contradictions of capitalist mode of social
production. The contradictions facilitate the legitimation of prevailing relations of
inequality (accordingly, injustice) and privilege in contemporary organisations and
institutions. Thus, the labour process analysis is understood to focus on a deeper
understanding ofmoral and ethical disputes arising out of the process whereby capital
exploits the surplus value from labour. Because moral problems are particularly
concerned with the harms caused or brought to others in ways that are outside their
own control (Hosmer, 1994:19), the mechanism that the benefits are brought to capital
through the prevailing relations of inequality is ethically contestable when the harms
are simultaneously brought to labour in ways that are outside their own control.
Conventionally, capital has been little reserved in representing its moral
legitimacy as entrepreneurship by recourse to an assumption that the only effective
control which can be achieved is 'moral control'. As Roberts (1984) endorses,
Such moral forms of control will not be realised merely by insisting
that staff recognise that their interests are bound up with the survival
of the 'company as a whole', whilst in their immediate practice, through
coercion or manipulation, managers seek to deny or avoid this
interdependence. Instead what is required is a form of practice in which
there is a mutual recognition of one another as interdependent subjects;
each recognising his or her dependence on others' actions, whilst at the
same time acknowledging the freedom of action of others.
Even in the sphere of British insurance industry, for example, it is reported that
the members' sharing in a 'moral' view of the role of insurance has been an impetus to
the survival of life insurance, in particular. In this view, life insurance is perceived as
something that people 'ought' to have as it provides financial protection for dependents
and 'security' for the future (Knights and Morgan, 1995:203). However, a question still
remains whether capital's intent to enact such moral values upon the indeterminate
potential of labour and thus fully manoeuvre the capacities of labour power meets
labour's aspirations to solve their existential problems - insecurities and anxieties
(Willmott, 1994a). In regard to the moral idealism in the capitalist relations of
production, there are some harmonistic stances on capital-labour relations (Morgan,
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1986; 189) apart from the hold upon the antagonistic view of capital-labour relations.
For instance, criticising both Marx and Braverman, Cressey and Maclnnes (1980)
argue that there is a dual nature to the relationship of capital and labour. Capitalists are
faced with the problems of continually transforming the forces of production, which
entails stimulating motivation and harnessing labour's creative and productive powers.
Thus capitalists must to some degree seek a co-operative relationship with labour. But
it is a contestable issue that such a co-operative relationship is explicitly preserved to
make an appearance of meeting the standards specified in the ethical code of practice
(Nash, 1992) and implicitly deployed as tactics for extracting the surplus from labour.
This questionable issue casts a doubt to the moral authenticity of corporate culture in
which a precondition of 'shared values' is espoused as prerequisite for co-operative
relationships between capital and labour.
Given that the discourse of corporate culture is deployed as a means of
normative control for a higher level of efficiency and performance, its nature is
congruent with a corporate strategy (Rouleau and Seguin, 1995:106; Knights and
Willmott, 1987). In order to focus on the control impact of corporate culture on
managers in a company, it seems necessary to highlight the process whereby managers
are brought into the labour process. The relevance of this discussion to an appreciation
of the managers' subjectivity is pursued not only because it sheds light on the process
whereby managers are brought into the labour process, but because it is anticipated to
present a theoretical context in which the Edinso managers' accounts are more
meaningfully explicated in the part of empirical illustrations later. In this vein, the
concept of 'corporate strategy' is given a particular attention in relation to the
managers' subjectivity. As distinct from the ordinary (or, conventional) set of
definitions of strategy such as 'a pattern in a stream of actions' (Mintzberg, 1988), or
'the pattern to be seen emerging over time as actions are taken to enable the company
to continue into the future' (Watson, 1994:87), a different conception of 'strategy'
seems vitally necessary to recognise the importance of power effects of corporate
strategy. This leads to an investigation of strategy as a discourse. In general terms,
discourse is conceived of as a set of ideas and practices which condition our ways of
relating to, and acting upon, particular phenomena (Knights and Morgan, 1991a: 253).
Given that corporate strategic discourses are historically formed through the
conditions of discursive practices produced and reproduced by a mechanism of
power/knowledge relations (Foucault, 1980) in particular social contexts, its discourse
effects should also be noted. An examination of corporate strategic discourse as a
technology or mechanism of power can reveal certain truth effects. The process of
formulating and implementing the strategy inevitably entails power effects as well as
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truth effects related with the 'truth' of strategy. For the strategic discourse engages
individuals in practices through which they discover the very 'truth' of what they are -
viz. a 'strategic actor'. Indeed, the truth effect of the power mechanisms of the
discourse is to define for the individual what it is to be human - to constitute or
re-constitute their subjectivity (Knights and Morgan, 1991a: 260). In this vein, some
discourse effects of corporate strategies are now discussed.
The first effect is that corporate strategy is very naturally taken for granted as
the most appropriate means of resolving a company's problems. Both theorists and
specialists in the field of strategy provide their expertise to legitimate the supremacy of
their prescriptions embodied in the strategy. However, the triumph of corporate
strategy cannot be assumed to be a natural outcome of an obviously superior set of
techniques. Rather we need to examine in specific organisational contexts how it
becomes dominant. This effect is related with the corporate strategy's proclamation of
its capacity as 'real solutions' to the problems in and around the company. What the
discourse of corporate strategy does is to constitute a field of knowledge and power
which defines what the 'real problems' are within the company and what are the
parameters of the 'real solutions' to them. As Knights and Morgan (ibid. :270) suggest,
strategy does not simply respond to pre-existing problems. In the process of its
formulation, strategy is actively involved in the constitution, or re-definition, of
problems in advance of offering itself as a solution to them. The preemption of strategy
in the definition of problems and reality tends to block up the lower-level members'
anti-movement to define the reality from their own competing views. Strategy results
in the effect of insulating itself from the possibility ofmultiple choices.
The second effect is problematised with regard to the volatility of strategies.
As Friedman (1990) argues, strategies are about intentions which need not be
coherent, constant or successful. Changing market conditions, technological
reformations or the heat of shop-floor struggle may push top managers to change their
strategies. For instance, Knights and Morgan's (1995) study on the IT strategy in a life
insurance company illustrates an uneven, discontinuous implementation of strategy and
its change due to the market pressure for short-term profits. This case is called by the
authors as 'strategy under microscope' since it is almost seen as arbitrary and volatile.
A continuation of these volatile practices may lead employees to consider the strategies
as precarious, vulnerable and hence incredible. If strategies can be easily changed on
the excuse of such externalities as market pressures, state interventions etc., middle
managers are habituated to the practice of rationalising their failures as well as
successes by recourse to corporate strategies. Learning and subscribing to discourses
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on corporate strategy provides managers with a vocabulary of success and failure and a
means of celebrating the former and rationalising or re-defining the latter in terms of
relative success. It is characteristic of the discourse that everything is explicable in the
end (Knights and Morgan, 1991a; 263). It eventually follows that a key value of
corporate strategy is that it allows for management error (Friedman, 1990:180).
However, a dilemma for managers is that they are entrapped in such a volatile
nature of strategy. As Friedman (ibid.: 184) notes, the tenets of either strategy are
continually used by managers to further their goals and to justify their actions to
themselves, their lower-level managers and their workers. Though the managers want
to preserve a particular strategy by which they could justify themselves to the staff,
they are often forced to change strategies. It means that the managers have to find
themselves subjugated to the prevailing power relations because those managers who
do not change strategies will be less likely to survive. The effect of frequent changes of
strategies may be that the managers become cynical on any seemingly sophisticated
content of strategies buttressed by top management. Importantly, even though the
strategy is morally formulated on the proposition that it is possible to build trust,
commitment and effort on the part of all of the stakeholders by including ethical
principles in the strategic decision processes of the firm (Hosmer, 1994:28), the
managers are apt to underrate the import of the strategy and reckon it to be a volatile
tactic for a short-term profit in turbulent circumstances and hence easily changeable
according to the external contingencies. Such a discursive consciousness of managers
explains the reason why the prescriptions made by the business ethicists are not
persuasive enough to practising managers as was discussed in Chapter 3.
The third effect is of the strategy's legitimation function. When departmental
thinking is dominating the business practices of companies, each department in a
company is bound to claim its own merits in terms of its contribution to corporate
strategic intent (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989; quoted in Watson, 1994;94). For instance,
a marketing department can resort to a dramatic market pressure to legitimate their
merit, whilst the department of accounting emphasises cost-focused management to
legitimate their voice in a design of corporate strategy. This indicates that a corporate
strategic discourse is contested in the material and political contexts of a company
(Knights and Willmott, 1987). In consequence, the process of which representations
are allowed and which are not (Munro, 1993:253) is apt to be manipulable for each
department's legitimation of its competitive edge in the formation and implementation
of a particular corporate strategy.
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The fourth effect arises out of the very attempt to make use of organisational
culture, transformed as a corporate strategy, in order to synthesise the members'
conflicting voices. It is conceivable that employees aspire to constitute and maintain
their own culture to the extent that they constitute their identity work by registering
"differences" from the corporately imposed values. It can be constituted as unofficial
culture which is contrasted with official culture. Organisational culture is, thus,
required to be a balanced coexistence of unofficial culture and official culture. But the
struggle is that corporate management are eager to utilise the employees' innate
culture-building capacities by attuning them to the corporate core values which are
engineered to be shared by employees. By appealing to a moralisation of 'sharing',
corporate management try to incorporate the unofficial culture into the official culture.
They do so by an attempt to transform organisational culture into a corporate strategy.
But the difficulty comes from the intrinsic incompatibility between organisational
culture and corporate strategy because organisational culture is historically tested and
sedimented whereas corporate strategy is more likely to be surface events. Here,
corporate culture comes closer to corporate strategy whereas organisational culture is
to be understood as more authentic. (This difference is conclusively re-emphasised in
Chapter 8).
As Freeman and Gilbert (1988) argue, implicit in the management of corporate
culture is the intent to reinforce the defense of a distinctive competence through the
development of a strongly held collective belief in such a competence. However, the
factor markets for labour can become distorted through the practice of culture
management. Practitioners of this approach seek to find employees whose values and
beliefs match those of the culture of a given firm. In this sense, price as an arbitrator in
the labour market is partially replaced by the required congruence of individual and
firm beliefs. The selective use of information in devising the instruments of culture
management - myths, legends, and so on - and the suggestion in some quarters that
culture management is the essence of general management appear to run counter to the
ethical principle of 'free flow of information'. The very idea of managing corporate
culture is constrained by the common morality of ruling out lying and false promises
(ibid.; 128). The strategic management of corporate culture is basically incompatible
with the common morality of treating others as ends (Mclntyre, 1981). These tensions
may lead to a multiplicity of resistance. For example, employees can be reluctant to
adopt innovative management techniques (e.g., budgeting) and show repeated failure
to meet deadlines (Knights and Willmott, 1987:57).
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In summary, the discourse effects arising out of the formation and
implementation of corporate strategy are sure to bring about tensions between the
formers of strategies and the managers as agents to implement them. The tensions are
understood to emerge from the managers' perceived contradictions inherent in the
corporate strategic discourses. That is, control staictures and strategies typically
contain their own inherent contradictions (Storey, 1985). For instance, as to the top
managers' self-contradiction inherent in their manner of deploying management
philosophies, Friedman (1990:184) highlights a differentiation of managerial strategies
from management philosophies. He observes that top managers will jettison even such
philosophies or values if they appear to get in the way of their goals. Clearly, this
indicates that corporately espoused values are manipulable for a company's short-term
interests. Manipulability of corporate values is also illustrated in Knights and Willmott's
(1987) case study when they contend, drawing upon the domination mechanism
(Deetz, 1985), that such contents of corporate culture as 'team metaphor' and the
capacity to act "professionally" are utilised as strategies and a means to reproduce the
prevailing power relations.
Indeed, the moral limits of corporate strategy (Freeman and Gilbert, 1988) are
conflated with, and magnified in, the discourse of corporate culture because of the
synergy effect delivered by corporate culture. A crucial point is that the core shared
values are mandated by top management without following a due process of
converging all the competing views and values of the members in the company.
Freeman and Gilbert (ibid.) argue that an appreciation of a full account of how the
implicit morality of corporate strategy violates the common morality requires an
understanding of a macroeconomic context in which the corporate strategic planning
process is located. The fact that corporate strategy runs counter to the principles of
common morality such as Promise Keeping, Nonmalevolence, and Respect for Persons
indicates the contradictions of capitalism itself. For whilst the legitimacy of corporate
strategy in terms of its economic rationale is pursued at its contribution to the
attainment of an ideal capitalism (or, perfect competition, free enterprise), it
simultaneously violates the implicit morality of the marketplace necessary for a
realisation of general equilibrium as the outcome of free enterprises' Invisible Hand
mechanism. Indeed, the real world is far from the ideal of capitalism as the labour
process analysis pinpoints. The conditions for perfect market cannot be fulfilled in a
real world, and this obliges us to recognise the conditions of market imperfection.
Hence, the moral legitimacy of corporate strategy consists in providing the imperfect
market conditions with a second-best solution. Though corporate strategy seems to
contribute to the second-best argument that the closer the market approximates perfect
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markets conditions, the closer the outcome of market activity will be to Pareto
optimality, its implicit morality requires a critical reflection in view of'implicit morality
of the marketplace' and 'common morality' (Freeman and Gilbert, ibid.: 124-130).
Discussions so far have concerned the discourse effects of corporate strategy
and illuminated contradictions inherent in the corporate strategic discourses. The
contradictions were contextualised in the discrepancy between the ideal conditions of
capitalism (or, perfect market) and the real market situations. It should be underscored
that the internal logic of corporate strategy must have influenced the economic actors'
(the managers, in particular) ways of constituting their subjectivity by participating in
the implementation of strategies. To be sure, the managers' ways of consuming the
corporate strategies have an influence on the ways in which their subjectivity is
constituted. Whereas their active involvement in the implementation of strategies may
constitute a front side of their subjectivity, a backstage side of their subjectivity is liable
to be passive involvement in the strategies to the extent that they share only the
expressions and not the corporate values imposed through strategies. Accordingly, it is
necessary to understand the managers' subjective experiences as agents whose roles
are to convey the strategies through the hierarchical chain of command and implement
them in a purported way. So it seems to be in order to delve into the managers' lived
experiences in the labour process.
Managerial Labour and Surveillance Mechanism
The corporate strategic discourse becomes part of the everyday lived
experience of managers. Undertaking the role of mediating and re-presenting the
mixed messages of corporate strategy, managers are bound to be situated in a
vulnerable position. They are ordered to convey the mixed messages to their
subordinates despite the apparent existence of contradictions inherent in the messages.
An almost compulsory inculcation of corporate strategy drives the managerial work
into the labour process. Just as a simple dichotomy of 'wage labour' and 'labour power'
is useful to highlight a commodification of labour (Braverman, 1974), a dichotomy of
'managerial labour' and 'managerial power' seems to shed light on how the managerial
work is brought into the labour process. Whereas 'managerial power' may contain even
the latent creative capacity for management including the managerial expertise,
'managerial labour' is a more narrowed capacity for management which is forced to
comply with the imperatives of corporate strategy. Therefore, the commodity which a
manager sells is not a fixed amount of managerial labour embodied in a managerial
performance like meeting the corporate targets but the 'managerial power': i.e. the
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capacity to manage. Thus the commodity which is exchanged in the marketplace
(managerial power) is not the same entry which enters into the managerial labour
process (managerial labour). Consequently, managers inevitably enter into the capitalist
relations of production, which are independent of their will (Marx, 1975;425, quoted in
Knights and Willmott, 1990). They are subjugated to the imperatives of corporate
strategic discourses. The discrepancy between 'managerial power' and 'managerial
labour' is suggestive enough to confirm that managers are entrapped in the
"undecidable" position which is composed of'part of management' and 'part of labour'.
As Carter (1985;65) frames the issue,
an increasing number of people perform jobs the composition ofwhich is
made up of part function of capital, part function of labour. People
performing such jobs make up the new middle class... There now exists a
relatively large group of employees who share characteristics on both
sides of the oppositions.
A following account of a manager in Watson's (1994;48) fieldwork seems to
show an attribute of labour which is latent in the work ofmanagement.
'What does being a manager involve, as you see it?'
'It always needs to be seen in a business context, yes, that's the way I
would put it. It means having an understanding of the business and then
translating the circumstance with which one is faced into an acceptable
- no... yes - into an acceptable way of running the business from the
point of view of shareholders, other managers and people who are
employed. Yeah. And managers need to spell out what they expect from
people who they are managing and to ensure, having spelled it out, that
it's delivered. How's that?' (emphasis added).
A key word in this account is 'translating'. The manager finds himself
entrapped in the labour of translating the circumstance with which he is faced into an
acceptable way of running the business. Though he did not specify a rationale of the
acceptable ways, it is certainly confined to monetary concerns insofar as it should be
acceptable from the viewpoint of shareholders. Managers are entrapped in the labour
process in that they are ordered to transmit and re-present the content and ethos of
corporate strategy to their subordinates irrespective of their plausible competing views
of it. Moreover, they have to undertake the typical tasks required of them as is well
described by a manager in Watson's (1994) study;
'I didn't realise it until you asked me all that earlier about what I
believe management is, but I didn't really have much of an idea about
"management", other than that I was responsible for sorting out the shop
and the people so that we got the stuff out at month end. I just thought
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it was a basic, you know, an ordinary decent way to treat people; to be
straight with them, not to treat them like mugs and to respect the fact
that they have feelings. But this idea that you can build people up so
that they feel they own the job and they want to do, not just a good
job, but a better job - you know continuous improvement and all that -
well it's given me a sort of idea of what I ought to be doing as a
manager.'
The obligations to deliver the imperatives of corporate strategy in addition to
the typical tasks narrated above are certain to be burdensome for the managers to the
extent that the managerial labour process makes them increasingly powerless (Jermier
and LaNuez, 1994). Teulings (1986) contends that though the power of management
as a whole (the power of the administrative machinery) has greatly increased with the
development of organised capitalism, simultaneously the power of the individual
manager as a participant in the division of labour of the management process has
diminished. The powerlessness of the manager has many implications particularly in
relation to the contradictory effects brought about by the enactment of corporate
culture. Central to these contradictions embedded in the effects of corporate culture
upon managers are the relations between and within each level of management that
was separately identified. Basically, as Teulings (ibid.) argues, an increasing rationality
of the labour process of management is achieved by its differentiation and hierarchical
separation of functions. For instance, the middle managers strive for confirming their
expertise in the governance of 'quality' by virtue of their professional differentiation
from other provinces ofmanagement (Munro, 1995). But, at the same time, this makes
their inner contradiction more manifest. Teulings argues that rationalisation of
management as a labour process results in a politicisation of the relations between
levels of management, a development that is widely regarded with feelings of
incapacity by the individual manager, who is trained to function in a decomposed and
hierarchically structured sub-system. For the rules which lead to success in his own
labour process no longer appear to apply, and in any case, no longer appear to work in
the process of accommodation with other logics of action (ibid.; 164-5). This manifest
segregation in the functions of management is hardly rendered to be compatible with
the collectivist ethos of shared values espoused by corporate culture. Consequently,
the individual manager would most likely share only the expressions of the values as
their strategic conduct. Though this kind of strategic conduct may help secure the
individual manager's status, there may arise the possibility that each manager
appropriates the shared expressions in an expedient way for success in his own labour
process, and the ways of expediency are compounded with different levels of
management. As a result, the extent to which morality is corporately appropriated
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through the medium of shared expressions is escalated in proportion to the gradient of
expertise between and within each level ofmanagement that was separately identified.
Moreover, this segmentalism in management tends to bring about an attitude
of self-derision among the managers as is expressed in a manager's account in Watson's
(1994:130) study;
"Managers believe that they can't influence the management of the
company but, if only they knew, they can. They are the management but
are always saying that "they" will not let us do this or that. I know
that I have got influence, but a lot ofmanagers do not realise that
the source of the answers to many of the knotty problems that they've
got is in themselves. They actually know the answers, if only they
could cogently put it together and present it."
Indeed, the managers' split image is so miserable that their position as
manager is understood to be a servitude to their superiors to that extent that they are
regarded as scapegoats who are fallen into the destiny of subjugation. Knights
(1990:319) argues that it may be suggested that subjugation occurs where the freedom
of a subject is directed narrowly, and in a self-disciplined fashion, towards practices
which may be seen or thought to secure the acknowledgment, recognition and
confirmation of self by significant others. The subjugation is also constituted around
corporate strategy since corporate strategic practices demand the managers to commit
themselves to the strategic control practices while sacrificing their competing views on
the process of control practices. An understanding of corporate strategy as such is
endorsed by Knights and Morgan (1991a) who contend that strategy is a mechanism of
power that transforms individuals into particular kinds of subjects who secure a sense
ofwell-being through participation in strategic practices. The question of 'how free the
managers really are to manage?' is another cry for emancipation every manager should
face. As a manager in Watson's (1994;133) study exclaims;
"That's all very well, and I'll fight to the death to do what I can.
But the real fight is going to be the fight to be allowed to manage."
(Watson, 1994:133).
However, if the fight for their right to manage is one thing, how they conceive
of management is another. As is the common case with most of egoistic individuals,
managers are apt to seek for their own rights based on self-interests without paying a
due degree of caution to the dark side of management; "surveillance". As Lyon (1994)
contends, the present is called surveillance society after the risk society,
postmodernity, the McDonald's society, and the surveillance function is regarded as
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one of the indispensable managerial functions to control the labour process.
Surveillance is basically meant to be close monitoring in an attempt to ensure the
punctual checking of production process. In this sense, such modern strategic control
techniques as JIT (Just-in Time) and TQM (total quality management) are known to be
the mechanisms of surveillance and control that operate in the contemporary
workplace. As a prototype of surveillance, the Panopticon is to:
... induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility
that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things
that surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is
discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to
render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural
apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining power
relations independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the
inmates should be caught up in a power situation ofwhich they are
themselves the bearers. ... The Panopticon is a machine for dissociating the
see/being seen dyad: in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen,
without ever seeing; in the central power, one sees everything without
being seen (Foucault, I977;201-2).
The effectiveness of the Panopticon is expected to be gained not only in its
economy of presence but also in its overcoming the time and space constraints. The
need for an extension of surveillance is linked to Social Taylorism whereby the very
principles of Taylorism become intensified, extended and increasingly automated
through the application of new technologies. The recording of tasks, the surveillance of
consumption, the spread of 'cybernetic marketing' are all the hallmarks of the growth of
a 'programmed' market aimed at a heightened level of plan and control, a corollary of
surveillance (Webster and Robins, 1993:248). Indeed, the surveillance mechanism
penetrates even into the terrain of the managerial work so as to intensify the degree to
which managers are brought into the labour process. Dandeker (1990) identifies four
criteria which quantify an organisation's surveillance capacity. These are: (1) The size
of the files - the number of subjects and items of useful information. (2) The
centralisation of the files - this allows gathering of information at any one point and
using it at any other, with cross-referral at the central point. (3) The speed of
information flow - the time taken to gather, process and use information in the
management of behaviour. (4) The number of points of contact between system and
subjects - this relates to the continuity of monitoring and corrective action - detection
and retaliation.
However, the surveillance capacity is not confined to a quantifiable set of
criteria. For instance, Warde (1992) notes that a notorious employer in Lancaster was
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reputed to use a telescope at his home to watch workers arriving at work in the
mornings, and he kept a 'black book' recording miscreant behaviour among his
workers. Surveillance is also qualitatively intensified by the adjustment of
organisational ladder through which accountability is assumed. Munro and Hartherly
(1993) argue that managers are likely to subvert practices which develop in the name
of lateral accountability into acting as a "supplement" for more intensive surveillance,
given that hierarchical accountability orientates managers towards surveillance of
"decisions" within a dyadic staicture of superior-subordinates. Moreover, an
increasingly complex network of organisational activities demands a more systematic
diversity ofmeans of surveillance. As Foucault (1977) puts,
As the machinery of production became larger and more complex, as the
number of workers and the division of labour increased, supervision
became ever more necessary and more difficult.
This complex social relation of production induces the import of computer
technology for surveillance. In growing recognition of governmental and corporate
surveillance of the individual, Rosen and Baroudi (1992) stress the structural outcomes
enabled by computer-based technology. That which is at stake in relation to
surveillance is the illusions of decentralisation. As Heydebrand (1985, quoted in Rosen
and Baroudi, ibid.) notes, centralisation and decentralisation 'are no longer opposites
or alternatives, but they are mutually dependent and operate simultaneously'. Because
information technology may reach directly from the bottom to the top of a hierarchy -
from the shop floor to the corporate office - it may facilitate the centralisation of
control through the standardisation of information, more complete record-keeping, and
faster information processing (Robey, 1981 quoted in Rosen and Baroudi, ibid.). This
quantified control mechanism is likely to marginalise the competing views of
lower-level employees which can not be quantitatively standardised such that only
surveillance is centrally intensified. Thus, what appears to be greater decentralisation
may simply entail the delegation of more routine decisions whose outcomes are more
closely controlled (Robey, ibid.).
The increasingly unobtrusive control enabled by computer-based technology
leads to management's prioritisation of information/surveillance as a requisite of
effective planning and control (Webster and Robins, 1993;246). The 'information
panopticon' is alternatively termed the 'electronic panopticon' where 'a disembodied eye
can overcome the constraints of architecture and space to bring its disciplinary gaze to
bear at the very heart of the labour process (Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992a; 283). For
example, at-home-workers used the terminal at home linked to a central office
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computer to keep track of the number of hours the individual was logged into the
system and working. The computer made it possible for the supervisor to log into the
system and check the employees' work and progress (Rosen and Baroudi, ibid.).
Eventually, though it appears that more autonomy is seemingly granted to the
employees, it is management that can hold more central control over the employees.
As Sewell and Wilkinson (1992a; 283) argue,
the development and continued refinement of electronic surveillance
systems using computer-based technology can provide the means by which
management can achieve the benefits that derive from the delegation of
responsibility to teams while retaining authority and disciplinary
control through ownership of the superstructure of surveillance and the
information it collects, retains, and disseminates.
The electronic technologies do indeed allow managers to individuate labour
processes, thereby increasing control while apparently delegating responsibilities. This
tactic of'divide and rule' is partly congruent with TQM principles which entail pushing
responsibility downwards and the flattening of the hierarchy. This is a form of what
Muetzelfeldt (1989) calls 'devolutionism', where decentralisation of tactical
responsibility occurs at the same time as strategic control is centralised (Sewell and
Wilkinson, 1992a). Surveillance does contribute to the individuation of managerial
work. Indeed, this is a key point - surveillance empowers the corporate management at
the centre while monitoring the isolated individual employee (Webster and Robins,
1993). The surveillance function of monitoring the isolated individual is integral to
TQM in speeding up, and improving the efficiency of, the identification of
responsibility for, and correction of\ faults. For instance, Sewell and Wilkinson (1992a)
report that a dissemination of accountability to the isolated individual is compounded
with such collective surveillance as 'employee peer surveillance' at the UK Nissan
plant. The collective scrutiny of the work team coerces an individual employee to share
any positive divergence from a climate of discretion and its resultant ingenuity. In this
sense, through the concept of continuous improvement, JIT/TQM possesses a
powerful instrument by which management can appropriate the ingenuity of the work
force. Moreover, the electronic panopticon brings out the minutest distinctions
between individuals, having the ability to penetrate to the very core of an individual's
work activities. Indeed, it is the way that performance distinctions within and between
teams are revealed through peer group scrutiny or the selective use of information
gathered through electronic surveillance which enables managers to reduce the
negative divergences and exploit the positive divergences which individuals make
(ibid. ;287).
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The elevation of the intensity of surveillance may lead to a state in which
surveillance is highly internalised. This form of surveillance may actually be the
ultimate aim of the surveillors since it relatively saves the cost for keeping the
surveillance mechanism permanent. It is through a surveillance apparatus that extends
beyond the individual plant and even beyond national boundaries that the employees
internalise managerial norms of performance evaluation in the age of the multinational
corporation (Rosen and Baroudi, 1992). As one top-level manager at a workplace has
put it:
From my desk I can look at any plant. They all know what I am looking
at. They can see it, too, and how they stack up.... A worker under these
conditions does not need to be controlled - you simply expect him to
respond to the information the same way you do. (ZubofF, 1988: quoted in
Rosen and Baroudi, ibid.)
The ease with which managers can control their subordinates is predicated on
a precondition that the effect of continual and systematic surveillance is manifested as
the subordinates' self-discipline (or, self-regulation as distinct from self-management).
This indicates that the surveillance mechanism also conveys 'disciplinary power' as a
'capillary' form of power. Domination is secured by management by means of
'disciplinary power'; 'managerial accounting' is seen to be 'normalizing' disciplinary
practices (Knights and Collinson, 1987, quoted in Sakolsky, 1992). Rule (1973;
quoted in Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992a) succinctly describes the disciplinary effect of
the total surveillance system when he puts it,
Every action of every client would be scrutinised, recorded and
evaluated both at the moment of occurrence and for ever afterwards. The
system would collate all information at a single point, making it
impossible for anyone to evade responsibilityfor his past by fleeing
from the scene of earlier behaviour.... Any sign of disobedience -
present or anticipated - would result in corrective action....
apprehension and sanction would occur immediately. By making detection
and retaliation inevitable such a system would make disobedience almost
unthinkable, (emphasis added)
The imposition of responsibility is a moral obligation laid upon employees,
which the surveillance mechanism is insidiously aimed at. The case of intensifying
responsibilities is illustrated in a TQM regime when a dissemination of accountability
away from the line, through 'output' measures which individuate and intensify
responsibilities, facilitates a switch to an insistence on a number being met, at all costs
to the individuals concerned (Munro, 1995). A genuine value of responsibility is to be
duly respected, but it is likely to be detached from its intrinsic nature and extrinsically
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exploited within the fold of surveillance mechanism. This raises a concern for the role
of'language' and 'moral values' to be used as mediators of surveillance mechanism.
As distinct from the mass producing sectors of cars and electronics, the
insurance industry is particularly keen to the role of language as a mediator of
surveillance mechanism. In accordance with its nature of industry, moral values like
care, trust, prudence, amicableness, family, integrity and fairness are at once the
normative virtues and the cultural assets to be corporately appropriated by corporate
management. For example, management can use techniques of 'Power/Moral Values'
to bridge the gap between the employees' responsibilities as represented by contractual
arrangements and their actual activities as they are played out on the office, a process
which Townley (1990) describes as '... creating the industrial subject' (quoted in Sewell
and Wilkinson, 1992a). That is, the corporate ethos of shared moral values in the
name of being loyal to the customers is geared to being loyal to the company. This
infusion of moral values into the employees' psyche is expected by corporate
management to maintain their self-regulation and contribute to the differences in
corporate performance. In Foucault's terms, the employees have become bound up in a
power situation ofwhich they are themselves the bearers.
Given that morality is corporately enacted by recourse to an emphasis on an
ethos of sharing, management is partly done by surveillance over 'expressions' or the
use of expressions through which morality is conveyed in an ethos of sharing. The
members' accounts (Munro and Mouritsen, in press) represent such ways in which
'expressions' or the use of expressions are conveyed in an ethos of sharing. Indeed,
surveillance through "accounts" is an intelligent monitoring to the extent that it is able
to check when and where expressions pertinent to the corporate values of 'quality' and
'profit' are expediently 'displayed'. The transformation of moral values into the objects
of surveillance for corporate performance is a process whereby morality is corporately
manipulated through the medium of shared moral expressions. In recognition of the
fact that efficiency, productivity, accuracy and predictability are the hallmarks of
contemporary surveillance (Lyon, 1994;216), the appropriation of moral values is
intended to complement those comprehensive goals of surveillance mechanism.
Forasmuch as the increasing use of mandatory urine analysis and drug testing
is conceived as future forms of organisational surveillance (Sakolsky, 1992), the
consequences of surveillance technology for the employees' subjectivity and
personhood are to be reflected. At stake is the employees' responses to the existence of
surveillance mechanism in its diversity. Sewell and Wilkinson (1992a) argue that
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employees know that such information gleaned from surveillance is generated by,
available to, and the property of, the central power. However, employees are unaware
of the extent to which even more information is generated, scrutinised and acted upon.
Within this constraint of asymmetry of information, the employees' subjectivity and
personhood may be redefined by surveillance-based powers (Lyon, 1994). It may be
likely that employees appear to comply with the imperatives of corporate strategy only
to the extent that they can evade their superiors' scope of surveillance gaze. This
expedient attitude leads easily to moral expediency whereby employees' humanness
loses its sustained dignity. At the extreme, the employees try to adjust themselves
expediently to the surveillance mechanism and consequently partake in a complicity to
exploit morality, which is initiated by corporate management as part of the surveillance
mechanism through "accounts". Indeed, surveillance is conducted on the employees'
accounts which are presumed to convey the degree to which they expediently display
moral expressions pertinent to the corporate values of quality and profit. Corporate
culture is intended to have a binding force on the employees' ways of conduct and
accountability and to check through accounts whether employees share moral values.
In this sense, corporate culture is viewed to enforce surveillance on the employees'
expediency in appropriating moral expressions for the accomplishment of corporate
core values. As a consequence, moral cynicism amounts to what surveillance has made
of the modern employees at workplace and how it is implicated in what they have
become. Moral cynicism is most likely to result in the employees' resistance to
surveillance mechanism.
As Sakolsky (1992) argues, not only do production workers constantly attempt
to counter computer surveillance but foremen and middle managers do so as well.
Zuboffs (1988, quoted in Sakolsky, ibid.) empirical evidence suggests the employees'
will to resist the pertinacious surveillance;
'There are only a few standard operating procedures we can cheat on
because it can't be traced. When they can't trace it, we feel more
freedom'. (Zuboff, 1988; quoted in Sakolsky, ibid.).
Because any power relation includes resistance as part of the relationships that
define it, managers are to be entrapped in the multifold structure of power relations.
They have to conduct surveillance on their subordinates and are simultaneously
surveilled by their superiors on the hierarchical line. They are also induced to resist the
surveillance from above, and at the same time are perturbed by their subordinates'
resistance to their own conduct of surveillance. These complex power relations
compounded by surveillance mechanism not only bring the managers into the
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inextricable web of labour process but also complicate the constitution of their
subjectivity especially in terms of 'ethicality' which is embedded in their lived
experiences ofmanaging.
Managers' Ethical Subjectivity
Willmott (1993) argues that for corporate culturism, the moral issue of
whether employees are enabled to develop a (socially organised) capacity to reflect
upon, and choose between, competing values is irrelevant so long as they believe, or
feel, that their needs or purposes are being fulfilled. That is, their moral autonomy is
vulnerable not only because corporate core values systematically constrain it but
because employees themselves surrender it. At a superficial level at least, the
decentralisation and delegation promoted by TQM (Wilkinson and Willmott, 1995)
and the practical autonomy endorsed by corporate culturism (Peters and Waterman,
1982) appear to permit managers as much autonomy as possible. However, it is
ambiguous how the managers can ascertain the degree to which they feel that they are
free in their managerial work.
The ambiguity inherent in the managers' scope of autonomy stems initially
from the structural relations between agents and principals. For the economic rationale
of the principal-agent relationship looks at each exchange as a new event,
unencumbered by feelings of gratitude, indifference, disloyalty, or revenge. Any notion
of intended reciprocity for past benefits and/or harms on the part of the agent is sternly
excluded (Hosmer, 1994;30). Indeed, moral hazards - the lack of enthusiastic
adherence to contractual agreements - are felt to be a problem only for the agent, never
for the principal. This callous relationship makes managers take an ambiguous attitude
to the seemingly broad scope of their autonomy. They come to find themselves
entrapped in a dual nature of autonomy. On the one hand, the autonomy appears to
provide managers with an appreciation of their greater influence over the decisions
taken elsewhere in the organisation that affected their activities. On the other hand, the
fear that their misuse of the autonomy might result in the harm to the principals (e.g.,
failure to increase the shareholders' wealth) leads the managers to retreat from
discretion which is allegedly secured by decentralisation. As Teulings (1986;54)
highlights the institutionalisation of distinctive management functions at separate levels
of management, the managers' subjectivity is bound to be shaped on the institutional
status of agents as situated in the mediating social position to serve their principals -
owners, stockholders, and other relevant stakeholders.
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The unavoidable understanding of the managers' subjectivity in this way
necessitates an appreciation of their social status in the class positions. The term,
middle groupings, seems to be more appropriate for grasping the relational dynamics
of these particular collective intermediate agents. A preference of this term over 'class'
is introduced and endorsed by Smith and Willmott (1991) when they analyse the
process through which the positions occupied by the so-called intermediate strata are
constituted and reproduced. The term, 'class', is more likely to confine the analyses of
dynamics of social relations to a static dimension and hence misses a plentitude of
insights into the moral and ethical issues embedded in the complex network of social
interactions among the diverse modes of social groupings. The social status of
managers belongs to Marx's identification of three occupational groups whose numbers
are swelled with the development of capitalism: guardians of the capitalist state, such
as civil servants, policemen and soldiers; office workers who are engaged in
'calculation, administration and sales'; and managers 'to whom administration and
supervisory responsibilities are delegated' (Rattansi, 1985; quoted in Smith and
Willmott, 1991).
That which characterises the class subjectivity of middle managers is their
class ambiguity. As Munro (1995) pinpoints, the modern corporate strategy like total
quality management (TQM) appears to provide managers with much autonomy, but
many managers at the same time enjoy little autonomy, and in this respect their
position is not so dissimilar to that of manual wage-labour. Marx (1969;573, quoted in
Smith and Willmott, ibid.) described this dual nature of managers as standing 'between
the workman on the one hand and the capitalist and landlord on the other, thereby
burdening the former whilst increasing the social security and power of the latter'. The
contradictory pressures upon the managers may be felt intense by themselves when
their differing qualifications and expertise brought to the labour market are exchanged
in 'unjust' ways. This is so because the capitalists are calculative enough to try to
reduce the wages of management and supervision as much as possible by means of
proletarianisation of the managers; consisting of deskilling of particular jobs,
socio-political radicalism amongst white-collar workers, changes in the composition of
the class structure with an expansion of working class positions, and reducing career
opportunities or trajectories in white-collar jobs (Marshall and Rose, 1988, quoted in
Smith and Willmott, ibid.). The managers' collective efforts to differentiate themselves
from a large undifferentiated working class are also ineffective because differentiation
has always existed within the working class, and privileged, skilled autonomous
workers are still wage-labourers, whose privileges, skills and autonomy are under
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constant threat of removal by capitalists (Meiksins, 1985; 112, quoted in Smith and
Willmott, ibid.).
This formidably vulnerable status of managers urges them to rely upon the
methods that make it possible for them to maintain their identity at the workplace. At
stake here is their adherence to 'professionalism'. As Meiksins (1985;115) notes, the
'ideology of professionalism' is the most powerful status division, placing formidable
barriers between those occupations that define themselves as 'professions' and other
types of wage-labour. The formation of subcultures (accounting, personnel, IT,
marketing departments) within the professional middle groupings is anticipated by the
managers to function as a foothold by which to secure and obtain the resources. The
conflicts among the professional groupings of managers become fierce to the extent
that internecine competition between these groups over their value to capital is a
hallmark of their struggle within the capitalist division of labour (Smith and Willmott,
1991:30), resulting in unfair practices. In short, middle groupings within the collective
labourer experience ambiguous conditions and relations with both traditional labour
and corporate capital.
That which I highlight in view of the managers' status as 'part function of
capital' and 'part function of labour' in such ambiguous conditions is the managers'
moral conduct regarding the emergence of'unintended consequences'. Their existential
status to sit on the fence facilitates a deployment of moral expediency. When the
'unintended consequences' turn out to be caused by the less elaborate design of
corporate strategy on the part of capital, managers are likely to identify with the status
of wage-labourer and stress their 'part function of labour' with distancing from their
'part function of capital'. They ascribe the blame to capital for the fact that they
sometimes enter into competition with other employees as a result of the way in which
employers structure the conflict, not of any necessary conflict of interest among
themselves (Meiksins, 1985, quoted in Smith and Willmott, ibid.). When they are
accused of sharing the corporate core values initiated by capital's endorsement of
corporate culture, they can afford to make excuses by asserting that they did not share
the values but only the expressions. By contrast, when the 'unintended consequences'
turn out to be caused by the effect of de-skilling or lack of expertise on the part of
labour, managers are likely to identify with petty bourgeois class positions and stick to
their 'part function of capital' with distancing from their 'part function of labour'.
Making the ideology of professionalism distinctive, they may try to evade the blame
and elude the sharing of collective responsibilities. This way of escaping responsibilities
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is a tacit pattern of moral expediency which bears analogy to the chameleon. However,
the managers may often be challenged by an appeal to self-conscious moral choices.
For instance, Liedtka (1989) discusses the interplay of individual and corporate
value systems and the varying nature of the value conflicts faced by managers. Her
value congruence model is composed of the manager's individual values and the
company's values. The consonant and contending values are respectively applied to
both the individual values and the company values. That is, when the individual values
are contending, the manager is in internal disequilibrium, having "mixed emotions"
about the decision under consideration. However, when the individual values are
strongly held, they aid decision-making in the face of corporate mixed messages. The
individual again returns to a state of internal equilibrium but must deal with contending
organisational values. The behaviour fostered by this muddled corporate message
might be reflected in the opportunism of those who indulge, with little apparent sense
of wrong-doing, in insider trading, abetted in their pursuits by companies whose
espoused codes of conduct differ from those actually in use. In line with the
interactions of the manager's individual values and the corporate values, a diversity of
situations can be constituted. Liedtka (ibid.) illustrates a manager's case that described
his frustration in attempting to resolve a quality control problem in his area. He has
been unable to determine on which shift or with which worker it originates. He
characterises his most important values as producing high quality work and treating his
people fairly. In an attempt to remedy the quality problem, he has decided to give all
six workers on that situation a verbal warning, though five of them are probably
innocent. This is a difficult decision for him, given the high value he places upon being
"fair". In explaining how he arrived at this situation, he discussed the trade-offs
involved:
"Being fair runs into my personal success. The conflict is that the
production floor is a representation ofme - it reflects my reputation.
Versus, how fair can I be to the supervisors? How much is a lack of
training versus poor attitude? But if you sit and try to be fair to each
individual, you never get anything done, because there's always a piece
that wasn't their fault. So you basically have to find some poor soul to
blame - but that rubs."
This case shows a dilemma that a manager can face relating to his contending values (a
choice between his own perfectionism and regard for quality versus being fair to his
subordinates). Indeed, the ethical issues experienced by managers are so varied as to
go beyond the formal relations with their subordinates. It is reported, for instance, that
a number of interviewed managers discuss incidents in which they were concerned
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about the kind and degrees of consideration they ought to extend to employees above
and beyond their formal relationship to them as supervisors and employers (Waters, et
al., 1986;375). However, it is a striking contrast that managers are more likely to be
enthusiastic regarding the moral issues within the company than they are regarding the
moral concerns without the company. This is evidenced when the interviewed
managers' moral concerns with their customers are found to be ambivalent. In general,
the interviewed managers in Waters et al.'s (ibid.) study felt that their relationships with
their customers ought to be guided by standards of fair treatment, honesty, and loyalty
but they assumed quite varied positions regarding the extent to which these standards
were to be defined and/or modified by conventional competitive practices. This
suggests that the moral righteousness for customers is only ostensibly observed and is
more likely to be compromised according to the arbitrary conventional competitive
practices which are often incompatible with the righteousness sustained by the
managers concerned.
It seems worthwhile to note two intriguing facts from the empirical findings in
Waters et al.'s (1986) study. The first is that the interviewed managers tend to be not
directly expressing specific moral standards with respect to their own behaviour. In
other words, there was a substantial recognition of moral ambiguity and uncertainty
with respect to their own behaviour when the managers were able to describe that
behaviour in relation to conflicting norms, unclear responsibilities and/or justifying
reasons. When no such moderating arguments were employed, the behaviour was
labelled as clearly unethical and attributed to not to "self' but to a collective "we" or to
specific or generalised "others". This seems to convey an aspect of human nature that
man is generous to his own conduct while being morally strict about other people's
conduct. At the same time, it is indicative of the managers' innate disposition for moral
judgment which is likely to be more extrinsically projected onto the "other" rather than
on themselves and exposed upon a moral critique of the others' behaviour.
The second is that managers experience moral responsibility and concern with
respect to those transactions in which they experience themselves as having the power
to affect the well-being of the other party to the transaction. This tendency was well
expressed in the result that the most frequently mentioned context ofmoral issues was
with respect to employees. Underpinning the cases in this context is the theme that
managers can and must exercise power in their relationships with subordinates. This
takes the form of hiring and firing, rewarding or punishing, treating them fairly or
discriminating, helping or not helping. Contrary to this, the least frequently mentioned
context of moral issues was with respect to peers and superiors. And the interviewed
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managers seldom brought up issues related to water and air pollution, social audits,
general issues of corporate social responsibility, or corporate governance. It may well
be that they failed to consider these issues at any length because these concerns do not
directly touch upon the everyday responsibilities of individual managers whose felt
power is narrowly limited. As Teulings (1986) contends, the power of the individual
manager (and his sense of power, in particular) thus lags behind the power of
management. The manager forms part of an extensive machinery of power, without
being able to derive from it any real sense of sharing that power. The managers'
perceived lack of sharing the corporate power is most likely to make them estranged
from commitment to the corporate values espoused in the name of corporate culture.
Recognising the corporate intent aimed at capital accumulation by means of shared
corporate values, the managers may share only the expressions of the espoused values
as their strategic conduct to cope with the reality of their powerlessness.
By contrast, the argument can be posited that managers are not totally blocked
from sharing corporate power. It is certain that power is to some degree allowed to be
shared by the managers. However, the process and effect of power bestowal leaves
room for ethical disputes. The myth of sovereignty fostered by modernity should be a
focus of analysis here because power is recognised to be relegated through the
empowerment of 'individual sovereignty'. As to the individual sovereignty which
individual managers may cleave to as a counter-measure against the vulnerability of
their subjectivity, Willmott (1994a: 89) contends;
In the institutions ofmodernity, it is contended, individuals are
routinely constituted to develop and demonstrate a sense of themselves
as sovereign agents. This self-understanding is appealing insofar as it
confers a sense of autonomy and self-determination. But it is also
demanding and frightening insofar as it exacts upon individuals a heavy
burden of responsibility for taking charge of self-identity, fortune and fate.
If the preservation of sovereign agents by conferring a sense of autonomy and
self-determination is managerially intended to induce an intensification of
accountabilities (Munro, 1995), it is a typical mode of contradictions in the capitalist
labour process. For the preservation of employee rights by conferring a sense of
autonomy and self-determination is eventually appropriated for capital accumulation.
This argument can be amplified and illustrated through a consideration of Foucault's
notion of subjection (or subjectification). Foucault (1982) characterises subjection as a
form of power that operates (productively) by defining agency in individualised,
self-knowing ways. Subjection, Foucault (1982) writes, 'categorises the individual,
marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of
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truth upon him which he must recognise and which others must recognise in him'. The
power of subjection, it is suggested, operates through (modern) practices that bestow
upon human beings the sense of 'freedom' and 'responsibility' for the closure of
indeterminacy and presents subjects with the means of exercising their sovereignty by
offloading the burden of responsibility onto one or more (powerful) authorities - in the
form of religion, corporate membership, parenthood, career or other anxiety-assuaging
icons of individual salvation or 'success' (Willmott, 1994a). For instance, a manager
who is in control of (or, sovereign over) specific tasks grounded on a corporate
strategy can divest any blame from the public by unloading the burden of responsibility
onto his corporation which initiated the corporate strategy. This practice may seduce
the manager to be habituated to a manner in which he is privileged to be free from any
moral accusations and responsibilities.
The corporate practice of individualising managers' sovereignty may result in
some negative effects which are also ethically problematic. Boosting individual
sovereignty may drive managers into a myth of narcissism and thus make them
deficient in ethical competence (Bauman, 1993) to judge their experiences from the
objective viewpoints. They come to regard their sovereignty as paramount among all
the rationales by which to assess the ethically contestable matters. Insofar as the
interpretations of these ethically contestable matters serve to secure their sovereignty,
they are accepted as desirable by the sovereign managers. It is the case, in the end, that
the managers consider their subjective judgments to be more credible than the
objective authorities like religious precepts, consultancy with experienced seniors,
reference to professional guidelines when trying to approach the ethical conflicts
emerging in their everyday practices.
As Willmott (1994a) argues, the ethical merit of 'strong' corporate cultures
embodied in 'shared values' is also considered to 'provide the framework in which
respect for the individual is a pervasive theme in the excellent companies' (Peters and
Waterman, 1982), and thus subjection for employees is feasible. For employees are
induced to become consumers of corporate culture as they are presented with
opportunities to express their 'individuality' - to 'stick out'. A confirmation of their
sense ofbeing autonomous subjects is engineered as opportunities are created for them
to enact, and thereby reproduce, a normative framework designed by a corporate
culture discourse (Dahler-Larsen, 1994). Conversely, any perceived failure, anticipated
or real, to reproduce the values recognisable by the mandates of corporate culture is
associated with feelings of anxiety, guilt or shame. In this way, individualising
disciplines of subjection simultaneously heighten anxiety as they problematise
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self-identity and provide diverse, if evanescent, means of assuaging personal
responsibility (Willmott, 1994a).
Indeed, the individualisation of modern subjects produces those persons who
are seemingly capable of autonomous action, yet who are also acutely vulnerable
because they are held individually responsible for their actions. If they have to rely
upon the more powerful authorities like their corporations by unloading the heavy
burden of responsibilities, it is eventually the case that such ethical values as 'freedom'
and 'responsibility' are appropriated for reinforcing the conditions ofmanagers' reliance
upon the corporations, which produces and reproduces their own subordination and
leaves the inequalities of power relations intact. This is suggestive of why the moral
standards the managers invoke remain precarious and unclear (Bird and Waters, 1987).
Since managerial moral standards are fragmented and only partially conventionalised,
managers' feelings of obligation with respect to these standards are uncertain, and
often, managers are unclear about what course of action is morally appropriate in a
condition where they are totally subordinated to the corporation. And that
opportunities to confirm a sense of individual sovereignty are highly valued indicates
why the managers invoke the moral standards as largely private intuitions rather than
collective and public agreements (Bird and Waters, ibid.).
The contradiction inherent in the effects of boosting individual sovereignty
becomes evident in its incompatibility with the collective ethos of corporate culture as
a normative control mechanism. When Foucault (1982; quoted in Knights, 1990)
discusses how subjects become 'tied to their own identity by a conscience or
self-knowledge', he specifies the individualising effects of power on subjectivity by
contending that power mechanisms (for example, the examination, occupational
recruitment, career systems, and so on) have the effect of separating individuals off
from one another and forcing them back upon themselves. Paradoxically, another
coexistent control mechanism is here contrasted with such individualising control,
which is drawn upon the collectivising power of shared values: corporate culture as a
control mechanism. On the one hand, the effect of the condition that individual
managers are separated off from one another is to restrict the competence of individual
subjects to a limited reservoir of self-knowledge. On the other hand, the corporate
endorsement of shared values bewilders the managers because they are, in reality,
caught in a dilemma between the collectivist obligation of shared values and the
individualistic separation of themselves. This dilemma may incite the employees to
share only the expressions as their strategic conduct by which to assuage the dilemma
in an expedient way. Indeed the social act of 'sharing' implies essentially a two-faced
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entity: 'unite and divide'. This dualistic contradiction is echoed by Knights (1990: 324)
when he contends:
what characterises modern Western technologies of power is that they
elevate the independent freedom and intentionality of subjects while
often narrowing the forms and limiting the means by which these can be
sustained. It is this contradiction in capitalist society that is seen
by humanistic Marxists as alienation or a denial of the possibilities
for human beings to express their essential nature.
The incompatibility between individualising effects and a collectivist ethos of
shared values is a representative contradiction in capitalist labour process. This
condition of incompatibility may lead the individual manager to a state ofmoral anomie
in which he suffers confusion as to how to acquit himself following what content of
ethical standards. Such a confused state of normlessness is caused by a clash between
two incompatible credos imposed upon the manager. He is left with a sense of ethical
disorder such that he is conditioned to relativise the cause of unexpected consequences
relating to his involvement in the work. He is habituated to the conduct of taking credit
and divesting blame in a self-advantageous manner. This can be delineated as a process
of 'cultural conditioning' of moral abuse. Instead of penetrating this contradictory
fetishism of individual sovereignty, and thereby releasing ourselves from the unjust
struggle of securing the sovereignty, we direct our efforts to maintaining the social
conditions required for its confirmation (Willmott, 1994a). For instance, the managers
subjected to the precarious contingencies of market relations are eager to seek for
existential comfort by developing a strategy and a plan of action. This comfort comes
from the sense that strategic intervention can give managers a feeling that their destiny
is at least in their own hands (Knights and Morgan, 1991a: 264) to the neglect of any
ethical import of their strategic intervention.
Finally, what is conceivable of the managers' ethical subjectivity formed against
the contradictions inherent in the corporate strategy and control is their 'resistance'.
The managers who refuse the moral muteness (Bird and Waters, 1989) are deemed to
be 'moral reformers'. It is plausible that the stronger the pressures from the top-down
hierarchy are so as to abolish any attempt ofmanagers to keep their ethical identity, the
more the managers' aspiration for identity work becomes strenuous. They may try to
constitute their identity by registering the 'differences' even from their colleagues. For
instance, managers' attitudes on the corporate strategy may vary according to their
personal differences. Within the lower ranks of an organisation, we are likely to
encounter mass indifference or even cynicism about the way in which the discourse of
strategy is used by corporate management (Knights and Morgan, 1991a: 260). The
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managers' experience in the labour process may be at variance with values acquired
outside that process (Friedman, 1990:185), bringing about a diversity of resistance
practices. The subtle and covert resistance practices are discussed by labour process
theorists (Knights, et al., 1994).
For instance, Jermier and LaNuez (1994) suggest that low or reduced personal
control and the experience of negative affect at the workplace underlie many acts of
sabotage, and managers as well as technocrats have experienced increasing
powerlessness and insecurity. What is lacking in their analysis of managers' motive for
resistance is that managers may have felt moral stress caused by the apprehension that
moral talk will threaten the organisational harmony, efficiency and their own reputation
for power and effectiveness (Bird and Waters, 1989). It follows that although they
address moral issues in their company, they are bound to be cautious such that they
share only the expressions of moral talk to the extent that their moral talk does not
threaten the organisational harmony, efficiency and their own reputation for power and
effectiveness. As another case, Collinson (1994) describes two quite different courses
of resistance, each related to a particular mode of worker subjectivity. The dominant
pattern of resistance within the factory is what he calls 'resistance through distance'
whereby because they were being treated like commodities, the workers distanced
themselves mentally from their work and from management's efforts to make them part
of the 'team'. The other pattern of resistance is called as 'resistance through persistence'
since the unequally treated woman in an insurance company resisted by deploying
formal procedures of protest evolved through a prolonged series of meetings, hearings
and negotiations. Though an unethical cause is regarded as a motive for resistance in
Collinson's study, it is confined to an individual's personal protest against the injustice.
Rather, it is crucial to bring 'resistance' to prominence against the circumstances in
which the ethically contestable practices are deeply embedded in the capitalist structure
of social production and taken for granted to be accepted as the elements of corporate
culture. This may lead to a collective form of resistance as far as the members are
critically conscious of these practices perpetuated in their company. But, the labour
process which is enforced by surveillance mechanism may turn the members' resistance
into the strengthening of the prevailing power relations. As has been argued so far, the
regime of 'strong' corporate culture mediates and facilitates this mechanism of
subjugation to the corporate power. The moral expressions which are espoused by
corporate culture to be shared allow for power effects to be asymmetrical and
stabilised without assumptions of a totalitarian state.
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In summary, managers are understood to take on a varying degree of
involvement with the ethically relevant circumstances in their lived experience in the
company. This is deemed to constitute their ethical subjectivity in diverse ways. If they
felt increasing powerlessness and insecurity, they would prefer to remain indifferent to
the ethically problematic contingencies in their lived experience. When they are
seduced and ordered to morally compromise, they involuntarily come to join the
accomplice in unethical conduct which can be occasioned by the imperatives of
corporate strategy. Or when they are obliged to re-present the tenet of shared moral
values by an agenda of corporate culture, it is the case that they partake in a complicity
to manipulate the moral values for managing the impression of their corporate image
both internally and externally. As Bird et al. (1989) argue, managers may also use
moral expressions and talk ethics not in order to judge the Tightness or wrongness of
particular decisions but to express personal feelings and to evade the moral judgments
of others. For instance, they use moral expressions to rationalise their morally
questionable actions by modifying critical judgments and invoking mitigating
circumstances. Or moral expressions can be used to complain and to seek sympathy for
themselves. Characteristically, they articulate the frustrated feelings by talking about
their own difficulties and the unfairness and insensitivity of others, and their own
under-recognised moral strengths (Bird et al., ibid.). By contrast, if they are critically
conscious of the unethical practices associated with the imperatives of corporate
strategy, they may dare to resist them even in subtle and covert ways. However, the
difficulty with which managers do resist the ideological structure of authority within
their companies or industries is evidenced by an empirical result that rarely did the
interviewed managers directly refer to specific political or managerial philosophies
(Bird et al., ibid). This seems to imply the extent to which the power of corporate
control strategies subdue the managers as employees.
Conclusion
I have so far discussed the ways in which managers as middle groupings were
brought into the labour process and entrapped in the imperatives of corporate strategic
discourses. I suggested that the 'allocative' nature of corporate strategy foreshadowed
ethical claims which penetrated all the different levels of management. I also indicated
that though corporate strategy pursues its moral legitimacy by providing effective ways
of management, its multifarious aspects should be reflected in the light of ethical
implications.
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In recognition of an increasingly wide range of lived experiences ofmanagers
mediating between the corporate management and the operational control, I suggested
that an appreciation of the constitution of their subjectivity was vital. For it helps
grasp how the contradictions inherent in the reproduction of monopoly capitalism are
conveyed and mediated by the managers' lived experiences. I argued that their moral
conduct was also influenced by their interactions with the mechanism of corporate
culture. As Bauman (1993;32) puts,
morality is a practice negotiated between learning agents capable of
growth on the one hand and a culture capable of change on the other.
'Ethicality' is constructed through the reciprocity of cultural relations between
capital and labour. Specifically, capital makes use of 'corporate culture' as a strategy
for corporate management, and employees also seek for their security by partaking in a
complicity to make appearance of sharing values (even moral values) through the
medium of shared expressions. Significantly, the labour process whereby corporate
power and dominance is reinforced by surveillance mechanism turns any effort of
employees to maintain their identity work into the strengthening of prevailing power
relations. The managers' intermediate status between
'part function of capital' and 'part function of labour' mediates and facilitates this
reproduction of prevailing power relations and inequalities. For managers are
entrapped in the managerial labour process which is characterised by the
incompatibility between the individuated functions of management and the collectivist
ethos of shared values. In consequence, each manager appropriates the shared
expressions in an expedient way for success in his own labour process, and the ways of
expediency are compounded with different levels of management. As a result, the
extent to which morality is corporately appropriated through the medium of shared
expressions is escalated such that the managers' moral expediency makes them trapped
in a vicious circle ofmoral cynicism and dependence.
Indeed, managers are brought into the labour process whereby they should
undertake the burden of existential tensions in the reproduction of capitalist relations
of production which is typified by the prevailing system of inequalities and injustice. A
critical reflection of the Edinso managers' interview accounts from the next chapter is
expected to present some insights into how they performed 'the moral' in the context of
the imperatives of corporate strategy. The reflection is predicated on the proposition
that the managers' ethical subjectivity, constituted in the context of new managerial




DYNAMICS OF 'SHARING' IN EDINSO
Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to investigate moral and ethical implications embedded
in the processes through which new managerialist practices are enacted in a business
firm. I suggest that such new managerial practices as 'corporate culture' and 'Quality
Agenda' imply a certain degree of moral and ethical problems. Bearing this in mind, I
have put an emphasis on a distinction between 'shared values' and 'shared expressions',
which has been established as an analytic concept to explicate the members' moral
conduct especially in the context where they should cope with the imperatives of the
corporate strategies in the form of new managerial discourses.
This chapter introduces some empirical illustrations of new managerial
practices in Edinso, a financial services company in the U.K. Basically, I suppose that
the managers' accounts represent a diversity of competing views which might be
marginalised by Edinso's core values espoused in the name of corporate culture. As a
typical insurance company located in the U.K., Edinso has implemented a couple of
prospective corporate strategies in recent years and accomplished a successful
performance at least in respect of its financial goals. As Knights and Morgan
(1995; 195-6) suggest, the adoption of corporate strategies and systems of strategic
management by British insurance companies in general is seen to have been
precipitated by a more competitive and productive economy stimulated by the state
since the early 1980s. The competitive external environments must have been a
catalyst for constituting the cultural manifestations by which Edinso members'
everyday practices are significantly influenced. For they collectively believe the market
to be very competitive and take it for granted as an inextricable attribute of the
external environments. Insofar as the strategic management is, by nature, bound to
cherish the corporately selected values and concentrate resources on them, these
corporate core values are doomed to be the source of inequalities in the organisation
of work. And they mediate a fortification of asymmetrical relations prevailing in the
company, bringing about a range of unjust practices. An exclusive endorsement of the
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core values is most likely to marginalise the competing views which may emerge from
the part of employees. When the rationale, deployed to justify a marginalisation of
competing views, is not rational enough to attain consent from the employees, it is
simply tantamount to a contradiction inherent in all the different modes ofmanagement
control by corporate management. Given that such management control devices as
'strong corporate culture', 'quality initiatives', 'Total Quality Management' (TQM) are
of the same stream in a new managerialism, an investigation of moral limits of those
corporate strategies is meant to pinpoint the inadequacies of the cultural change
agenda in Edinso.
Comparative Analyses of Interview Accounts
In the empirical chapters, a review of 14 interview accounts is conducted with
a comparative approach to them. Each interview was carried out for about one and
half hours during the period between Dec. 1991 and Feb. 1992. In accordance with
premises on a quasi-conversational informal interview, the practicalities of the
ethnographic interview conducted in my fieldwork take on indirectness as its principal
characteristic. Whereas the conventional interview questions are more likely to be
direct in order to extract 'information' from the interviewees, the ethnographic
interview questions flow naturally from interaction with the interviewees. This is not to
say that some questions are not prepared, but rather these are framed to enter the
setting as naturally as possible; in a conversational manner rather than a probing
manner since businessmen tend to be very sensitive to moral or ethical terms and
reluctant to give their views on such sensitive issues. A set of question items I used in
my fieldwork are presented at [Appendix 1], These questions are classifiable
according to Spradley's (1979) taxonomy of ethnographic questions: descriptive
questions, structural questions, and contrast questions. The first question about the
interviewee's ROUTINE belongs to 'descriptive questions' which aim to elicit a large
sample of utterances in the interviewee's native language. Given that experience
questions are also classified into descriptive questions (Spradley, ibid.; 88-9), the fifth
question about SUCCESS can belong to a category of descriptive questions. At the
same time, a composite format of 'satisfying' and 'disappointing' within the fold of
SUCCESS is characteristic of contrast questions. The remaining questions from the
second to the fifth belong to structural questions because these questions are expected
to enable the ethnographic interviewer to discover information about domains, the
basic units in an interviewee's cultural knowledge. They allow the interviewer to find
out how informants have organised their knowledge within their company (ibid.;60).
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With the help of the informant, Mr Group Actuary in Edinso, I could have
meetings with a cluster ofmanagers working at central posts. While proceeding on the
interviews, the interviewed managers' accounts were occasionally cross-checked with
one another. Now they are synthetically reflected in a basic framework of
distinctiveness between 'corporate core values' and 'ambivalence', which has largely
influenced the Edinso managers' ethical subjectivity relating to their managerial jobs.
Here, it seems necessary to underline that, as Silverman (1985) suggests, accounts as
interview data need not be seen as true or false reports, but as 'displays of perspective,
or moral forms'. The framework around which a variety of moral forms is constituted
and expressed is specifically construed as cotflictive distinctiveness between
'corporate core values' and 'ambivalence'. This is premised on a recognition that the
members of Edinso are competent individuals who can shape activities and aspirations
apart from the ones espoused and commanded by Edinso's core values.
Administration and Its Business Networks in Edinso
Edinso seems to be largely regarded as quite successful by the managers whom
I interviewed. Edinso has recently recorded a rapid growth in terms of a size of the
company, at least. Eight years ago Edinso had slightly less than five hundred people.
Edinso now has over seventeen hundred ~ in the whole of the UK. Edinso's record
growth seems to have been remarkable enough to meet its apparent business goal
which is officially recognised: 'returning monetary benefits to the customers
(policyholders) who are holding the company's insurance products'. This euphoria is
observed by most of the interviewed managers and is clearly manifested in Edinso's
official documents. This is flamboyantly demonstrated in an official documentation (An
Introduction to Edinso, 1991).
"1990 was another recordyearfor the Society. Total Revenue premiums
exceeded 600m poundsfor thefirst time(+40%). New premiums increased
by 47% compared with 1989. Of these, 97.2m pounds were regular,
304m pounds were single premiums. Over the decade 1980-90, the
Society's new premium income hadgrown over tenfold, registering new
business growth among the highest in the UK insurance industry.
Edinso's expenses reflected this growth in sales, specifically in staffing,
but also as a result of the 1986 Financial Services Act and new UK
pensions legislation. However, greater business volumes and increased
productivity have more than offset these costs, leading to enhanced
profitability."
From a combination of interviewed managers' euphoria and Edinso's official
documentation, it seems certain that such goals as rapid growth in a short period,
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increased productivity, and enhanced profitability are regarded as Edinso's 'core
corporate values'. They are portrayed as essential to bringing about Edinso's excellence
as a business firm. However, given that any company can continue to act in seemingly
self-contradictory ways, Edinso cannot be exceptional in having a good deal of
self-contradictions embedded in its ways of pursuing corporate core values. More
specifically, it cannot be ruled out that in the process of strongly emphasising such
core corporate values, a considerable extent of other competing views might have
been systematically repressed, unconsciously deleted, or deliberately disregarded. In
constructing this marginalisation of other competing views, the corporate
management's prerogatives must have played a major role such that Edinso's moral
legitimacy is threatened in its authentic sense.
In the sense that communication channels are crucial in the formation of the
likelihood that other competing views are marginalised in Edinso, a glance at the
group and divisional management structure [Appendix 2] seems meaningful. This
organisational chart needs to be understood in terms of its realities to adapt to the
challenge of changing environments. As Mr Operations Manager mentions:
"The industry we work in is very complex and it is very difficidt to have
an overall grasp ofwhat is happening within that industry. The rules
change. They seem to change every week."
This turbulent environment is also delineated in a document. (The Edinso
Range, 1991: p.l) in this way:
"Edinso is committed to the principle of independentfinancial advice.
The financial services industry has been subject to a considerable period
ofupheaval; scarcely a month goes by without new or revised legislation
causing all ofus to re-examine our ways ofworking.".
Accordingly, the frequent instances to re-examine Edinso's ways ofworking are
rendered to bring about a lot of conflicts which are likely to be intertwined with ethical
disputes in Edinso. Notably, Edinso seems to be able to be permitted an allowance for
making excuses for unexpected consequences by recourse to the frequent changes of
legislation. In consequence, this may cause members to be habituated to moral
expediency. Though Edinso professes one of its aims to be taking responsibilities to its
industry and to the community [cf. Note 1 of this chapter], it is liable to impute the
unintended consequences to the frequent changes of legislation rather than to its own
faults. If this is the case, the moral profession of taking responsibilities is only a
perfunctory sharing of moral expressions. In the meantime, a dynamic network
revolving around Edinso can be diagrammed as in [Appendix 3], It is expected to give
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a grasp of how the day-to-day activities are structurally constituted around Edinso. In
addition to the circumstance that Edinso is located in a multilateral network of
relations, the government's position above Edinso is noteworthy because Edinso is
strongly influenced by the changes of governmental legislations.
To recapitulate Edinso's fabric of social relations in and around the company, it
is understood that a measure of conflicts arise out of confrontations between the
corporate values espoused by executive level management and the employees'
ambivalence surfacing from their competing views. The pressures from incessant
changes ofwork environments oblige Edinso to meet conflicting demands in adapting
to new types of products and new systems to account for those products under a
condition of limited resources. Edinso's social network coupled with the influence of
external environments presages the extent to which the members' competing views
should be silenced in preference for the company interests. It also can influence the
managers' attitudes to the corporate values enacted by corporate management because
Edinso's social network is entitled to confer the legitimacy on the corporate
management's espousal of the core values. For example, the core values justifiable by
recourse to rapidly changing legal environments are more receptive to the managers
despite any subsequent ethical problems perceived by them in their managerial work.
Moreover, the binding force of the core values is likely to be strengthened when they
are legitimated to be compatible with the collective meanings of the corporate culture
ofEdinso, to which we now turn.
Dynamics of Edinso's Corporate Culture
As an independent business firm, Edinso must have been aware of its identity
in terms of its own ways of practices which have sustained its business, and its own
ways of shaping the ethos which has sedimented for over 180 years of history. As was
introduced before, a predominant value which is crucial in shaping Edinso's identity is
undoubtedly a successful level of financial performances. Thus, it is feasible that the
problem in Edinso is primarily defined as a problem of financial performances just as
corporate culture protagonists, in contradistinction to other camps in the field of
organisational culture, pointed directly at organisational performance, however
operationalised, as their dependent variable and their key area of problem definition
and relevance (Dahler-Larsen, 1994). This recognition is rendered to illuminate a
context where Edinso's organisational culture is transformed into its corporate culture
when it is mediated by corporate strategic discourses which subject the company's
cultural manifestations to a systematic programme of planning and control. Indeed, the
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problems in Edinso are re-constituted and displaced by the corporate strategic
discourses in the context of its corporate culture (Knights and Morgan, 1991). This
way of re-constituting the problems in Edinso by means of corporate strategic
discourses is ultimately aimed at securing the corporate hegemony. Thus, it follows
that hegemony is secured through "cultural leadership" by which hegemonic rule is
accomplished through the production of subjects who define and perceive their
interests to be served by the imperatives of corporate strategy. What these interests are
will "depend upon the use of particular discursive means of formulating objectives and
situating the agent in relation to them" (Knights and Willmott, 1987:48). In short, the
deliberate management of corporate culture serves to potentiate the corporate
management's hegemonic rule by selectively enacting the core values and appropriating
morality which is conveyed by the core values.
It seems significant to note that some attributes which form Edinso's cultural
uniqueness contribute to making an appearance of moral congruence within the
company. Some components of Edinso's corporate culture are recognised to play a
key role in the constitution of the ways in which Edinso's corporate values are enacted
among the employees' discursive consciousness, and accordingly influence the level of
ethical climate in work situations. Therefore, scrutinization of the major components
of Edinso's corporate culture should show why and how 'the ethical' is central to
Edinso's existential status as a life insurance company. It will also shed light on how
the core values, fortified through cultural justification, are given the collective
meanings so as to have a binding force against the emergence of ambivalence of the
managers as employees.
A. Complexity and Competitiveness
Complexity and competitiveness as the general characteristics of the insurance
industry are also major determinants of the degree of binding force of Edinso's core
values on the managers' conduct. The factor of 'competitiveness' is particularly
intriguing in terms of its influence on the emergence and formation of Edinso's
corporate culture as corporate strategy. For, as Dahler-Larsen (1994) argues, a crisis
in competitiveness in the West (as epitomised specifically by the relative failure of
certain American industries vis-a-vis Japanese competitors) motivated the corporate
leaders even in the British insurance industries to look for new tools to improve
innovativeness and performance. The cross-national character of the problems of
competitiveness has motivated a focus on cultural factors in this search for
determinants of relative competitive advantages (Knights and Morgan, 1995:201-203).
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Along with competitiveness, the complexity of the job characteristics is also
noteworthy. As Mr Service Director describes it;
"It is unpredictable, although the specific aspects I am talking about
are now known and stated[ but the complications that are involved are
very dramatic. For example, any one person now, if they have been
given the minimum pension required by law, could have sixteen
different slices ofbenefit to really achieve thai because of legislation
requirements, and valuation ofbenefits up to retirement age means
differing requirements ofescalation after retirement. Andwith
equalisation ofpension ages coming in as well, it meansyou could
have benefits accruing to two different pension ages. So all in all, you
have to split down any one person'spension intofifteen or sixteen
different sums -- and value them all in a different way. It's very
difficult to deal with all the possibilities."
Such a high level of complexity in job characteristics is likely to confine the
managers' scope of actions to a limited range. As was discussed in Chapter 4, though
the sense of 'freedom' and 'responsibility' is possibly bestowed upon the managers, the
complexity associated with their jobs makes them offload the burden of responsibility
onto the more powerful authority - their company. As a result, the corporately
espoused core values are relatively consolidated with a residue of restricting the
emergence of ambivalence from the managers. Moreover, it is projected that
competitiveness in the insurance industry makes it less likely for the managers to dare
to raise their competing views and ambivalence. As Mr Service Director adds evidence
of competitiveness in the insurance industry at which Edinso is located:
"But added to it is the complexity of the business we are in and, to a
certain extent, the competitiveness of the industry. It is, Iwould
think, the most competitive industry that we have — a hundredplus
Life offices all dealing with the same sort of thing, as a generality."
In such service and information industries as the insurance industry, the
managers, on the one hand, exercise greater discretion and interact increasingly with
the environment, providing more opportunities for ethical decision making to occur.
But, on the other hand, the most competitive industry may bring about too much
pressure upon the managers such that an undesirable syndrome of 'there is no
alternative' may impede the managers' will to choose a more ethically valid procedure
according to their competing views and ambivalence. These contextual traits of
'complexity' and 'competitiveness' may enable the corporate management to retain
control of the resources required to run Edinso's business. A rhetoric of 'complexity'
and 'competitiveness' may become quite expedient for the corporate management to
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use in order to set the corporate agenda and structure the patterns of communication.
Being able to speak without continuous or sustained challenges, the corporate
management can reconstitute the structures that define the corporate core values and
confirm the legitimacy of their moral leadership. The ways in which the corporate
management constitute Edinso's relationships with external intermediaries are
meaningful in this respect.
B. Relationships with Edinso's Intermediaries
A fierce degree of competitiveness in the insurance industry must have
precipitated Edinso to take some measures against the external challenges from the
marketplace. Because Edinso's business network with customers is characterised as
'indirect' by way of intermediaries, Edinso's efforts to survive in fierce competition are
duly to be attuned to meeting the intermediaries' demands. Being persuasively
legitimated by the corporate management's interpretation of complex and competitive
market pressures, keeping good relations with the intermediaries is conferred a
collective meaning and accordingly has a binding force such that it is considered to be
a significant part ofEdinso's corporate culture.
The structure of multiple relationships among Edinso staff, its sales force,
customers, and intermediaries (I.F.A -Independent Financial Advisors) as brokers may
contain no less ethical issues in this particular type of business transactions than any
other complex business relations. The significant position which IFAs occupy in their
relations with Edinso is publicly endorsed at some official statements of Edinso: "The
Edinso remains a staunch and vocal support of the Independent Financial Adviser" as
is proclaimed at the introductory bulletin published by Edinso. The Chief Executive's
statement in Annual Review and Financial Highlights 1993 also emphasises the
importance ofgood relationships with IFAs when he said;
"We are proud of the accolades we have received for product quality,
service and investment performance, and see one of our main
challenges as being to improve the public's choice of solutions to
their pensions and savings needs. In this we will continue to work closely
with leading IFAs".
Though maintaining good relationships with IFAs is corporately espoused as a
shared core value for Edinso, there are yet some ethical problems embedded in the
process of directing the individual managers' actions according to the core value of
maintaining a staunch support for IFAs. As an independent agent in charge of
objectively evaluating Edinso's performance and providing the would-be policyholders
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with fair information, IFAs apparently require information which is as comprehensive
as possible relating to Edinso's business activities. However, because the objective
assessment of performance is confined to the financial indicators, the hidden aspect of
the processes whereby Edinso's performance is accomplished is treated as unseen and
thus insignificant for the customers. Importantly, the undetected practices of Edinso
staff may do harm to the customers. This is evidenced in Mr Service Director's
accounts which make the salesmen's business practice look highly questionable in
terms of its ethical transparency:
"So, it is a very competitive industry as such and salesmen might almost
hide the truth, not go intofull details ofeverything, if they think it will mean
that some other companywill get the business — which does mean that ten
years down the line apolicyholder may have thought such
and such a thing would happen but something totally different happens
based on the contract's specifications. "
And he continues to specify about the background in which the salesmen
almost inadvertently hide the truth and do not go into full details of everything.
"That's just one aspect. The bigger cause is undoubtedly the
complications, both legal and the product terms that may offer the
flexibility. It is a very complex operation. And it's so complex that we
could not operate the way we do now five years ago. We just couldn't
have offered the types ofcontracts without the use of the computer. To
contemplate offering daily pricedfunds, sixteen differentfunds, to one
individual wouldjust be unthinkable seven years ago."
After confiding the salesmen's ethically questionable practices to me, he
attributes the cause of the salesmen's insincere attitudes to the very complex operation.
This complexity is used to make excuses for the salesmen's insincere conduct. Indeed,
complexity as a cultural feature of Edinso is regarded as a collective meaning to which
members can resort in order to make excuses for their ethically problematic
comportment. But the salesmen's ethically problematic practices should not be justified
simply by recourse to a very complex operation. More significant is that fair
information which should be unbiasedly provided to the customers is tacitly distorted
by the salesmen. Worse is the fact that IFAs' independent criteria fall short of dealing
with this hidden aspect of Edinso's business activities because IFAs are only
preoccupied with Edinso's financial performances.
In the meantime, the independent financial advisers seem to be placed at a
special status in Edinso's business transactions. As Mr Operations Manager introduces:
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"And what we do is to try andmake sure that ourproducts and services
are strong enoughfor those to be recommended. Recommended without
bias —for we don't own the Adviser. He's his own man. He can decide what
company's products to recommend—should it be Edinso, should it
be Standard Life, or whatever. So, the discipline on ourselves is to make
sure that we make it difficultfor him not to recommend us because the
product is so strong and investment performance is good and service is
good. We have said very strongly that this is the best wayfor our
industry to work. So, that's why we are supporting that whole area of
financial advice. ... Each element in your service is analysed very
carefully by the Independent Financial Advisers. When someone retires,
they don't want theirpension two weeks after they retire. They want
theirpension on the day they retire. So we've got to gear ourselves up
to demonstrate to these Independent Financial Advisers that we deliver.
People who want their money, get their money. That's very important."
In this account, self-contradictory statements are detected in that Edinso puts
pressure on IFAs while it feigns to fully acknowledge the IFAs' independence. "We
make it difficult for him not to recommend us", or "we are supporting that whole area
of financial advice" seem to be concrete actions on the part of Edinso, which might
impair to some extent Edinso's self-assertion that IFAs' assessment is totally
independent. The feasibility that these self-contradictory attitudes might come into
play is apparent in the fact that Edinso staff have most regular contact with IFAs
outside the organisation. As Mr Personnel Manager puts;
"Asyou'veprobably knownfrom the people you've already spoken to, in
this business we tend not to deal with the end consumer. We sell most
ofour business through Independent Financial Advisers. Brokers.
Professional intermediaries. So they are the people we have most regular
contact with outside the organisation."
Meanwhile, the government's regulation of the IFAs' independent status
demands an assurance of complete independence in order to preserve a basic ethical
standard which is required of multiple relationships in the British insurance industry.
However, even the government's regulation is limited to IFAs' independence of any
other financial firms only in terms of financial matters. As Mr Operations Manager
confirms:
"So, all the government is concernedwith, is that if the Financial
Advisers claim independence, then they should actually demonstrate it
and be seen to be investigating the market, properly. So, within that
overallframework, these guys can workprettyfreely. There is no
question ofEdinso having a shareholding in any of these Advisers or
owning them outright. They're completely independentfinancially."
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If the IFAs' independence is assured only financially, their legally protected
status of independence is apt to be appropriated for other purposes. For example, Mr
Marketing Manager is critical of the brokers' attitude when he observes;
"A lot ofour intermediaries are just hard-nosed businessmen that, if
they sell a lot ofpolicies, they get a lot ofcommission and that is
all that they are interested in."
IFAs' preoccupation with getting a lot of commission is questionable enough
to make Edinso's managers sceptical of the IFAs' officially professed independence. If
the managers are ordered to maintain good relationships with IFAs despite their
skepticism, the managers' action is bound to be directed by Edinso's core value of
keeping a staunch support for IFAs. When this core value works as organisational
pressure upon the managers, their action is obliged to be narrowed so as to bring
about unethical conduct in the end.
As for another case of the IFAs' pressure on Edinso, Mr Claims Manager
explains the meaning of turn round standards as a mediating device which functions
between Edinso and IFA:
"We have turn round standards —what Imean by that is that when an item
ofmail comes in to us we have a certain standard set that we must have
thatpiece ofmail turned round and back out the door with the claim. At
the start, the standards ofwhat we could do, what we were able to do
were set by Edinso but it is getting to the stage that it has been
getting better and better. Thisyear's warrants are going out to what
the IFA is demanding, what the marketplace is demanding. And so we've
now reached the stage where we are going to do the turn round standards
that the marketplace wants. So it's been a gradual developmentfrom us
setting the rules to the IFA setting the rules."
When the IFAs become the subjects who take initiatives in setting the
turn-round standard rules, a subsequent consequence will be that Edinso is subject to
IFA's demands and accordingly the ideal relations of 'independent partners' between
Edinso and IFAs will be somehow threatened. This is likely to lead to a couple of
issues with the IFAs, which seem to be inevitably arising. As Mr Operations Manager
puts:
"More frequently, issues can arise with the Independent Financial
Advisors that we have. These people are controlling a whole range of
clients, many ofwhom will be Edinso clients. Ifwe have a difficulty
with a FinancialAdvisor, that ispotentially very serious. So, some
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action might need to he taken to resolve that and resolve it very
quickly. A large proportion of these will he dealt with within their own
areas, but there are times, for whatever reason, when it cannot be
resolved at that level. It would then come to me. And I would have to
make sure the thing was done. These problems are not arising all the time,
but when they do arise, they have to be dealt with very quickly, very
promptly, and very tactfully sometimes — and the matter has got to be
resolved in a manner which he is happy with"
That the matter has got to be resolved in a manner with which the IFA is
happy indicates the degree to which the managers in Edinso are subject to the demands
of IFAs. This unequal power relation may silence the managers' competing views and
bring the managers into the labour process because they are entrapped by the dual
demands from both IFAs and the customers. Moreover, when I asked about difficulties
with the customer services, Mr Service Director indicated that a source of problem lay
with the IFA:
"The policy-holder may have misunderstood what sort ofpolicy he has. The
Independent Financial Adviser may have said one thing whereas
something else is infact. "
The above accounts suggest that misunderstandings can arise from the IFAs'
lack of expertise though they claim their independence as a sort of identity work to the
extent that it is almost their trademark. The IFAs' complacency may have led to the
customers' misunderstandings. Indeed, the excessive elevation of any agents'
independent status can result in the effect of detaching its intrinsic nature of
independence and extrinsically exploiting it for other commercial purposes. Edinso is
also seen to be using IFAs to legitimate Edinso's taking steps which put pressure on
the managers through making their loyalty to the company visible by performance
indicators because IFAs can lawfully provide the Edinso staff with the objective
indicators of their individual performances. Indeed, the ethical value of independence
is liable to be multifariously exploited as Bauman (1989;183) contends that morality is
something society manipulates, exploits, re-directs. As he (1991; 12) adds,
Autonomy can be recognised as a manipulated form of a morality of
freedom when it is used as the right to decide when to keep the eyes
open and when close them down; the right to separate, to discriminate,
to peel off and to trim. For the territorial and functional autonomy
which the fragmentation of powers brings in its wake consists first and
foremost in the right not to look beyond the fence and not to be looked at
from outside of the fence.
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The social network which manipulates morality goes beyond the sphere of
individual agents like IFAs. It is constituted revolving around the core internal
strategies which Edinso deploys for an excellent level of corporate performance.
Among them is 'Quality-agenda' which is currently implemented in Edinso.
C. 'Quality Agenda'
In order to meet the IFAs' demands upon Edinso in terms ofmaintaining high
standards as a recommendable company, Edinso must be keen to enhance the
standards in all aspects of its business. Quality is regarded as a consummate yardstick
by which to assess Edinso's self-performance. The front page in Edinso's Annual
Review andFinancial Highlights 1993 emphasises Edinso's key business concerns in a
symbolic manner. It runs as follows; "Strength through 'tradition', 'people',
'investment', 'innovation', 'vision', and 'quality'". By reason of a weighted nuance of
'strength' which is emphasised in the modern companies where an ethos of shared core
values is corporately espoused and implemented, the deliberate connection between
'quality' and 'strength' seems to carry a significant implication. As Peters and Waterman
(1982;321) are complacent with the bluff of'excellent companies',
Cost and efficiency, over the long run, follow from the emphasis on
quality, service, innovativeness, result sharing, participation,
excitement, and an external problem-solving focus that is tailored to
the customer, (emphasis added)
Certainly, the top management intend that 'quality agenda' as Edinso's
corporate core value directs the managers' actions towards being adjusted to hard
work. At face value, a range of directions aimed to be controlled by top management
by means of quality agenda seems limitless to such an extent as to cover a whole sort
of culture. As Mr Quality Manager puts,
"The programme really does require a whole sort ofculture to change it
quite significantly towards serving the customer andgetting things
rightfirst time."
Relatedly, Mr Operations Manager's accounts also put an emphasis on the
construct of'right';
"So, we are at the early stages ofdeveloping quality measures. What we
have ispretty efficient quantity measures: numbers ofpieces ofwork
done in such and such a time. What we want to do is, develop that and
say, "OK, that number ofpieces ofwork was done. How many of them
were right? ". That's the measure ofquality."
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Though the managers echo the value of 'right' as the measure of quality in
contrast to the measures of quantity, they are not specific about whom doing things
'right' is for. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the tenet of "Do what's right" raises a
question of "right from whose eyes?". Members may feel confusion when facing up to
a choice between doing 'right for company' and 'right for justice'. If 'right' is narrowed
and directed in favour of Edinso's core values such as profit and efficiency, it loses its
authenticity and only its expression is appropriated in the name of the measure of
quality. Meanwhile, the Chief Executive's full support of the quality initiative is notable
in the official statement at Annual Review andFinancialHighlights J993.
Continuous improvement in our business processes, in our
relationships with IFAs, and in the development of our people, is
central to our growth strategy.
Indeed, continuous improvement is mainly focused on such core values as
Edinso's relationships with IFAs, human resource management and its business
processes. More specifically, Mr Operations Manager gives an account of the
inevitable context in which continuous improvement cannot but weigh with Edinso;
"We want to be continually surprising the customer as to what we can do
for him. So ifhe wants somethingfrom us, we should be able to do it
right away. That's an ongoingprocess because the better we get at that,
the more will be expected of us - which isfine because we want always
to have that discipline imposed on us and thatpressure imposed on us,
to keep improving all the time. And never, never, rest on the laurels of
whatyou are doingjust now. We could convince ourselves that we were
the best in the market now and say "That'sfine" - but it will take no
time at allfor the rest of the market to catch up. So we've got to
continue to set new standards, and develop all the time."
The accounts above are certain to indicate that the 'quality-agenda' is intended
to harness the continuous improvement in order for the rest of the market not to catch
up Edinso. To be sure, quality is a counter measure against the market pressure of
competition. As Hill (1995) explicates, the core principle of'continuous improvement'
draws on a proposition that the improvement process both creates and depends on
cultural change. The appropriate culture has many elements. It includes: the
internalisation of quality and continuous improvement as a goal of all activities; the
absolute priority of customer satisfaction; a systematic and rational approach to quality
improvement issues; more open communication, so that those further down are
listened to by those further up; the greater involvement of a wider range of people in
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the decision-making process; and the creation of high-trust social relationships
(ibid.;38). Clearly, attempts to develop such ethical values as self-regulating and
responsible individuals, delegation of authority, participation, and high-trust social
relationships are made by the quality agenda. It starts from the relatively incontestable
proposition that we should all be concerned about the improvement of quality.
However, with this assurance come both an ideological framework of individual
responsibility within a market relation - of individuals being both customer and
supplier - and a shoring up of organisational hierarchy with a new legitimacy
(Tuckman, 1994;732).
Pressure of competitiveness in the market can confer legitimacy on the
corporate management in ingraining core assumptions of quality drive; internal market
relations. With the support of the New Right ideology, 'quality initiatives' are deployed
in the legitimation process to firm and congeal the reality which is presented by the
company. For example, the removal of the comforts of high inflation and a less open,
less competitive market (CEO statement in Edinso Annual Review 1993) is a reality
presented by the company (cf. Knights and Morgan, 1995; Kerfoot and Knights,
1993). As Edinso grows and its business becomes increasingly complex, more and
more meanings will be required to link and integrate the fragmented work forces.
'Quality drive' as a legitimation process works to create those meanings which will
integrate the employees' subjective experiences and the objective meanings of the
external environments. The legitimation process produces the explanations which
make the company's version of reality subjectively conceded by employees in the
assertion that 'corporate core values' are the best integrators and thus should be shared
by the members ofEdinso.
Indeed, the quality agenda is the highly abstract systems of symbolisation
which are deployed as a means of legitimation. It is characterised to be abstract
because its conception and execution is itself very flexible and transformative. Coote
and Pfeffer (1991, quoted in Tuckman, 1994) identify four current approaches to the
definition of quality. They define these approaches as the traditional -what we might
call the commonsense view; the scientific -Juran's 'fitness for purpose'; a managerial
view associated with excellence; a consumerist approach; and a democratic approach
to quality which would serve to empower the consumer. As Tuckman (ibid) argues,
there is a fundamental transformation occurring from the commonsense view. Quality
is being reduced to quantity, its essence being denied in the transformation: ' ... quality
is precisely measurable by the oldest and most respected of measurements - cold hard
cash'. Quality is also becoming a metaphor for the market; the symbol of free choice.
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The new right idea that one's internal colleagues are to be perceived as customers of 'a
service' is legitimated to exert pressure for improvement. In short, the appeal of the
term is that it can be used to legitimise all sorts of measures and changes in the name
of a self-evident good (Wilkinson and Willmott, 1995; 1).
Potentially, these abstract systems of legitimation obstruct the individuals to
apply their innate capacity of ethical reasoning (Bauman, 1993) to their concrete
experiences of everyday practices in the company. A newly emerging view of reality
may give rise to the appearance of conflict with the existing view of reality which has
already been symbolically legitimised in the company by virtue of the quality agenda.
On the part of corporate management, the need for continual legitimation and universe
maintenance is great because a competing view of reality may appear at any time.
Within this scheme of systematically blocking the competing views of reality, the
ethical import of the concrete example is displaced by the pre-established 'grounds' of
the abstract systems of symbolisation: 'quality agenda'. Caught within the process of
legitimation, the concrete example loses its moral 'force'. For instance, as Kerfoot and
Knights (1995) argue, the promotion of quality management and its concerns with
trust, commitment and employees having the 'right attitude' is in direct contradiction
with the atmosphere of job insecurity caused by frequent corporate restructuring and
associated threats of redundancy. Consequently, the employees' job right connected
with the concrete examples loses its moral 'force' in the legitimation process of quality
initiatives for meeting above all the requirements of customer needs first.
In Edinso, the advent of quality seems to provide ample opportunities for
highly abstract systems of symbolisation of 'sharing'. Open-door communication, team
briefing, circulation of a regularly published bulletin with a title of'Q - Review' seem to
be anticipated to deliver a weight of cultural changes to the employees. According to
Mr Quality Manager, this strategic initiative is approved by the executive level and
reinforced by the Chief Executive's interest and support as is verified in his most
satisfying experience:
"Getting the backing of the ChiefExecutive himself IfI have aproblem
with anything andpropose a solution, he usually backs it. That's the
most satisfying thing. He supports me tremendously. So that'sprobably
the most encouraging aspect of it."
Being typical of total quality management as compared with the traditional
quality initiatives (Hill, 1995), getting the backing of the Chief Executive is indicative
of a bureaucratic hierarchy through which the quality agenda is enacted. Meanwhile, it
is noteworthy that the quality agenda is launched at a time when the mission statement
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is simultaneously drafted. An obvious example of the attempts to construct a unitary
set of corporate beliefs and values is in the development of 'mission statements',
although here the concept of 'quality' serves the same role. Clearly the message of
mission statements is deemed to convey the notion that what unifies organisational
effort and transcends sectional interests is that all should work together to achieve
'quality'. However, the notion of quality being deployed is far from a socially neutral
one (Tuckman, 1994;730). The notion of quality is deployed as a management device
by which to systematically recognise and reward individuals, symbolically and
materially, for identifying their sense of purpose with the values that are designed into
the organisation (Willmott, 1993). This systematic detachment of the properties
intrinsic to 'quality' towards a total surveillance mechanism is bound to give rise to the
members' ambivalence. Though the quality agenda is aimed at converging the
collective meanings of the members' everyday practices into the achievement of
'quality', the gradient of expertise of the managers may be incongruous with a
totalising scheme of the quality agenda. The ways in which the members' ambivalence
on the quality agenda is formed will be discussed in detail at the section ofTQM (total
quality management) in the next chapter. As another managerial device to collectivise
the segregated labour power in Edinso, 'family atmosphere' is also significant for
understanding the dynamics ofEdinso's corporate culture.
D. Family Atmosphere
It is the family atmosphere that Edinso tries to highlight in attempting to
display its internal merit outwardly to the IFAs and the customers. The family
atmosphere is also intended to buttress the implementation of 'Quality agenda' in
support of the internal customer relationships. Indeed, as the size of a modern business
company becomes bigger and bigger, so the corporate management should resort to a
managerial glue by which to consolidate emotional cohesiveness among employees and
control an increasingly diversified range of businesses. Accordingly, they even boast
that they treat their employees like 'one big happy family'. However, as Sternberg
(1994) argues, the ethical difficulty is not just that they may be hypocritical in making
that claim, but even worse, that they might not be. The more literally managers
consider their staff to be an extended family, the more likely it is that basic moral
issues will be confused, and that the ends of both business and of family will be
subverted (ibid.;37).
The use of the family metaphor is a part of the culture-building efforts of
Edinso to produce a rhetoric; a language or discourse designed to persuade to 'work
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together', 'developing' themselves in the process of helping develop the business
(Watson, 1994:113). It is related with how far management was successful in
establishing a common 'story' that everyone could subscribe to as a means towards
making Edinso a moral community. As Anthony (1986) suggests, for an organisation
to function as a moral order, as a community, it requires a 'tradition', a 'narrative' to
shape it. Managers have to function as narrators, therefore - as storytellers. Indeed,
'family atmosphere' is a peculiar aspect of Edinso's corporate culture to the extent that
'family atmosphere' is regarded as a 'tradition', a 'narrative' to shape Edinso as a moral
community. Its peculiarity has been historically constituted in the context where
Edinso has been located in the milieu of the general norms of the British life insurance
industry of which paternalism is characteristic (Kerfoot and Knights, 1993).
Importantly, the constitution of the family atmosphere within Edinso is basically
characterised to be artificial rather than natural. The need for Edinso to conform to
paternalism as a traditional norm of the life insurance industry seemed to have urged
them to be keen to constitute a family atmosphere which they calculated to be
strategically advantageous for its corporate image. For instance, Edinso's participating
in the insurance trade bodies is considered important to Edinso as Mr Pensions
Manager explains;
"Aspart of the technical and communication theme, Iparticipate in national
trade bodies. I'm a member of the pensions committee of the Association of
British Insurers, andprior to that I was the Chairman of the Association of
Pensioner Trustees, which is a UnitedKingdom trade body in the pensions
area, which was extremely helpful to us. Participation in these trade bodies
is important to us really in three ways.... Ifyou are seen as an
organisation to be exerting a positive influence on developments in the
industry, then that has got to be helpful to you in the industry in
trying to sell business."
If Edinso's positive influence on developments in the industry is calculatively
intended to take the advantage in selling business, a constitution of family atmosphere
within Edinso is more likely to be artificial rather than natural. This artificialness seems
to be inevitable in the condition that Edinso should meet the demands imposed by
external trade interest groups. As Mr Quality Manager explains;
"Externally, there are various trade magazines who periodically do
surveys on performance and on products, and so on. So, we can take those
surveys onboard, and try andmake some use of them."
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Moreover, the need for Edinso to keep a family-like structure (Kerfoot and
Knights, 1994) seems vital for keeping a good image to IFAs. As Mr Group Actuary
narrates;
"These brokers, middlemen want us to be efficient, helpful and effective
andprovide these things like good investmentperformance, and
efficiency charges andgood administration, good service" (emphasis added)
Given that a good administration is feasible by a harmonious relationship
among the members, a family atmosphere enacted to manifest a good administration to
the IFAs can be appropriated by a necessity of Edinso's public image to IFAs. This
intentionality is evidenced by Mr Marketing Manager when he asserts that Edinso's
image as a big player in the IFA market should be appealing enough to make the
people do pay attention to Edinso;
"I think what we must do is make sure that our image as a bigplayer in
the I.F.A market, which we now definitely are, becomes so obvious that
the people that haven'tyet paidattention to us do pay attention to us
and almost ask us to come in and speak to them, whereas until now we
have always gone and hammered down the doors. I think that can be a
great help to the salesforce."
In addition to the external causes for a need to constitute a family-like
atmosphere, there are some internal causes for the constitution of family atmosphere.
Mr Operations Manager alludes to one of the internal causes;
"In our own service side, in a shortperiod of three orfour years, we've
doubled the number ofstaff. You can have a relatively comfortable means
ofcommunication with, say, three hundredpeople, but ifyou suddenly have
six hundredpeople, then the communication structure has to reflect
that. It becomes more difficult to ensure that everybody is covered, that
nobody is missed out. That'spart of the continuing challenge as the
organisation groM's and grows quite quickly: to make sure that you
develop your internal infrastructures, to make sure thatyou retain the
benefits ofa smaller organisation when you grow into a bigger
organisation. It means we are always looking at management structure
and communication structure."
The accounts above indicate that the constitution of family-like structure is a
consequence ofEdinso's attempt to look at management structure and communication
structure which are facilitative of adapting to a change in size and yet retaining the
benefits of a smaller organisation. Moreover, the character of job situation seemed to
have influenced a formation of family atmosphere. Mr Operation Manager's comment;
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"Because of the nature of where we are, we are fairly remote from day to day
operations", is indicative of a desperate need for a family-like structure. For as
Kerfoot and Knights (1993) argue, a social constitution of family-like structure is
expected to achieve the effect of integrating business strategy not as a corporate policy
but at the level of everyday workplace practices. Relatedly, a tint of artificialness in a
formation of family atmosphere is also perceived in Mr Investment Manager's answer
to my question about a comparative degree of family atmosphere between different
departments in Edinso;
"What Imeant was: perhaps not in daily contact to the same degree that
Investment have. .Just hv the nature of the job, nothingmore than that.
it's just the nature of the job. The InvestmentManager will be
interacting with all the desks all the time. That need not be the case
with other departments." (emphasis added)
The accounts above affirm that the family atmosphere is constituted by
virtue of the nature of the job itself. By necessity of the job itself was the family
atmosphere constituted. This may lead to a circumstance that if the necessity of the job
itself suddenly ceases to exist, the family atmosphere may also vanish all of a sudden.
If then, it is the case that only the expressions of the family metaphor are shared to the
extent that they are necessary to meet the job requirements and are contributory to
keeping the cohesiveness among the members in the department of Investment.
Edinso's managerial intention to make the family metaphor out of the pragmatic
demands is linked to some controversies over the genuineness of family atmosphere.
Mr Personnel Manager's account indicates this aspect;
"So, we do still try hard to maintain the bestfeatures ofwhat people
think ofas being afamily atmosphere, but at the same time trying to
develop more andmore professional ways ofmanagingpeople. That's
not an easy thing to do because there are mixedmessages there: yes, we
are a big, friendly, happyplace where lots ofpeople, even the most
senior people are relaxed and enjoy their work; but at the same time we
are very demanding.ofpeople about how hard they work and to what
standards they work. It isn't easy to get those two messages over at the
same time."
The corporate management's aim to get the mixed messages over at the same
time would likely to bring about the employees' ambivalence with respect to the
corporate intention to engender the family atmosphere within Edinso. Indeed, Edinso's
managerial intent to maintain the family atmosphere with hard working conditions
demanded of the employees is highly questionable. It is generally recognised that the
genuine meaning of a family relationship as a mode of social relations consists in being
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free from any coercive power imposed upon members and providing them with such
basic moral values as sympathy, fairness, self-control, duty (Goldman, 1980). When
Clegg (1989), in his Frameworks of Power, makes the apocalyptic statement: "The
forgetting of power would be the fate of our era?", it seems to indicate a possible
return of all modern organisations to the genuine state of a family relationship.
Families exist for the mutual care and support of family members, particularly those,
like children and the very old, who are less capable of looking after themselves. A
family takes care of its members simply because they are family, without any particular
regard for reciprocity or merit; family members are kept and cared for, come what may
(Sternberg, 1994). If this pure nature of'family' is tarnished into a managerial device to
be used for effectively collectivising the segregated labour power, it is manipulated for
a shift from a family metaphor to a corporate metaphor. That is, 'family' is detached
from its intrinsic authenticity and in turn attached to extrinsic corporate utilities
embodied in building up 'soft conditions for hard working'.
Mr Personnel Manager's view to maintain the family atmosphere as a
professional way of managing people is tantamount to Edinso's peculiarity in relation
to paternalism. This means that Edinso's family atmosphere is deliberately transformed
into Edinso's corporate strategy. Kerfoot and Knights (1993) draw a distinction
between 'paternalism' and 'strategic management' when they argue that paternalism
can, in general, be seen as a way of managing that involves the exercise of power by
senior staff who 'shield' subordinates from any decision-making responsibility. By
contrast, once having designed a set of corporate and business plans, 'strategic
management' aims to 'cascade' decision-making responsibility down the hierarchy so as
to engage staff at various levels in the business. Whereas staff in paternalistic
companies are simply expected to execute the decisions handed down to them from 'on
high', the adoption of strategic management imposes upon all members of the
organisation to be more directly concerned with the immediate success of particular
business initiatives, and the longer term survival and strength of the overall enterprise.
In the same vein, Edinso's peculiar form of paternalism entrenches the members'
dependency on the company by transforming paternalism into Edinso's corporate
strategy. Given that, 'family atmosphere' is a means to extract surplus from the
managerial labour. For a surplus work in the form of 'patriarchal power' is demanded
of the managers when they deal with their subordinates especially in the scheme of
corporate culture where family atmosphere is deliberately emphasised. Indeed, the
family atmosphere involves highly particular ways of managing social relations. It has
the effect of rendering social relations less problematic - by displacing or dissimulating
intimacy, sexuality and hierarchy (Kerfoot and Knights, ibid.). Paternalism, expected
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to carry on the intimacy as a shared emotion, is deployed as a means of cutting off the
possible extension of intimacy: the separateness and distance between the paternalist
and the subordinates. Sharing as unite and divide. Subordinates may voluntarily
submit to paternalistic managers for, at one level, submission is itself intimately related
to pleasure and desire. From this perspective, paternalism can be seen to result in, or
indeed be articulated through, the themes of control and submission, mastery and
domination. In relation to hierarchy, paternalism seeks to generate a relation of trust
through the pretence of equality for the purpose of securing instrumental gain. Such
trust is more readily sustained given that the 'gentlemanly relations' involves a tacit
agreement to provide life-time employment in exchange for moral rectitude by the
employee. In itself an exercise of power, paternalism gives the illusion ultimately of
displacing power. It is an 'economy of power' (Foucault, 1980) in that the dignity of
the subordinate appears to remain intact at the same time as he or she is manipulated,
enabling hierarchical interactions to occur as if they were personal, and so softening
their coercive impact without damaging the effectiveness of their control (Kerfoot and
Knights, 1993).
A conflation of 'paternalistic masculinity' and 'competitive masculinity'
(ibid.;659) in Edinso is the effect of both the chief executive's intended initiative and
the intense competitiveness in the market. As Mr Investment Manager says,
"Butfrom the Executive level down, they've engendered this happy,
'relaxed but getting on with thejob' atmosphere — which I think
contributes a great deal. It contributes to trust between people.
People get on well with each other."
This is echoed by Mr Pensions Manager who believes that his company has a
very open style ofmanagement.
"But certainly within Edinso it is quite clear and it's deliberate that
you have this informality and it comesfrom the top. It comesfrom the
chiefexecutive. We have a very open style ofmanagement."
However, when the family atmosphere has been engendered by the corporate
management rather than the natural aspirations which could have been possible
through the members' autonomous interactions with one another, the construction of
family atmosphere is to be criticised as the managerially intended consequence. It
follows that if only the formality of family atmosphere is implemented with the absence
of its substantial content, the managerial intent of engendering the family atmosphere
is to extract hard work from the employees and justify it by recourse to the putatively
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conceded family atmosphere. It is only a moral vocabulary to justify an extraction of
surplus from labour. Thus, it is questionable whether such family ethic-relevant
standards as the mutual respect among the colleagues and the willingness to take care
of their colleagues' circumstances are really observed by the members to establish a
genuine sense of family atmosphere. For a distorted use of 'family value' may bring
about detachment effects that such artificial cohesion is maintained by the top
management to enunciate the norms of 'belonging' and 'sharing' through an ethos of
'family value' whereas segmentalism is still in force even within Edinso's business
networks. As Kerfoot and Knights (1993) argue,
In our view, paternalistic management is a way of controlling employees
through the pretense of family imagery, thus providing space for the
manager to act as 'caring' and 'protective' head of the industrial 'household'.
As an epiphenomenon of this top-down engendering of family atmosphere, a
self-contradiction is brought about in connection with Edinso's communicative tactics.
Mr Group Actuary's accounts are relevant:
"And we're sending letters to everybody's home address so that all the
employees receiving special magazines every month telling them about
the latest happenings in the qualityprogramme ofwhat is happening
next, and so it's also tied up with communication through the staff. So
we're trying also new ways ofcommunicating with the staffso that
everyone shoidd be involved and understand what is going on. So
writing to the homes of the staffmeans thatperhaps they would read,
something which they don't read them at the office. So it comes to the
house perhaps they will read it."
I argue that Edinso's communicative tactics to send home the mails related with
quality programmes is a tacit way of extracting the surplus from labour. The
employees in Edinso are officially rewarded on the basis of the amount of work they
provide at the office during the office hours. Intruding into the employees' private life
and time at home, Edinso's managerial tactics to get all the staffmore involved in the
company are intended to control the employees' private sphere out of the reach of
official management. It is not only manipulating the intrinsic nature of the family
values, but violating the communicative ethics in which the information receivers'
rights should be reasonably respected. Indeed, the modern corporation is fast
becoming a monstrosity that "bosses not only our working hours but invades our
homes and dictates our thoughts and dreams" (Bendix, 1956).
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The other aspects of fabrication of family imagery are also constitutive of
self-contradictions embedded in Edinso's corporate culture. These are illustrated in the
managers' everyday practices. For instance, Mr Marketing Manager's accounts are
relevant;
"The Service departmen!, they are part ofLife and Pensions division so
they prepare a report that attempts to summarise what is going on.
Because they are a mile and a halfaway, I don'tfeel I've got an
accurate feel ofhow morale is or what the main issues are, and it is
very much a view that isfiltered byMr Service Director that I get
which might not always be the same view 1 get by beingface to face with
a lot of thefinance people on a regular basis. Again, it's because
we've got bigger and now split sides, it may be aproblem."
Though there is a geographical distance between the headquarters and the
service department by a mile and a half away, it seems that he had to get an accurate
feel of how morale at another department was. This is so because if the family
atmosphere were genuinely constituted and shared among members, the cohesiveness
among the members could overcome the geographical distance. Mr Investment
Manager's accounts echo this deficiency in the actuality of the family atmosphere;
"It may be that there are stresses and strains elsewhere in the office
that I'm not aware of - so I can't really comment on that. I'm speaking
purelyfrom my own workpoint ofview. The atmosphere and the ethos
of the place has always been a nice andfriendly atmosphere, with a
good relationship between the executive and everybody in the room."
The accounts above show again a malfunction of departmentalism (Kanter,
1983). Because only the expressions of family imagery are shared within the
department, these expressions are in the end narrowed and directed both within the
department and for the department's selfish advantages segregated from other
departments. If then, such schemes to sustain a team-like solidarity (Kerfoot and
Knights, 1994; 137) in Edinso as 'team briefing system' and 'focus groups' stand aloof
from their official proclamations. Such collectivist terms as team, family, group are
mobilised only to the extent that their expressions are circulated in a direction for
corporate objectives, leaving hollow the intrinsic nature of these collectivist ethos.
To recapitulate the arguments so far, the family imagery is to a great degree
void of its intrinsic meaning. The use of a family metaphor in Edinso is quite
managerially intended by Edinso's corporate management. The members are not
deeply involved in constituting the so-called family atmosphere. A recognition that the
use of the family metaphor is regarded as a basic assumption and thus has a binding
108
force in characterising Edinso's corporate culture is valid only insofar as the use of the
family metaphor as shared expressions is calculated to contribute to enhancing the
level of corporate performance. Consequently, management in Edinso is partly to
check through the surveillance of the members' accounts whether the members are
sharing the expressions of the family metaphor. Basically, it is premised on 'employee
involvement' in the assumed family values. As Willmott (1993) puts;
Union recognition and collective bargaining have provided a means of
"institutionalising conflict", though this has been complemented and/or
challenged by various schemes intended to encourage "employee
involvement" that rely more heavily upon the self-disciplining
capacities of employees."
Indeed, power is intended to come from the conditions that the family
atmosphere is to encourage "employee involvement" that relies heavily upon the
self-disciplining capacities of employees by virtue of a universal consent to the
assumed authenticity of 'family' metaphor. That which makes more dominant this
managerial power arising from the manipulation of a family value is that the family
metaphor is narrowed and directed in a corporate way. This arbitrariness of the family
metaphor is evidenced by Mr Group Actuary when he stresses the necessity to
produce the family atmosphere and connects it with Edinso's business success;
"I think that reminds me that we are still trying to produce a sort of
family atmosphere or at least that atmosphere in which people do
respect, care for each other and that seems important in our success
because I mean that people are more ready to help one another and they
can react more quickly andperhaps change can take place more quickly
and the relationships between people are good and that companypolicy
towards them is good andpeople feel their contribution is important."
(emphasis added)
Given that the family atmosphere is anticipated to be produced rather than
naturally constructed, such ethical conduct as 'respect, care for each other' is very
likely to be a formality lacking real substance. It is only a moral vocabulary to justify
an extraction of surplus from labour by making people feel that their contribution is
important. The artificiality of producing family atmosphere is well revealed in a
transition from 'the social' as intrinsic to family values to 'the technical' like 'people are
more ready to help one another', 'they can react more quickly', 'change can take place
more quickly'. This mechanism suggests that the authentic nature of the family
metaphor is deployed as a surveillance path. A shift from the authentic nature of the
family value to the surveillance path can easily marginalise 'the social' as Munro
(1993 ;251) argues,
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An emphasis on surveillance, even where it appears to counterbalance the
economic by bringing in the "political", can easily marginalise the
social by displacing an examination of social conduct.
When the members' use of the expressions of the family metaphor is
mobilised as a control device to overcome the limits of a geographical distance, it is
the case that management is done by surveillance over 'expressions' or the use of
expressions of the family metaphor. Surveillance through "accounts" is an intelligent
monitoring to the extent that it checks when and where expressions of the family
metaphor are 'displayed' in connection with the core values of quality and profit. This
monitoring of time and space through the display of expressions of the family
metaphor is partly alluded to in Mr Service Director's accounts;
"The Group ChiefExecutive also has lots ofdiscussions with our main
IFAs and customers, so they will be telling him when they think the
service isn't up to the level they want it to be." (emphasis added)
The appropriation of family expressions is likely to be contingently carried
out according to the time and space which need the expedient display of family
expressions. Indeed, the family atmosphere becomes a space of representation, a
territory in which identities have to be created and affiliations have to be settled (cf.
Munro, 1995). A violation of a priori established homogeneity through the family
atmosphere incurs a fate of being ostracised. That distanciation need not involve a
geographical distance is something Goffman (1968, quoted in Munro, 1993) raises in
his discussion of the surveillance of persons being moved in "blocks":
When persons are moved in blocks, they can be supervised by personnel
whose chief activity is not guidance or periodic inspection (as in many
employer-employee relations) but rather surveillance - a seeing to it
that everyone does what he has been clearly told is required of him, under
conditions where one person's infraction is likely to stand out in
relief against the visible, constantly examined compliance of the others.
Insofar as there exists a constitution of classes between those who are to be
supervised and those who conduct the surveillance, the authentic nature of family
values is only appropriated for the creation of social distance just as quality reinforces
the bureaucratic relations (Tuckman, 1994). In short, a family metaphor as expressions
is systematically manipulated in various ways such that a picture of a "family" is at the
same time a picture of a "controlled anarchy" (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992). This




As has been discussed so far, the scepticism about the authenticity of such
internal strategies as 'quality agenda' and 'family atmosphere' leads to a questioning of
the bureaucratic practices which might exist in parallel to such seemingly non-
bureaucratic measures. As far as the extent to which Edinso is also reified by
'bureaucracy' is concerned, it cannot be placed as an exceptional case. What is critical
here is that the scheme of corporate culture as a normative control is built into the very
structure ofbureaucracy even in the site of Edinso. If the ethos of sharing is enacted to
complement an inevitable shortage of control inherent in bureaucracy, such a
normative control as corporate culture is eventually a means for insidiously enforcing
the bureaucracy. Indeed, such control devices as corporate cultures, quality agenda
and other techniques for encouraging self-monitoring and self-disciplining work
practices are in the end aimed at enforcing the pre-existing bureaucratic hegemony.
Hence, the notion of emancipatory interests (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992) is sure to
be relevant for Edinso's case. It seems necessary to point out whether Edinso's
paternalistic (or, family) atmosphere can be compatible with its bureaucracy.
Apparently, it seems that a degree of bureaucratic structure in Edinso is not so severe
that members in Edinso seem to be capable ofworking in a quite autonomous working
environment. As Mr New Business Manager's accounts allude to it:
"Something which I consider very, very high, is the motivation and the
working environment of the staff themselves. If they're happy, well-
motivated, then they will be more productive. I believe in delegation
down to the lowest possible denominator. I'm afirm believer that the
greater freedom you give to someone to get on with the job, the higher
motivated they will be. So we try andgive them as muchfreedom to get
on with the job themselves, once they are suitably trained. And we try
to delegate tasks to them so that they are continually getting some form
ofchallenge, something extra to do. Once again this has already shown
that it is working in that we are now gettingpeople askingfor
additionaljobs which require more work andmore responsibility. It
keeps the morale very high as well. This is the stage we are at the
moment."
However, the above accounts leave some suspicion on the genuineness of
'giving as much freedom' in the employees' work. The process of socialisation through
the well-contrived training programmes is more likely to fix the members' freedom of
choice among the diverse competing views at the already "naturalised" scope of
choices within Edinso. Thus, Edinso's managerial practice to give the members much
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freedom to get on with the job 'once they are suitably trained', should be reflected in
view of its genuine effect upon the members' self-determined autonomy in their
working situations. If the managers try to delegate tasks to their subordinates so that
they are continually getting something extra to do, the delegation is apt to be used to
exploit the normative labour in the name of 'giving as much freedom'. An ethic of
freedom is appropriated in the name of the managerial legitimacy of 'delegation'.
Moreover, there seem to be some areas wherein the bureaucratic ethic obliges the
members to be passively receptive to the priorities set by the executive-level
management. As Mr New Business Manager testifies:
"The priorities Edinso has imposed on me are almost identical to the
way Iwouldprioritise my work anyway. It was the way I was used to be
working. I haven't been asked to change anything. Therefore I
obviously agree with the way Edinso is working".
That Edinso has imposed its priorities on Mr New Business Manager as the
only alternative of choice to him cannot be considered unproblematic. It is conceivable
that the priorities are set up mainly according to Edinso's core values. Given that
bureaucracy is the organised form of coercive inclusion and exclusion, silencing the
competing standpoints of the members is legitimised by a bureaucratic ethic that the
bureaucrat's own act becomes an end in itself and can be judged only by its intrinsic
criteria of propriety and success. What matters then is whether the act has been
performed according to the best available technological know-how, and whether its
output has been cost-effective. Criteria are clear-cut and easy to operate. Once, thanks
to the complex functional differentiation within bureaucracy, the actors have been
distantiated from the ultimate outcomes of the operation to which they contribute,
their moral concerns can concentrate fully on the good performance of the job at hand
(Bauman, 1989). In this vein, Edinso's professed merit in the personnel management
that it has a fairly large number of managers is to be critically examined in light of its
implied bureaucracy. When the managers' accountability is solely determined by the
limited scope of priorities according to Edinso's core values, the existence of a large
number of managers is bound to result in an expansion of bureaucratic morale within
the company. What matters is only the efficiency and lowering of costs of their
processing. As Mr Operations Manager indicates:
"The criteria ofaccountability would be what is controllable by the
manager and we've separated the company into discrete business units."
A phenomenon in Edinso that the company is separated into discrete business
units seems to affirm, as Munro (1993) suggests, that the function of organising is not
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so much to bring things together as it is to keep things apart. As Munro (ibid.) argues,
we can go further and notice that when we think of'people' we think of division. When
we think of 'things' we think of multiplication; we talk about bringing together, about
organising as a product. This kind of detachment: the social as division; the technical
as multiplication (Munro, 1993), may latently lead to the managers' sense of
powerlessness as a result of such an acute division of labour. This abstract explication
is concretely evidenced by Mr New Business Manager's own experiential sense of
bureaucracy:
"Here, you have a bureaucracy. To a much lesser extent. But the
difference here is the attitude. Ifyou have an idea, people are willing
to change. People are willing but it still takes time to implement the
changes because of the size of the organisation. Because, ifyou take
Edinso as a whole, there are forty tofifty departments. You might think
each department might interact with only one or two other departments,
but they don't. Each department interacts with every other department.
For example, what Legal Advice does affects me. What I do affects
Legal Advice. What Management Information does affects me and vice
versa. It's a very, very complex diagram of inter-relationships between the
departments. As I said, that is where the disappointment comes. Because it is
so complex, I can'tjust implement a change. I've got to think how it is going
to affect the other departments. So it takes time."
The enlarged size of the company is certain to make the individual managers
more subject to a decomposed and hierarchically structured sub-system. Thus, even
though the individual managers want to implement a change with their own competing
views, they are fallen into feelings of incapacity because it takes time for them to think
how it is going to affect the other departments. This inertia suppressing the individual
managers' initiative for change leads to the condition that only the people at the chief
executive level can initiate the changes in the form of corporate strategy. As a result,
the individual manager is bound to be insulated in his little box, separated from any
involvement in corporate strategic planning. The complexity caused by an enlarged
size of the company is likely to be adopted by corporate management for legitimating
their own ways of corporate governance. The corporate core value of 'rapid growth in
a short period' may also block the managers' attempted conception of any change. In
fact, it is quite a matter of subjective interpretation and judgment how much complex
the interactions among the departments in Edinso are in reality. Accordingly, it is also
quite plausible that the perceived degree of complexity is unduly exaggerated so as to
block in advance the managers' attempted conception of any change. At stake is the
case that the shared congruity about the perceived complexity is taken for granted and
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legitimated in the name of core values, 'rapid growth in a short period', excluding out
any conceivability of competing views.
Mr Group Accountant also seems to have been disappointed by Edinso's
bureaucratic attitude which he thinks is implied in the estranged attitude of
executive-level people who are unwilling to understand what their subordinates are
trying to do:
"Biggest disappointment I suppose is that all the good work the
financial team is hying to do has not been recognisedproperly, that the
executives do not really understand what we are trying to do, it's better
now."
Indeed, there may emerge many constraints that narrow the managers'
discretion both in conception and execution, which in turn potentiate the bureaucratic
dominance. Jackall (1988;6), in his ethnographic studies of the world of corporate
managers, exemplifies a facet of bureaucratic ethic in an interview with a former
vice-president of a large firm who says: "What is right in the corporation is not what is
right in a man's home or in his church. What is right in the corporation is what the guy
above you wants from you, or what is moderated by the opinions of one's peer group.
That's what morality is in the corporation". This means that individuals capable of
appropriate moral judgment often lose their moral identity (Giddens, 1991 ;209-231)
when their organisational position is forced to follow the organisational standards of
morality even though they are often incompatible with the individuals' standards of
morality.
Conclusion
Complexity and competitiveness are understood to be the major external
causes which have influenced the formation of collective meanings and binding forces
imposed upon the members in Edinso. In response to these environmental pressures
upon Edinso, such strategic measures were taken as staunch support for IFAs, the
family atmosphere, and the quality agenda. These strategies were originally intended to
develop the members' capacity to cope with the external pressures. As the legitimacy
of introducing those strategies became fortified by the corporate management's whole
gamut of justification, rationalisation and signification however, so they came to place
themselves as cultural manifestations whose collective meanings and binding forces to
which the members were bound to consent. As a consequence, the bureaucratic
climate was still co-existing in parallel to the collective ethos for cultural changes.
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Transformation of the authentic nature of a family metaphor into a corporate
metaphor was seen to be part of the cultural effects in Edinso. To be sure, the
constitution of a family atmosphere was engineered by top management with a
calculation that it would work as a managerial device with which it was easy to get its
legitimacy as collective meaning with a binding force. However, I argued that the
enactment of family imagery was conducive to a surveillance path through which an
intelligent monitoring was done to check when and where expressions of the family
imagery were effectively displayed in accordance with the core values of 'quality' and
'profit'. As a penetrating value which underlies such family resemblances as 'corporate
culture' and 'TQM', the family metaphor was vulnerable to the corporate
appropriation.
Indeed, Edinso seems to try to conflate the cultural management with the
optional use of the traditional bureaucratic methods of management. Under these
circumstances, it appears that some of the more overt trappings of bureaucratic
control systems and managerial power are relaxed, disguised, or reinterpreted.
However, the enhanced flexibility, structural ambiguity, looser behavioural controls,
and less rigid supervision ofwork behaviour that are prescribed and often implemented
by the designers of the cultural change are balanced by management's relentless efforts
to define and impose the managers' role. The essence of bureaucratic control - the
formalisation, codification, and enforcement of rules and regulations - does not change
in principle under a system of corporate culture; it merely shifts its focus, at
management's discretion, from the organisational structure to the organisational
culture, from the members' behaviour to their experience (Kunda, 1992:220).
In summary, the juxtaposition of the hierarchy (official power dynamics) and
the horizontal harmony (as is termed 'family atmosphere' by interviewed managers) of
management in Edinso seems to contain a degree of potential for ethical disputes.
They are likely to be prominent during periods when the business environment is
characterised as 'ever-changing' while Edinso's traditional conservatism is also
perpetuated. This dilemma may lead to a diversity ofways in which Edinso is inclined
to be expedient in coping with the conflictive situations. Principally, Edinso's corporate
management are most likely to take the initiative in managing conflictive situations by
enacting the expressions of corporately espoused values to be shared. In response to
this corporate imposition of shared core values, the employees may act in different
ways. Their attitudes are indeed characterised to be mixed and ambivalent. One way is
to try to maintain their identity work by resisting the inculcation of corporate core
values. A possible strategic conduct to be taken by them is to share deliberately the
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expressions of the core values while keeping on their ambivalence. In contrast to this
negative attitude of sharing expressions, the other way is to partake more positively in
the sharing of expressions which is manoeuvred by the corporate management. The
consequences common to both ways are that morality can be socially manipulated
through the medium of shared expressions. This dynamics is more specified in the
following chapter to which we now turn.
[NOTES]
[1] I could attain a finally drafted mission statement quite late after finishing the
interviews. Actually it was attainable when I was writing up this thesis in 1995. It
showed that one ofEdinso's aims was as follows;
6. Responsibilities
We will take seriously our responsibilities to our industry and to
the community andwill seek to make positive contributions to
both. We will deal honestly andfairly with our customers and
business contracts at all times.
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CHAPTER 6
STRATEGIC MANIPULATION OF MORAL 'EXPRESSIONS' IN EDINSO
Introduction
Edinso's ideal image of a moral community seems to be conceivable insofar as
it is considered to be normatively integrated. Indeed, most of the modern business
corporations do, at the very least, try to pretend this ideal, and are not reluctant at all
to profess it publicly through advertisements on the media. It is almost a first step in
the efforts to improve a corporate image to decorate a company's face with a flourish
of such moral languages as "an enterprise to pursue public good", "a firm with an
ideology of infinite responsibility", "a company strong in financial prudence", "fair
treatment to all employees", not to mention "being faithful to corporate social
responsibility or responsiveness (Carroll, 1989)".
It is certain that the fair social identity of a business firm facilitates an
effective functioning at the organisational-level. As Greenberg (1988) discusses, an
organisational-level image of fairness - that is, a corporate culture of fairness - may
help attract and retain the best qualified job candidates, as well as customers who are
attracted by the company's positive image. Indeed, it has been argued that the public
will recognise and support "socially responsive firms"; that is, those that fulfil society's
moral and ethical expectations (Murray & Montanari, 1986). To the extent that this is
true, then benefits of identities of corporate fairness may also be realised in terms of
marketing indicators (e.g., percent of market share) as well as management indicators
(e.g., degree of job satisfaction). Promotional efforts that position corporations as
fair-minded to their employees, the surrounding economic community, and the ecology
may be the result of efforts to cultivate a corporate image of fairness (Greenberg,
1988).
Edinso's collective concerns with its corporate image to the public culminate
in the attempts not only to draft out a mission statement, but also to tacitly link the
policyholders' ethical concerns and their investment interests. This way of connecting
the ethical concerns with the management of corporate image is characteristic of
British entrepreneurs in that British entrepreneurs tend to emphasise the corporate
ethics through CEO and shareholders whereas American companies tend to infuse it
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through personnel managers and labour unions (Robertson and Schlegelmilch, 1992).
Edinso's internal status of ethical integrity is the proviso which needs to be fulfilled at
the least in order to attract the shareholders' investment mind through the channels to
meet their ethical concerns. When Edinso's internal status of ethical integrity is
accomplished by the non-manipulated consensus between management and employees,
it is free from any accusation. But, if such ethically unproblematic condition is attained
through any degree of coercive moralising imposed by corporate management upon
employees, a questioning of what rights of the employees have to be silenced for the
company's publicly perceived ethical image should be raised. Whilst a company's
outward image of ethical entity may be pursued as a teleological effect, the real face of
inside the company is a matter of process which is to be deontologically examined.
The existential condition that Edinso is also a business company to seek for
profitability by selling as many insurance products as possible leaves a large room for
the possibility that a publicly projected image of Edinso is not congruent with its real
state. In this vein, Edinso's Ethical Unit Trust (or, Ethical Trust) as one of its insurance
products seems to have many implications. Significantly, I argue that the Ethical Trust
is used as a marketing strategy and the moral expressions conveyed through Ethical
Trust are strategically appropriated both by Edinso and policyholders.
In this Chapter, I also argue that self-contradictions embedded in TQM
become manifest when the tenets of the strategy are not coherent one another such
that employees cast a serious doubt to the corporate intentions to implement TQM.
This doubt may lead the employees to a state of less active engagement in their works,
which is contrary to the expectations of the implemented strategy. The effect of these
self-contradictions stems from the fact that 'quality' is detached from its intrinsic nature
and extrinsically attached to the corporate metaphor. As was discussed in the previous
chapters, that which mediates this detachment effect is the medium of shared
expressions of 'quality'. That is, the 'quality' initiative is not a new value, but only its
expressions or the use of its expressions is different. Because any enactment of
strategic agenda is likely to leave 'traces' in the accounts which members offer each
other (Garfinkel, 1967), the self-contradictions of the quality agenda are assumed to be
unveiled through the 'traces'. Since shifts in language stand at the heart of moving
people about, then specific power effects which follow from the advent of TQM as a
corporate strategy become traceable through members' accounts (Munro, 1995; 148).
Importantly, that which is underlying TQM is that members may not share the tenets
of TQM, but rather share only its expressions.
Ethical Unit Trust As Moral Expressions of Marketing Strategy
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According to a list of UK Ethical and Environmental Funds as at 31.12.89
which appears as an appendix in Harte et al.'s (1991;253) survey of'ethical investment
and the corporate reporting function', Edinso belongs to that list of companies even at
present. The official title of 'Ethical Unit Trust' [Appendix 4] seems to add another
uniqueness to Edinso's business practices. Given that a company's corporate culture is,
to a large extent, intentionally constituted for its external image to the public, Ethical
Unit Trust seems to be a product of a deliberate marketing strategy which effectively
mediates between the constitution of Edinso's corporate culture and the management
of its external image to the public. As was addressed at the section of Edinso's
dynamics of corporate culture in Chapter 5, family atmosphere was found to be
occupying a central place in characterising Edinso's corporate culture in terms of
sustaining the members' collective beliefs and applying the binding forces to the
members' conduct. However, the individual members' competing views of family
atmosphere may be at variance with the company's managerial intent to enact family
imagery. If it is the case, then the corporate management's deliberate attempt to
constitute family atmosphere in Edinso is legitimised on the ground that family values
as the universal norm can precede the individual members' ambivalence on the
collective meanings and binding forces of the "family imagery". Indeed, the corporate
management can conceive that an ethos of family atmosphere is able to dissolve the
indidividual members' ambivalence and absorb the conflicts arising out of the
confrontations between the different departments. The corporate management are also
likely to be inclined to mobilise the family atmosphere outwardly for the purpose of
managing Edinso's corporate image for the public, assuming that society cannot afford
to play a role of moral crusades any more. Edinso's strategy to constitute its corporate
culture with a focus on family values is certainly deemed to be productive for the
corporate management to consolidate group cohesiveness among the members and
demonstrate outwardly Edinso's attachment to the family values which are lost in and
thus missed by the society (Dahler-Uarsen, 1994). In this context, Edinso's ethical unit
trust as an insurance product has a strong merit to mediate between the constitution of
corporate culture and the management of corporate image to the public because most
of the ethical criteria for investment (as is well shown in the Appendix 4) carry family
values directly or indirectly.
It seems to me that the significance of 'ethical unit trust' should occupy a
major (not a side issue as Mr Marketing Manager assessed it in his accounts) part of
business activities in Edinso. For Edinso is required to demonstrate its own ethical
standards which are appropriate for an agent to be entrusted with the policyholders'
119
ethical aspirations. Edinso is recognised, ostensibly at the very least, to be ethically
integrated as Mr Ethical Trust Manager says;
"I think the company has been well known forfairness in the business
relations and activities, and that is something that I've alwaysfound
in working here. There is a lot ofmerit in it and it is one of the
reasons why Edinso has continued to be quite successful. Companies
that are very respectful of their employees and treat themfairly, are
companies that generally do well -simply because the people there are
positively motivated to workfor them."
However, as we have already observed in the preceding Chapter, Edinso has a
considerable degree of latent problems from the ethical perspective. Importantly, the
ethical unit trust is actually not situated at central but situated at peripheral in the
context of Edinso's corporate strategic planning as is evidenced in Mr Ethical Trust
Manager's accounts:
"The ethical thrust to our business is very much a side issue, it is not
central issue. We have experimented with halfa dozen similar niche
markets which, we believe, were consistent with but slightly different
from our mainline business. We push into sellingproducts especiallyfor
women rather than justfor clients as a whole, as another example. They
all run alongside the main thrust which is to sell as much pensions as
we can. They seemed to be not in conflict with but it hasn't diverted
our main thrust: it's very much seen as a side issue."
Also, it seems to be a definite reality that there was consensus in terms of
'motive' among the core members who were active in establishing this special portfolio,
the ethical unit trust, mainly in line with Edinso's search for a higher level of
profitability. At this point, let us listen to Mr Marketing Manager's explanation as a
testimony:
"I think our involvement with the ethical side of the market was, to a
certain extent, fate or luck or whatever else. There was an intermediary
who was very keen onpromoting ethical investment who came to us to
say, look we want a major Life company that is in the pensions market to
work with us and have a majorpension fund. We agreed that we were
prepared to be that company but our ethical criteria, the criteria that
that company wanted, were already working with, we didn't actually
manipulate and change that criteria. The criteria that we were happy to
be involved with but we haven't changed their overallphilosophy to
business because of that. We just see it as another thrust or another strand
ofhow we try and sell business."
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From the above account, it is evident that Edinso did not take the initiative in
drafting and changing the ethical criteria. This explanation of the background is exactly
echoed by Mr Ethical Unit Trust Manager's testimony:
"Within the company it wasfelt that there was a goodmarket, a growing
market in thefuturefor it, and it would be a good idea to launch a
product very early on. So, yes, it was a company initiative —because we
saw good long-term prospectsfor it. —The motive was that it was a
product that people wouldwant to invest in —therefore it would be
profitable for Edinso to do it. I think that's really the main motive. I
think that would be the motive behind everything that the company does."
The above account indicates that profit-making is playing a role of morally
justifying 'business activity' in Edinso to the extent that profit would be the motive
behind everything that the company does. However, 'profit' often includes the moral or
value consideration of having been rightly or fairly earned. As Camenisch (1987)
argues, mistakes to be avoided in making moral sense of profit should include the
assumption that profitability establishes a company's moral rectitude. Profit is too
complex a phenomenon to establish any such thing. Steps towards clarifying these
issues include distinguishing profit as the goal of the corporation from the larger goals
of the economy itself, and clarifying what is meant by profit. Meanwhile, when I asked
Mr Ethical Unit Trust Manager about whether he believes his task is appropriate for
his personal interest or traits, he answered that it was not the case:
"No, maybe not. But I don't think it's very important. Because we don't
do any screeningfor ethical companies(we buy it in), it's not so
important to have somebody who M'ants to save rain forests or something
like that. By the time the Ethical Fund reaches me, we are looking
purely at investment criteria and trying to construct aportfolio which
will do well."
The above account seems to imply that a cautious attitude needs to be stressed
in investing. Mr Ethical Unit Trust Manager's preoccupation with looking purely at
investment criteria and trying to construct a portfolio which will do well is apt to
disregard a possible case that by making such investments, investors enable others to
do wrong. In following this view, Irvine (1987) suggests that when weighing the
purchase of a certain company's stock, investors should ask themselves the following
question: "Would this sort of investment, if made by many people, enable others to do
wrong?". As regards the Ethical Unit Trust, Mr Investment Manager testifies as a
manager accountable for the job of investment:
"Edinso is not constrained by any of these considerations. So we
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may or may not depend ifwe think they are attractive or not. We will
invest in Scottish Whisky companies ifwe so wish; if we think they
are attractive investments and offer an attractive return. We will invest
in them, yes"
In addition to the motive of attaining a higher level of profitability, the
consensus behind launching the ethical unit trust seems to imply another motive as is
revealed in Mr Marketing Manager's remark:
"We feel it (ethical unit trust) helps to enhance our image, but we
haven't said that we will only do business on an ethical basis. "
From the testimonies explicated above, it is certain that the pure motive of
launching the ethical unit trust is highly questionable in light of ethical standards the
substance of which should not be contaminated by any partisan's arbitrary interests.
This worry also seems to be relevant in the case of Edinso in that the marketing
department did not take the initiative in setting up the criteria of ethical investment. As
Mr Marketing Manager's account verifies:
"It (the agenda ofethical criteria) has been agreed by our marketing
department that we are happy to go along with that but the actual
criteria that we put up in thefirst place was actually determined by an
independent thirdparty".
In consideration of the moral premise that ethical standards should be treated
as an end itself not as instruments for another end such as profitability, the ethical
legitimacy of launching the ethical unit trust leads inevitably to a lot of disputes in
terms of ethical purity. For instance, an official document presenting further
information on the ethical unit trust contains the following statements:
Units in the Ethical Trust may be switched for units of another Edinso
Trust at any time on favourable terms.
If the ethical unit trust is used as a means to enhance the company's image or
as an another instrument for profit-gain, it is doomed to result in moral fiction
(Mclntyre, 1981) which is recognised to be a social manipulation of 'the ethical' in
Edinso. Meanwhile, the policy-holders as investors in the ethical unit trust do not seem
to be active in influencing the management of their fund as is evidenced by Mr Ethical
Unit Trust's account:
"They are only investing. They don't get involved like that. What we do
say is, ifany investorsfind themselvesparticularly upset by any
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specific company /hat we have invested in, then we will go and research
their complaint, andmay say the company ifwe find that it is
warranted. So that's really the only impact they have: they can have a
feedback to us. Usually we find it's only by writing angry letters. If
people are happy about the way things are going, they won't
communicate with you. But if they are upset, they will. ... I receive one or
two letters a year. So the level ofactivitiesfrom policy-holders is not so
high."
The purpose of launching the ethical unit trust is presumed to upgrade the
level of ethical consciousness in investment between the investors and the invested
companies. However, the arousal of ethical consciousness tends to be done at the post
factum stage; i.e. after any investors find themselves particularly upset by any specific
company. The only way they can impact is to give feedback to Edinso. The reason
why the level of applying the investors' ethical consciousness is incipient is because the
alternative 'stories' are bound to be silenced while they are only investing, and don't get
involved in a more active manner. In order to enliven the silenced 'stories' in applying
the ethical consciousness to the actual cases, it needs to be emphasised at the
preventive stage; i.e. before any investors find themselves particularly upset by any
specific company. For instance, the investors can have influence upon the companies'
initiative to take such measures as installing a variety of environmental facilities which
can prevent the polluting of environments. It is worse that Edinso does not seem to be
so acute as to send feedback information of the invested companies to the
policy-holders as is alluded in Mr Investment Manager's accounts:
"For all the Unit Trusts, for example, there are regular reports sent to
unit-holders —telling them what we have been doing, andwhy, and so
on. But as to being informed about individual companies in any
detail... I'm not sure how much detailyou mean? We have
information, and ifsomeone wanted that on a specific company, we
could certainly provide it —to some ofourpolicy-holders, if that was
what they wanted. But it's a more general type ofcomment that gets
sent out to unit-holders on a regular basis: what we are doing, which
companies we are investing in andwhy."
The extent to which Edinso is specifically reporting to the unit-holders about
what Edinso is doing or which companies Edinso is investing in and why, is critical
because an understanding of the actual investment policies and their implementations is
an essential step in the development of social accounting. In their empirical study
concerned with the investment decision-making process of six American social
responsible mutual funds, Rockness and Williams (1988) suggest that availability of
appropriate information on social performance, rather than frequency of negative
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criteria, is the main reason for excluding firms from ethical portfolios. Perhaps of
particular relevance to accounting policy makers was their finding that such funds also
place heavy reliance on company annual reports for investment decision making,
despite their awareness of major deficiencies in the provision of data on corporate
social performance within these documents. When considered in conjunction with
earlier research suggesting that such social information as is provided within annual
reports tends not to be directly related to actual performance, and indeed at times
appears positively misleading (Wiseman, 1982), Rockness and Williams' study clearly
indicts the current corporate reporting practice as a major constraint facing the ethical
investor.
In short, the usefulness of social information to investors has provided the
focal point for the ethical investor's identity as a potentially significant change agent in
the development of corporate reporting practice, and for opinions of ethical fund
managers on the adequacy of current reporting practice and the need for change.
Much social accounting research (Owen et al., 1987) pointed out that investors are
likely to be almost entirely uninterested in corporate social reporting except in so far as
it influences their financial position and that social reporting is essentially justified on
the basis of the need to provide information to other elements in society. However,
such a generalisation may fail to distinguish between different kinds of shareholders. In
particular those aiming for short-term speculative profit should perhaps be
distinguished from others seeking to practice more responsible share ownership
involving long-term commitment. In consideration of the suggestions that shareholders
as involved owners rather than mere speculators may indeed have a role to play in the
development of social reporting (Owen, 1990), the Ethical Unit Trust Manager is
required to connect himself with the ethical investors by providing them with regular
information on the invested companies so that they can be more actively involved in
the companies' social concerns which occupy the major part of social accounting.
The extent to which Ethical Trust is corporately appropriated should be
considered in connection with Edinso's external status as shareholders in the
companies which meet the investment criteria of Ethical Trust. As Scott (1986)
p i reports, as institutional investors life insurance companies deal in huge sums ofmoney
and are frequently among the top shareholders in the major British companies,
exercising considerable power especially in relation to takeovers and mergers. Insofar
as Edinso does not more actively concern the ethical status of the companies in which
it remains as shareholders, it is the case that Ethical Trust is detached from its intrinsic
nature of conveying ethical values and rather attached to a management strategy of
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impression management (Rosenfeld et al., 1994) and attainment of a higher level of
profitability by making use of Ethical Trust as a marketing strategy.
For the launching ofEthical Trust as an insurance product it must have been
presumed that Edinso should, at the very least, have a sense of pride as a company the
internal ethical status of which reaches the degree of saving face in the external public
eye. Moreover, it must also have been assumed that Ethical Trust is intended to
sustain and secure the policyholders' intent to preserve their own ethical aspirations
and realise their subjective ethical values through investing in those companies which
are ethically integrated. In this sense, Ethical Trust is seen to function as a means of
financially constructing the policyholders' subjectivity or self-discipline (Knights and
Morgan, 1991). Thus, ifEdinso as an agent does its business while it remains detached
from the intrinsic nature of ethical values, the policyholders' subjectivity as ethical
investors is also bound to be constituted likewise.
Indeed, the management of Edinso's ethical unit trust is another case in which
the ethical approach to investment by organisations and individuals who are keen to
preserve the delicate balance of profit with responsibility is deliberately manipulated.
This is an example that a practice of socially manipulating 'the ethical' in the business
company is legally protected and promoted in the name of tax benefits. As Mr
Marketing Manager puts;
"The taxation advantages between investing through Life and Insurance
and investing in Unit Trusts swung towards Unit Trusts during the late
80's and therefore it is expected thatfuture growth will be concentrated
on unit trusts rather than in Life Insurance."
One of the official documentation of Edinso introduces further information on
the ethical unit trust of Edinso in respect of tax advantages:
When you cash in your units there is a potential capital gains
liability. However, many individuals escape this liability, as there is
complete exemption from capital gains tax in any year where income
from any chargeable source does not exceed a certain amount.
(emphasis added)
In the context that an ethic of fairness is not allegedly accomplished in the
current implementation of tax policies in Britain; in other words, justice in tax
collection is in a questionable state, a further interpretive analysis of the case that tax
exemption is granted in the ethical trust seems important. First, ongoing legislative
pressures to take greater account of the environmental problems and to improve
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business ethics are imposing the burden of sharing a portion of governmentality (Rose
and Miller, 1992) upon business activities, almost as driving forces to facilitate the
appropriation of Ethical Trust for tax exemption. This imperative is understood to be
inevitable in the sense that governments in the modern capitalistic societies are trapped
within an endless quest for economic growth in terms of quantitatively measurable
figures which they believe are robust evidence enough to appeal to their voters whose
minds are also obsessed by the wandering ideology of 'economism'. Given the
importance of tax policy to the extent that tax -based incomes policy seeks for
stabilisation of commodity prices and wages which are two pillars of the macro
economic policy, the business practice of seducing customers by a merit of tax
exemption granted in the ethical trust should be criticised to be manipulating 'the
ethical'.
Indeed, the mechanism whereby the management of Edinso's ethical unit
trust is socially manipulated takes on a structural formation around such economic
actors as government, the companies currently applying ethical criteria, and their
competitors with no ethical criteria as yet. This is implicated in a passage at the official
document ofEdinso ethical trust:
In the longer term there are ongoing legislative and social pressures
to take greater account of the environmental and to improve business
ethics. Enforcement of such issues tends to occur during periods of
economic growth when governments feel growth will not be
sacrificed. Therefore, companies well placed now will have an
advantage against their competitors which have as yet not applied
ethical criteria.
In the current circumstance where Ethical Trust is used as a means for tax
exemption and the ethical trust fund may be switched for units of another Edinso trust
at any time on favourable terms, such pressures to take greater account of the
environmental and to improve business ethics are to give an impetus to manipulating
the ethical unit trust. If 'the ethical' in Edinso is used as a legitimate means for an
advantage against the competitors, the business arena where the competitors also
manipulate 'the ethical' in their own tacit ways will incur a complete loss of ethical
authenticity, bringing about another dimension of competitiveness. Mr Ethical Trust
Manager's accounts are relevant for this aspect;
"As I said, other companies' Unit Trusts have different criteria. For
example, one criterion we have, is not to invest in companies which
test on animals. Whereas many other Trusts do not have that
criterion. So somebody whofelt very strongly about that, would never
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invest in other Ethical Unit Trusts, butpresumably would be quite
happy to come here. But everyone is different: depending on their
backgi'ound, their circumstances, their views."
Given that policyholders are not so active in the follow-up examination of
their invested companies, Edinso's efforts to meet the degree of policyholders' rigidity
in terms of ethical standards are only indicative of the differences in sharing the
expressions of Ethical Criteria. To be sure, the efforts are aligned with Edinso's
differentiation strategy for marketing rather than its authentic commitment to the
ethical criteria. Mr Ethical Trust Manager's accounts go on to suggest this Janus-like
aspect ofEthical Trust;
"Our Ethical Trust isjudged in comparison to other Ethical Trusts. We
can be successful at selling it if it is showing superior returns. Also,
the criteria we set -which are very rigid - may be comparedwith other
Ethical Trusts."
Edinso's established rigidity in the ethical criteria is more likely to be aimed
at occupying a relatively superior status over other competing companies' ethical trusts
rather than being focused on enhancing the ethical standards of invested companies.
Mr Ethical Trust Manager's comment; "Once we get a list of companies, I just look at
investment considerations", is suggestive of the fractured morality. The Ethical Unit
Trust as an ethical practice moralises actors like Edinso and policyholders at an initial
stage, but at the next stage it adiaphorises the consequent actions by simply looking at
investment considerations. This fragment ofmorality is most salient in Edinso's lack of
concern about the status of ethical standards related with the internal situations of
companies which passed through the screening of ethical criteria. The content of most
of the ethical criteria are deficient in the internal aspects of the company such as the
employees' job right, insider trading, discrimination, and so on. They are oriented only
to externally decorative ethical standards which the companies might plausibly
calculate to be advantageous for corporate image of the public. The lack of continual
interest in and reflection upon the revision of ethical criteria on the part of Edinso as
an agency accountable to the ethical fund is rationalised by Mr Ethical Trust Manager
as Edinso's policy of keeping consistency in a fairly rigid set of ethical criteria. As Mr
Ethical Trust Manager puts;
"We want to keep somethingfairly rigid -simplyfor consistency's sake,
because inconsistency will be the major obstacle to people investing in
an ethical unit trust. I think ifyou set up afairly rigid list and
stick to it, that's the best thingyou can do -in terms of the ability
to sell the product andfor the long-term performance as well. Ifyou
change criteria all the time, you mayfindyou have to buy and sell lots
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ofstocks, and that is not so goodfor the long-term investment returns."
Edinso's lack of self-reflective investigation of the ethical criteria, applied to
the invested companies, seems to be legitimated by virtue of saving transaction costs
incurred by having to buy and sell lots of stocks. However, given the many implicit
limitations embedded in the practice of Ethical Trust, such a way of handling the
ethical criteria mainly in terms of economic calculation is indeed narrowing and
directing the use of expressions of ethical trust with a loss of commitment to the
ethical values which are officially espoused to be realised.
In summary, the objective of Edinso's ethical trust stipulated at a promotional
bulletin incisively indicates the order of priority pursued by the implementation of
ethical trust,
To achieve capital growth by investing worldwide in any economic
sector. Investments will be conducted having regard to ethical
considerations as determined from time to time and by considering the
advice of the independent ethical adviser.
It is ironic that to achieve capital growth comes first, and ethical
considerations follow next. As has been argued before, the investors in the ethical trust
are also not interested in Edinso's internal status of ethical integrity as an agent who is
managing their funds. Rather, their first priority of interest is whether their agent's
financial performance is attractive enough to vicariously manage their funds in a more
profitable way. All in all, an excerpt from The Sunday Times (21 May, 1995) is
indicative of a subtle nuance lying between the lines mentioned by an ethical trust fund
manager;
"We are not trying to play God," said a spokesman. "Our aim is simply
to make sure our customers know exactly how their money is being
used."
Finally, it is contradictory that though the family value is strongly encouraged
to be shared and appreciated by Edinso members (cf. Chapter 5), the intrinsic nature of
family values is not substantially appreciated by the members. This is clearly shown in
the members' attitude to the existence and content of Ethical Unit Trust. An excerpt
from my interview with Mr Ethical Trust Manager is suggestive:
(Q) Are most of the members of this company aware of this Ethical Trust? Or is its
recognition confined only to investors, you, and some other people?
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(A) No, Iwould say most people in the company are aware ofnot only it, but also all
the products that Edinso sell. There has been quite a lot ofpublicity about that Trust
in the last couple ofyears. Iwould say that everyone knows about it.
(Q) With strong affection or special interest?
(A) I don't know. Probably it is regarded as just anotherproduct.
(O) And I don't think the Ethical Trust is regarded as heavily important by the
executive level - especially in strategy?
(A) No.
(0) Just minor?
(A) Yes. Simply because Edinso's main growth in the last few years has been in the
area ofPensions - and always will be for the foreseeable future. The Ethical Trust is
really just an adjunct to what we do.
The accounts above indicate quite manifestly how family value is detached
from its intrinsic nature and attached to the corporate purpose which is to induce an
intensification of accountabilities and extract surplus from labour by enacting
cohesiveness among the members through the inculcation of family values. As is
specified in [Appendix 4], the criteria for the investment via the Ethical Trust carry the
most significant values for safeguarding family life. Though the criteria are not directly
related with family life, they are at least indirectly affecting the well-being of family
life. The existential problems - insecurities, anxieties (cf. Chapter 4) - most of modern
employees in the company struggle with, are closely related with their sense of
responsibilities for a good life of their family. For instance, restrictions of investment
on the companies manufacturing nuclear weapons, liquor, tobacco are the indirect
measures to keep the family from the damages caused by the use of those products.
However, the members in Edinso do not seem to share those precious values
embedded in the Ethical Trust but share only its expressions to the extent that they
regard it as just another product. At this point, the intent of corporate management
with respect to the enactment of family atmosphere in Edinso is doubtedly detached
from its genuine, intrinsic nature as is also uncovered in the operating ofEthical Trust.
The fact that Edinso members have no serious concern for family values embodied in
the form of ethical criteria for investment is sufficiently suggestive of the possibility
that they have also been distanced from the intrinsic nature of family values and have
only participated in the sharing of family atmosphere in its superficial level rather than
in its committed and authentic level. The members' distanciation from the authentic
level of commitment to values is also illustrated at TQM to which we now turn.
129
Total Quality Management (TQM) as Moral Expressions
TQM is launched by corporate management under the rubric that it is a strong
measure to replace the dysfunctions of traditional bureaucratic control mechanisms.
Empowerment through 'delegation', 'flexibility', 'open communication', 'team working'
are all expected to contribute to cultural changes towards de-bureaucratisation.
However, beneath the market metaphor and the seeming critique of bureaucracy is its
apparent antithesis - the process of bureaucratisation (Tuckman, 1994). That is, the
formal dimension of TQM cannot be taken at face value. For example, Edinso's quality
programmes encourage a team work in the form of 'focus groups'. As Mr Quality
Manager introduces,
"We deliberately tried to get the lower levels ofstaff involved, and to
keep the management out of thefocus groups, so as to give the younger
and lower levels their own say on how to go about things - and not be
influenced by the management. That has been successful to that end, in
that we have got lower levels involved. But perhaps where it'sfailed is
that the managers have not got involved as much as we would like them
to. We told them not to get involved and interfere with thefocus
groups, but we told them that they had to take an interest in what the
groups were doing. Unfortunately the managers - or some of them - have
taken that as an option to opt out completely, and they're not getting
involved."
As Tuckman (1994) argues, TQM acts to both construct an emphasis on
group -or team work at lower levels and reinforce existing hierarchy. That which is
significant relating to the flexible focus group is to bring about the separation of
individual tasks from particular roles. It exemplifies the very depersonalisation of roles
which is at the heart of bureaucracy (ibid.;741). Cautions against this dysfunction of
bureaucracy are captured in the attitudes of some managers who do not intend to get
involved in the focus groups of Edinso as was illustrated in the above accounts. They
do not want their involvement with the focus groups which separates them from their
particular roles and accordingly do not want to assume responsibilities for unexpected
consequences of the work of the focus groups. Initially, the group-or team work at
lower levels as part of quality programmes is intended to transform the culture of the
workplace in attempting to construct a new worker; the 'ideal' self-managed worker,
sensitive to the dictates of the market (ibid,;732). However, the dictates of the market
tend to narrow the managers' managerial action such that they are afraid of raising
their own competing views and consequently remain to be satisfied somehow with the
existing hierarchy. Indeed, the 'quality organisation' often replicates the existing
hierarchy giving the senior roles new legitimacy (ibid,;741). That is, the market
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metaphor which is introduced as a counter to bureaucratic models of power and
authority does reversely reinforce the hierarchical hegemony. In this section, I reflect
critically such components of TQM as 'delegation', 'open door communication', 'team
briefing', and 'Q-track advice' which are practised in Edinso, too.
'Delegation' is a prominent way in which quality programmes are reversely
conducive to the reinforcement of bureaucratic hegemony. This is true of Edinso
senior managers' case as Mr Service Director mentions; "I try to delegate everything
and sit on top of the business". As Sewell and Wilkinson (1992b) argue, a
centralisation of power simultaneously occurs along with the delegation of
responsibility, a process which is termed 'devolutionism' though workers are trusted to
produce quality goods in the absence of bureaucratic control procedures. Putting that
quality may be constitutive of a new order, Munro (1995; 129) argues that quality is a
territory, a space of representation which is not only shaped by interests, but which, in
turn, is shaping interests. At stake is a question about how people reshape their
interests in the context of quality. Importantly, reshaping interests is not done in a
manner to assume active accountability but done in a passive manner to evade
responsibility. As Munro (ibid.; 133) puts,
By a process of delegation, responsibility is being limited within the
line. First, responsibility is being portrayed no longer as line
responsibility, but as specific to a point in the line. Second, there is
some asymmetry here about the nature of delegation. Responsibility
pertains particularly to the matter ofgetting it right for one's
senior. Blame cannot travel upwards -only credit can. Delegation in
Component, therefore, means more than a transfer of authority for
taking responsibility. Taking ownership implies a full transfer of
responsibility for what goes wrong, (emphasis original)
The reason why some middle managers in Edinso are reluctant to get
involved in the task groups of lower levels can be explained by their perception of
status. They are brought into the labour process to the extent that their seniors, by
delegation, do not care about blame for any unintended consequences while a full
transfer of responsibility for what goes wrong relating to the work of the task groups
of lower levels is imposed upon themselves. Being caught in this double burden, the
middle managers' strategic conduct for identity work is bound to focus on attempts to
hold their expertise. Because of their visibility, middle managers are particularly
vulnerable in the absence of claims to specialist expertise (Kerfoot and Knights, 1995).
As Munro (1995) argues, middle managers' identity work is done by representing
themselves as having the expertise over quality. In Latour's (1987) terms, they are
establishing themselves as an 'obligatory passage'. Being the obligatory passage
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constitutes their legitimacy to act as spokespersons for the customer, and representing
the customer, in turn, affirms the governing rights of middle managers (Munro, op.
cit.;146). That which is conceivable regarding middle managers' claim for expertise
over quality is their greedy attempts to monopolise the new province of quality,
excluding out other competing views to challenge their expertise. This preoccupation
with managerial expertise is likely to lead them to lose a sense of fairness in dealing
with the matters related with their would-be monopolised province of quality. Driven
by corporate core values of 'excellence' and 'success', middle managers' selfishness
through distancing themselves by recourse to their expertise over quality is
compounded by fearing to be left behind in a climate where 'quality is all'. As Kerfoot
and Knights (1995) put it in a comprehensive way,
Far from transforming workplace cultures and employee 'motivation',
'quality' and FIRM may be seen to provide management with a range of
what are held to be expertise, that not only generate the illusion of
controlling uncertainty, but restore legitimacy for managerial privilege
and authority. For those managers who are retained, the rise of such
initiatives as quality and FIRM creates yet another landmark or
watershed for delineating those who will 'succeed', as distinct from
those who will not. Given the precariousness of their position,
managers are thus as much concerned to sustain the definition of their
work as involving expert knowledge, as they are publicly preoccupied
with articulating their conversion to the central tenets of the quality
and HRM philosophies. Clearly, then, the self-disciplinary effects of
'new' managerial discourses may be more intense for management
than the workforce on whom they are often targeted.
Indeed, middle managers are obliged to convey the mixed messages brought
about by the advent of quality. As Kerfoot and Knights (ibid.) add, we may speculate
on the degree to which, although mouthing its incantations, middle managers will
respond to the call to think and feel quality in any more engaged a manner than their
subordinates. This degree of ambivalence which the middle managers are obliged to
take on is partly indicated in Mr Quality Manager's comment on the problems of
quality,
"The other problem with Quality has been management involvement. Some
of the managers have opted out. Iwas able to take that problem up to Chief
Executive and say "We do have a problem here. How are we going to
address it?". And we have agreed a wayforward. At the next quarter's
focus group activity, we are going to make a presentation to all
managers at that stage with hisfocus group. Involve the manager in that
way. Gradually bring him more and more into it. And try and convince the
manager that the focus group is now a resource he can use for his own
activity - locally to solve local problems. That's how we intend to
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bring the managers into it."
In spite of the calculated programmes to involve middle managers into the
side merits of quality by which to solve local problems, some managers seem to be
ambivalent on the corporate imperatives of quality by opting it out. This seems to
indicate that the result of TQM implementation was a highly polished processional
'front' which facilitates continuous change, whatever the career dissatisfactions of
middle managers (Webb, 1995; 115). Indeed, such espoused tenets of TQM as
'empowerment' and 'trust' are only rhetoric while the centralisation of power and
control is the reality (Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992b). Delegation turns out to be a
hollow, decorative managerial device by which top management disguises having
greater control of information in the absence of a proliferation of the layers of
bureaucracy. Mediating this process are the expressions ofTQM as rhetoric which are
shared in the narrowed and directed ways. The cascading system of communicating
information seems to convey such expressions of TQM along the hierarchical chain of
command in Edinso. However, Mr Quality Manager points out a friction where the
cascade system falls down:
"The conflict comes when you stop communicating specific pieces of
information. For example, ifyou take the cascading system of
communicating information: the chiefexecutive cascades it to senior
management, down to middle management, to the manager. Once you get
down two or three levels, you're never very sure that every manager above
that has communicated everything to everybody else. At the bottom of the
ladderyou mightfind some of the staffhad been told some of the things
and others hadn't been told some of the things. So there could be
friction there. I think that 's where the cascade system falls down. I
don't know the answer to be honest. I think there is aproblem. There is
a conflict. And it's up to every manager to try andmanage that problem.
Hisjob is to make sure that every member ofhis staffknows exactly what
theirjob is, andwhere itfits into the organisation. But there are
problems in doing that —because of the freedom given to individual
managers."
This account warns against inefficiency of the cascading system of
communication. As with the usual cases of formal communication, it may deliver only
the superficial content of communication, dropping specific pieces of communication.
Mr Quality Manager's diagnosis that the main reason why there could be friction is
because of the freedom given to individual managers, needs to be reflected in view of
the possibility that individual managers appropriate their freedom to create distance as
being essential to identity work (Munro, 1995; 134). Creating distance, along the
format of 'me Tarzan, you Jane', becomes definitional to being a 'good manager'. In
133
such ways, delegation and distance, do managers enact the great message that their
time is money (ibid.; 134). A delivery of the message that managers' time is money is
facilitated by "open door communication" as part of the quality programmes. Edinso is
also keen to utilise the open door communication as Mr Pensions Manager introduces,
"We have a very open style of management. For example,
I'm the only person here who actually has a room for myself
But almost everyone in this company who has a room
leaves the door open unless they are having aprivate meeting like this.
But normally ifyou are just working atyour desk, your door will be
open. It is quite deliberate so that ifanyone feels that they want to talk
to you if they want. Clearly they would think about that and try not to
waste your time. Before they would come through the open door, most
people would be clear in their own minds what it was that they wanted
to talk to you about, and they would be clear in their own minds that it
was worth the time".
In his accounts, there is a degree of self contradiction when he said that there
was no barrier in open-door communication. The strictness of his demand that people
should be clear in their own minds that "it was worth the time", is likely to be
deliberately obstructive to the members' aspirations to raise their competing
standpoints. In a situation that the seniors' time should be perceived as money, any
competing views likely to waste the money-time should be left unspoken. Hence, there
seems to be a couple of malfunctions accompanied by the open-door communication
system. As Mr Marketing Manager agrees:
"I think some people are possibly still inhibited: because there is a
door there, they don't like to come in and discuss things. I think the
open door must help. But I think every manager has to be aware that
there could still be things, outside their door, that they are not
aware of, that they should still go and seek out ofofficial
communication channels to make sure that that is collected as well. I
don't thinkyou can just rely on the open door —you assume that
everything comes in that should do."
Though Mr Marketing Manager emphasises the importance of 'going and
seeking out of official communication channels' to make sure that other things are
collected as well, a question still remains about what other things should be. If other
things are confined to ideas which should be contributory to Edinso's core values, the
authentic nature of 'openness' of the open door communication system is exploited for
an extrinsic purpose of collecting ideas which are freely collected without being
properly rewarded. That ideas are confined to the core values is succinctly evidenced
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in Mr Group Development Manager's experience which has been most satisfying in his
recent times:
"The open-mindedness of the organisation. It is open to new
developments. The SeniorManagers are very receptive to new ideas, new
developments in order to make ways ofmaking the company more
successful. It's the sort oforganisation where people will make things
happen, rather than think ofways whyyou can't do it. That's quite a
stimulating environment to he in."
However, when the open-mindedness is emphasised mainly to make ways of
making the company more successful by being open to new developments and new
ideas, the practice of open-door communication might be one-sidedly appropriated for
such corporate core values as 'more successful', 'more excellent' and 'more profitable'.
It sacrifices the lower-level employees' job rights which are most likely to be impaired
through the asymmetrical operation of 'open-door communication' as McArdle et al.
(1995;168) argue that there is in effect no extension of employee rights in the quality
organisation they studied. To the extent that the open-door communication is directed
at all-encompassing performances, quality deems to be employed as a means to
legitimate measuring 'output' in a much more intensive and individualised manner
(Munro, 1995). Rather than conduct surveillance over 'social' aspects, the incitement
of quality is to use 'output' measures, ranging from those attributed to an individual to
those attributed to the market, to question the sufficiency of colleagues' comportment
towards the 'technical' (ibid.; 143). Indeed, an emphasis on lateral accountability based
on a pseudo-market metaphor of treating one's colleagues as internal customers
intensifies the hierarchical accountability. As Munro and Hartherly (1993) argue,
Given that hierarchical accountability orientates managers towards
surveillance of "decisions" within a dyadic structure of superior-
subordinates, managers are likely to subvert practices which develop in
the name of lateral accountability into acting as a "supplement" for
more intensive surveillance.
In view of the typical fact that conceptions of accountability are vertically
aligned with reporting systems and are subordinate to a "surveillance" framing of
control (ibid.;369), the open-door communication as reporting systems is intended to
subject the members' accountability to a "surveillance" framing of control. For the
ideas worthy of crossing the open-door and spending the seniors' money-time must
convey an appearance of accountability as much as it is exactly aligned with Edinso's
core values. Importantly, at the heart of quality as a strategic agenda is a dissemination
of accountability (Munro, 1995). As Munro (ibid.) argues, this amounts to less than a
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lauded decentralisation of decision-taking and constitutes more an invention of lateral
accountabilities in order to deflect responsibility away from the line and simultaneously
through the imposition of measures of output, individuate responsibility to a point in
the line. Far from quality constituting accountabilities which are 'shared' in ways which
might reflect the genuine participative decision-taking, an individuation of
accountability may be intensified under quality regimes (ibid.; 146-7). The advent of
quality as an issue inevitably functions as a source from which some ethical issues are
socially constructed when the middle managers are demanded to govern the new
province of quality (ibid.). Quality, as a highly abstract system to legitimate measuring
'output' in a much more intensive and individualised manner, is bound to raise issues
with an 'internal' market of bids for resources. This is so because a formation of
different interests within the company under the quality regime brings about the
competing voices in the process of acquiring resources. Here, the justice concerns are
inextricably bound up in a complex process of an internal market of bids for resources
since the allocation of limited resources involves a careful attention to the question of
what principle (e.g., equity, parity, need) should govern the distribution of the amount
of resources that different interest groups claim. (The implication is that the interests
of those involved are in conflict with one another due to the finiteness of the
resources).
In alignment with the need to control the complex process of an internal
market of bids for resources, "Team Briefing" seems to be a supplement to quality
programmes in Edinso. This is premised on a recognition that information asymmetries
have bearing upon the ethical claims related with bids for resources within a fold of
internal market. Ostensibly, 'Team Briefing System' seems to have originated from the
necessity that the overall staff in Edinso should overcome the constraints in
communicative action and improve the effect of communication. As Mr Group
Actuary introduces:
"So that we are trying to set up a new system offlowing information down
through the company. So that top managers all need and receive our
briefingfrom the chiefexecutive and the top managers andmiddle
managers and they tell their subordinates on their own down through all
the company. So although that is a very simple idea, it's not something
that we have done very well in the past. So we have put in formal structure to
make sure that it's happened. And we have to set datesfor telling our
subordinates the news that they can go and tell their subordinates and each so
the information has been passed around the company. So that's change which
as it sounds very simple, but it's forcing us to actually set a date and a time to
have a meeting and then speak to the other people about the news about the
company and about aims and objectivesfor what is happening."
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The main characteristic of the Team Briefing System seems to be 'top-down'
vertical communication in that "they tell their subordinates on their own down through
all the company". Thus, it is completely up to the superiors rather than through the
consultation with subordinates to pass information around the company such that the
Team Briefing System is forcing them to actually set even a date and a time to have a
meeting and speak to the other people about aims and objectives for what is
happening, which are mainly oriented to Edinso's corporate core values. As Kerfoot
and Knights (1995) suggest, employees are held accountable to self and managerially
defined objectives by means of the 'team report-back' meeting; to quality team leaders;
and thence ultimately, although informally, through their annual appraisal. In this vein,
the necessity of the Team Briefing System seems to be in accordance with a project on
performance management. As Mr Personnel Manager explicates:
"What we're doing now is really saying, OK, we've done that —we've
got these large numbers ofpeople —the next thing we require to do is
to make sure that we are making the best possible use of that resource.
So what we are working on now is launching aproject on performance
management which is a way of trying to link very clearly corporate
objectives with divisional objectives with departmental objectives with
individual objectives. And to make sure that that message about what is
importantfor individuals or groups of individuals to be doing is very
clear all the way down the organisation, and that people are properly
equipped to meet the ever-changing demands that are placed upon them."
This account raises a doubt to the genuineness of the Team Briefing System's
objectives. It is certain that one of the objectives of the Team Briefing System is to
make the best possible use of human resources in the name of performance
management which is a way of trying to link objectives of different levels of staffs in
Edinso. The hierarchical flow of information through the Team Briefing System is
intended to make people properly equipped to meet the ever-changing demands that
are placed upon them (according to market logic). However, if it is the case, then a
sheer legitimacy of empowerment through quality is tarnished into a means to make
workers develop an identification with the aims of the corporation that employs them,
commitments beyond the line of duty, and a general desire to cooperate with
colleagues both within and across functional areas. Even though the Team Briefing
System seemingly works well enough to meet the general staffs demands for
communication, some malfunctions are also detected. As is testified by Mr Group
Development Manager who pinpoints the mere formality of the Team Briefing System:
"This is the sort ofsyndrome we saw when we introduced Team Briefing.
The information was disseminated. But the feedback was rather
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low-key. People felt "Is that all there is to tell us?". They seemed to have
this feeling that the Group Executives are sitting there, discussing
very secretive and very controversial issues all the time: very high
strategic priorities. And that with the advent of Team Briefing, suddenly
all these very important and very 'sexy' (ifI can use that word) issues
would he revealed to them. But ofcourse that 's not what happens. There
is very mundane activity going on. I should say that the Team Briefing
system was introduced six months ago. Prior to that, we did have a cycle
ofSenior Management briefings. And it was the responsibility of the
individual managers to pass on the information they thought was
relevant. And ad that Team Briefing did was to formalise the
structure. But when we announced Team briefing as a new system, it
created expectations amongst staff that there would be more information
available. But all it was doing wasformalising what was already
there."
A malfunction is detected that the feedback was rather low-key since
information was disseminated by way of Team Briefing. According to Mr Group
Development Manager, the reason why the feedback was rather low-key was because
the introduction of Team Briefing was not effective enough to meet the people's
expectation that they would be able to share information which contains very high
strategic priorities. Even though it is often inevitable that different levels of
management should have different levels of information, the flexibility in sharing more
strategic information down the lines is often required especially under the quality
regimes. For quality is professed to counter a bureaucratic practice of communication
wherein an informational representation of the vicious law of 'divide and rule' is
required to be kept. However, the Team Briefing System was found to have merely
formalised the pre-existing communication channels. This is indicative of another
aspect that the quality programme enforces the bureaucratic legitimacy. As Kerfoot
and Knights (1995;220) point out,
While seeming to 'flatten' the hierarchy, the effect of quality
management is to renew the legitimacy of large bureau-corporate
capitalist organisations.
Moreover, Mr Marketing Manager is skeptical about the effect of the Team
Briefing System when he criticises its limitation:
"Team briefing system, although I suspect a lot ofuseful information is
notfed into that so it's neverfed out. It'spart of the problem —
there are too many things to be talked about. I suspect there is a danger
that we have become so big that there are things I would like, whether I
should know about it or not I don't know, but Iwould certainly like to
know orfeel that I know there is support. There is a separate
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IS (Information Systems) report that gets distributed once a month which
does contain most of the information. On the investment front, apartfrom
a document which is preparedfor our independentfinancial advisers and
summaries what they think is the most important aspects, there is little
else formal that 's used to communicate."
This account indicates that the essential function of communication should
be done not only on a formal level but also on such informal levels as emotional and
affective. That is, the information agents cannot be satisfied only with the rational
dimension of information processing. They need affective confirmation of 'support'
through receiving information as Mr Marketing Manager asserts: "I would certainly
like to know or feel that I know there is support". Fostering the emotional aspect of
communication to confirm to employees that they are supported in their company is
important and, therefore, it needs to be developed as a rationale for communicative
ethics (Benhabib, 1990). Accordingly, it is questionable whether the definition of
quality encompasses even the affective dimension of communication (Fineman, 1994).
In brief, the formal dimension of TQM cannot be taken at face value: one approach to
the management of the supply chain may be proclaimed by senior management, and
even institutionalised, but this does not mean that senior management's objectives will
be shared or implemented by the managers involved at different organisational levels.
Insofar as the intrinsic nature of quality programmes is not put into practice, but only
its expressions are espoused and shared, it is the case that the managers involved at
different organisational levels partake in a complicity to narrow and direct a range of
concerns which are at stake under the regime of quality. As Webb (1995; 124) argues,
managers under the regime of quality are in fact subject to greater centralised control
and increased monitoring by corporate management.
Various methods ofmonitoring the effects of TQM are employed by Edinso,
too. Encouraged by receiving tremendous support from the Chief Executive, Mr
Quality Manager seems to be very active in enacting the quality agenda by every
means of communicating to the staff. As he adds;
"You can try and drive quality by issuing magazines, sending out memos
or letters to staff, but there's nothing better than actually speaking
to a group ofpeople about it. "
In addition to these methods, that which is implemented to surveill how quality
is ingrained into members' everyday practices is "Q-track advice" [Appendix 5],
However, this 'Q-track advice' itself verifies that 'quality agenda' as a corporate core
value is not actively shared even by the managers. They share only the expressions of it
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to the extent that they use the Q-track advice but question its objectivity which is
intrinsic to the nature of'Q-track advice'. As Mr Quality Manager puts;
"They do not see the 0-track system as being an objective system. They
do not see it as a way of reducing errors or addressingproblem areas.
They take it verypersonally."
Insofar as the objectivity of TQM is put into skepticism, TQM is recognised to
be more concerned with the subordination of employees' subjectivity (Tuckman,
1995). We might represent this development as an attempt at the internalisation of
surveillance - of the 'normalised gaze' (Foucault, 1977). A transformation of quality
into a measurable quantity like 'Q-track advice' is most likely to deny alternative
approaches and induce differential forms of engagement and 'resistance' due to a broad
range of subjective interpretations. As Kerfoot and Knights (1995) argue,
Holding to a naive belief that shifts in organisational culture can
readily be accomplished as an outcome of managerial will, the quality
literature fails to consider the possibility that quality concepts,
prescriptions, or invocations may be subject to a broad range of
interpretations and, even within the same interpretation, may
produce differential forms of engagement and/or resistance.
The 'Quality-track' system is indeed an implacably technocratic solution for
all the talk of culture. As Munro (1995) suggests, though there are a multitude of
training programmes for quality including the use of Q-track advice, the object of
training is to inculcate a readiness to work within measures of output, not to 'educate'.
Far from quality engendering a greater freedom to 'choose' identity, the effect of its
rhetoric is to render the would-be Prometheus more bound in the ties of a moral
discourse that makes a waiting customer more immediate and more pressing than
alternative ties such as guild association or departmental loyalty (ibid.; 144). This way
that the quality programmes impose tight attitudes on the employees' work practices
conveys that employees are neither treated as equals nor even consulted when
companies decide to adopt programmes of quality management: they are often merely
trained in its practices once the programme has been adopted by the senior
management (Kerfoot and Knights, 1995). In short, 'Q-track advice' is a typical device
for surveillance focused on a quantitative measure of 'output'; surveillance over a
propensity by employees to be idle and careless in their work. As Munro (1995; 147)
argues,
A dissemination of accountability away from the line, through 'output'
measures which individuate and intensify responsibilities, facilitates a
switch to an insistence on a number being met, at all costs to the
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individuals concerned. In this way, a propensity by managers to give
'accounts' which excuse, legitimate or justify their failures is
silenced.
Meanwhile, Edinso seems to try to send out feedback to the customers in an
understandable way. As Mr Claims Manager emphasises:
"What we should be able to do is write in plain English exactly what we
are trying to say and we should be able to go straight to an IFA or
straight to a company and miss out the branch or perhaps miss out in
time the IFA. But at the moment the way we write is too much jargon,
and nobody understands and it's got to be broken down. So that's going
to go livefrom the middle ofMarch and hopefully that's the start of
writing in plain English so that everybody understands."
In addition to the way Edinso writes: "which has too much jargon, and
nobody understands such that it's got to be broken down", there seems to be some
deliberate arbitrariness in Edinso's practice of communication with customers. Mr
Service Director's answer to my query about the transmission of information to the
customers suggests it:
"Correct and understandable. We can send outplenty of information that
is totally incomprehensible to anybody. And we do it. (Laughs) "
This account of confession delivers a basic question about the definition of
quality itself. Edinso is eager to receive quality information from customers in terms of
their personal specifications, but it is a striking contrast that Edinso sends out plenty of
information that is totally incomprehensible to anybody. If an ethos of quality to meet
the customers' requirements is selectively applied only insofar as it is directly
contributory to Edinso's economic core values, it is disguising Edinso's Janus-like
practice of business in the name of service to the customers. As Kerfoot and Knights
(1995) argue, employees may 'conform to the requirements' of the programme,
including the demands of internal or external customers, but only as minimally defined
in the language of quality literature. In the case of Edinso's practice of communication
with the customers, the concept of quality information was minimally defined notably
for Edinso's partial interests. Indeed, the meaning of 'total' is tarnished as Wilkinson
and Willmott (1995;20) argue that when evaluating TQM, it is (ironically) appropriate
to develop a more comprehensive, 'totalising' approach than has been commended
either by its gurus or by the majority of academic commentators. In this vein, a public
statement at Annual Review and Financial Highlights 1993' is also self-contradictory
in respect of how Edinso treats the needs of the customer,
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In more difficult times the competitive pressures in a market with too
many product providers become increasingly intense. In these
conditions a clear focus on the needs of the customer is critical.
It is clear that the competitive pressures in a market have been a central
impetus for upgrading a degree of focus on the needs of the customer. Rather than
arouse a sense of accountability as to meeting the needs of the customer on the level of
'reflexive self; the self accounting to the self, for the self (Munro and Mouritsen, in
press), Edinso's corporate management are featured to fabricate accountabilities (ibid.)
under the pressure of market competition. This leads to a question about the
superficiality of TQM in that its profession of being loyal to the requirements of the
customer remains only an expression by which to adapt to market pressures. In short,
the degree of artificiality of 'quality' becomes more clear when it is found to have
emerged from the existential condition of competition with other companies. As Mr
Quality Manager mentions;
"Not many years ago, I didn't have the focus of the customer in my mind -
or the customer wasn't veryfinelyfocused in my mind. Over the last
five years or so, it certainly has become the focus ofmy job: the end
customer. Possibly there are two reasonsfor it. The competitive element
is a very real needforfocusing on service. Ifeverybody else is doing
it, we can very easily get left behind. The ChiefExecutive, as I said
earlier, has decided that the way Edinso is going to grow and become a
majorforce -having already addressed the investment, marketing issues,
and so on -is through quality, through providing quality services.
Because there is a feeling that in an IFA's analysis, sen'ice will play
a large part in who he recommends to his customer. And service is a
more lasting element than, perhaps, investment, which is always going
to have itspeaks and troughs. Service is the one thing that is always
going to be there. So it is a definite focusfrom the competitive point of
view." (emphasis added)
It seems certain that caring for the customers was not a natural cause, but an
inevitable response to the dictates of the market. Competition as a collective meaning
held by Edinso members obliges them to be keen to the requirements of the customers.
Indeed, the pursuit of quality in financial services companies in recent years could be
seen essentially as a search for competitive advantage through differentiation strategies
(Porter, 1985). This has occurred largely as a result of a concern among companies to
differentiate themselves from their competitors in terms of service, within an industry
widely acknowledged to hold minimal differences between products across
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competitors (Kerfoot and Knights, 1995). Here let us listen to Mr Group Actuary's
testimony:
"All the other companies are trying to do the same. So it'sfirst time
that it has been formalised and the chiefexecutive has written to all
the staffs saying that he wants us to be involved in this, and he is
backing it. And structures are put into practicefor the first time. So
it's new although I think the best workers always have known that it's
important for them to work to the very bestf...) And quality means
different things in differentparts of the company. Andwith different
responsibilities and so quality ofservice means something different in
the departments which are involved with marketing."
The fact that a structure was put in with the launch of the quality agenda is
suggestive enough of its artificialness rather than natural constructiveness. It seems
that members are burdened with an intensification of accountabilities (Munro, 1995) as
the quality agenda places different responsibilities upon them. This implies that 'quality'
itself is detached from its authentic nature and attached extrinsically to such corporate
utilities as quality service, quality administration, cheap charges to customers, etc.
which are attainable through an intensification of accountabilities. As the neo-Marxist
labour process theorists contend, the quality agenda is, in the end, appropriated as a
means of extracting the surplus value from labour (Wilkinson and Willmott, 1995). At
the same time, it is likely that the quality agenda was set up for improving Edinso's
business competence by displaying its commitment to quality service for customers.
This means that it is moulded to keep Edinso's externally perceived corporate image to
look as morally integrated as possible. To be sure, Edinso's management strategy to
show its integrity to the external customers by the implementation of the quality
agenda takes on a character of manipulating an ethic of responsibility. This is so
because, as Mr Group Actuary's accounts above suggest, the quality agenda is
intended to induce different responsibilities, and it is legitimised in the name of
Edinso's corporate responsibility to the customers. In consequence, there is a lot of
cynicism even among the members in Edinso about the quality agenda. As Mr Quality
Manager approves it;
"I think there are a lot ofcynics amongst senior management. It's
unfortunate. Cynicism doesn't come out at senior management meetings.
The chiefexecutive is behind quality, so they are not going to rock the boat
when the chiefexecutive is trying to push it. But it -worries me
that in front of their own staff - when they cascade the information
down to the next level - they won't be putting the quality message over
because they don't believe it themselves."
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The other side of the quality agenda is certainly in dispute among the cynics.
Basically, the cynics' argument seems to consist of the notion that quality-initiative is
not just a current passion, or not just an imposition of managerial ideology. Since the
members have always been for quality, it is a reworking of that 'sharedness' which is a
kernel of corporate culture. This was already verified before by Mr Group Actuary in
Edinso; "So it's new although I think the best workers always have known that it's
important for them to work to the very best". Quality is rewriting what is shared such
that the employees are demanded to exhibit shared performativity as if they shared the
core values of Edinso. Overall, the changes introduced under the umbrella of TQM
seem to be a continuation of past traditions, rather than a radical break. The moral
rhetoric of TQM, and its ethos of 'partnership' with internal and external customers,
fitted easily with the pre-existing corporate ideology (Webb, 1995; 114)
The effect of this semblance of the pre-existing corporate ideology like
bureaucracy is to put more pressure on members to become involved in the workings
of the internal and external market as part of the process of the commodification of
internal organisational relations. As a result, the market and, in particular, the external
environment, allow management to shift responsibility for enhanced control and
exploitation away from themselves and on to external pressures (Tuckman, 1995).
Ascribing responsibilities to external pressures makes management be habituated to the
practice of stretching the distance between managerial action and its consequences
beyond the reach of moral limit (Bauman, 1991). This is a self-contradiction of TQM
in that such pretenses of moral values as self-reliance, trust, responsibility (Sewell and
Wilkinson, 1992b) will eventually result in immoral expediency. As Tuckman
(1994;747) argues,
Recently, with the extension of quality assurance, all these traditional
modes have come under greater surveillance, with TQM challenging
the conventional guardianship of quality. What has developed so far is
the appropriation of quality within a discourse which argues that there
is only the market alternative to stultifying modernity; that it must
occur within a system of the commodification of need and the
quantification of quality which is represented in organisational terms,
and represents organisation, as a chain of customers and suppliers. Far
from being an alternative to bureaucracy per se, TQM extends a
bureaucratisation process while challenging some of its dysfunctions.
In short, quality which professes 'shared' accountabilities is not a new
expression, but its use is different. It is manipulated as a means to legitimate the
employees' subjection to the quality agenda as a set of corporate core values. Given
that individual commitment arising from delegation and worker autonomy can be
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readily transformed into a more reliable form of collective self-discipline (Kerfoot and
Knights, 1995), such tenets of TQM as 'delegation' and 'autonomy' are corporately
appropriated for collectivising the labour power, which is advantageous for capital in
terms of gaining more profits. TQM is apparently intended to create a semblance of a
new era of trust between managements and workforces, and what is ostensibly a
wholesale transformation in the nature of supervision and control under cultures of
equality as opposed to coercion (Kerfoot and Knights, ibid.). However, such moral
values as 'trust' and 'equality' are exploited for extracting the surplus from labour. At
stake is the loss of employee rights which employees consenting to the tenets of the
quality regime expect to be extended and fulfilled. As McArdle et al. (1995) argue,
though employees appear to gain more satisfaction from the job enlargement process,
there is also the feeling that the so-called logics of the market are used to impose an
atmosphere of fear of unemployment as a means of avoiding any resistance from
employees. Rather than extending the rights of employees, TQM has introduced
'management by stress' into the workplace and forced workers to indulge in their own
work intensification and exploitation. Here, Mr Quality Manager's accounts are
suggestive;
"I think the best way to express cultural change is that people
historicallyfeel that they're just here to do a job - to pass the paper
from a to b, tofill in a computer screen, that sort of thing. What we
want them to realise is that other people depend on what they do. We
want to try and instill in every member ofstaff this customer service
requirement. Even if they only have internal customers - just another
department or another clerk sitting next to them - there is a
relationship there. And they must appreciate that thisperson depends on
them to do ajob properly."
An ethic of dependence is indispensable to the sustainment of organisational
life because every member is dependent on one another in many ways. However, this
ethic of dependency under the scheme of TQM is selectively applied to the relations of
internal customers by a managerial intent to intensify the degree of labour power. If
the employees' job right, buttressed by an ethic of mutual dependency on their
employers, is threatened by the fear of unemployment, the ethical imperative of serving
internal customers as a tenet of TQM is only a distorted way of managing by stress.
Conclusively, the critique of TQM in respect of its manipulation of morality leads to a
recognition that 'total' never characterises TQM because the definition of quality is
very selectively deployed to such an extent as to be rendered expedient. The managers
are reluctantly brought into the labour process in which they have to convey a
pseudo-totality, being simultaneously conscious of its fragmentation in reality. Kerfoot
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and Knights' (1995) insight is incisive here concerning the Janus-like characters of
TQM when they put,
Clearly, then, the introduction of quality and human resource programmes
as discrete and stand-alone policies with no direct connection between
them leaves organisations vulnerable to the charge that their policies
are inconsistent and senior management superficial in their commitment
to the transformation ofwork for which they are designed.
Indeed, the word, 'total' is void. Even though Mr Quality Manager asserts;
"So, we really want to address ever single aspect ofquality: as it affects the external
customer, the internal customer, the working environment of the staff... The scope is
limitless, really.", the totality he means is not substantive at all because the actual
scope of totality is really limited. It is detached from its authentic nature and attached
to an extrinsic appropriation for corporate core values. Only the expressions of totality
are shared with a residue of losing its authenticity. The loss of its authenticity ranges
from the negligence of employees' job rights to the arbitrary treatment of customer
needs (e.g. supply of information to customers in a totally incomprehensible way in the
case of Edinso). At worst, particularly in a recession, the ideology of TQM reduces
honesty, integrity, authenticity 'and all those good, nice words' to marketable
commodities which have a price just like any other goods; it reduces workplace
relations to the 'imperatives of the market' and becomes an excuse for managerialist,
and immoral, expediency (Webb, 1995;125).
Conclusion
"Having too many things to do. Being involved in too many areas. Not
enough staff Not enough time. People askingfor things too quickly —
i.e., very short deadlines. Lack ofknowledge ofsome things. Not knowing
enough about Edinso. Not knowing enough about howprofitable our
contracts are andwhich ones are more profitable than others, or which
branches make more profit than others, or which brokers make more
profit. Things like that."
It seems that Mr Liaison Manager's accounts above delineate most succinctly
what is going on in Edinso. The burden of too many things to do is certain to function
as a precondition for members to be entrapped in the labour process through which
they should meet the demands from people asking for things too quickly. In this
circumstance, a conception of 'family atmosphere' as a rather long-standing
commitment would have to be directed and narrowed in particular ways that serve to
meet the very short deadlines. If it is the case, then the family imagery is only used as
expressions by which to elicit the managerially contrived cohesiveness among the
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members ultimately for corporate performances. The myth of total quality management
is also proved in the chronic phenomenon of segmentalism as the accounts above
suggest that the members do not know which branches or brokers make more profit.
As has been discussed in this Chapter, the members' lack of knowledge about Edinso
was evidenced in the case of Ethical Trust the public legitimacy ofwhich was assumed
to rest with the members' common recognition of Edinso as a morally integrated
community. All in all, the dynamics of Edinso's corporate culture coupled with TQM is
characterised to be Janus-like; 'unity' and 'division', which will be discussed in more





A Plenary of Concepts
The thesis launched its track of moral problems in modern business firms by
casting a doubt on the current status of moral knowledge in the discourse of business
ethics. I pointed out that the discourse of business ethics was basically limited by
bracketing the context where employees were brought into the labour process by the
imperatives of a new managerialism. Summarising the transition of moral concerns in
the business arena according to Kohlberg's (1981) theory of moral development, the
thesis argued that the discourse of a new managerialism was in line with the
presumption of the post-conventional stage where the moral subjects' conduct was
more likely to hinge on autonomous reasoning rather than heteronomous control. I
suggested that such new managerialist discourses as 'corporate culture' and 'quality
agenda' were designed in accordance with this assumption that employees' labour
power could be more effectively managed by both giving them more autonomy and
making them more accountable to their autonomy. Central to this new managerialist
moral presumption was that when their autonomous aspirations were systematically
imbued with moral values to which they can commit, a higher level of corporate
performance could be attained.
In alignment with the managerially contrived assumption on the employees'
practical autonomy (Peters and Waterman, 1982), the crux of new managerialism is no
longer to issue instructions because employees are expected to know what to do
regarding their job. This seems to fit nicely with corporations' basic existential mission
to save costs as much as possible. In the case of 'total quality management' (TQM), for
example, employees are required to be more voluntarily involved in their works to the
extent that advocates of TQM decry the use of financial incentives to enforce
compliance (Oakland, 1989). The proviso that employees know what to do regarding
their job is assumed by corporate management to be both a condition and consequence
of the inculcation of an ethos of shared values imposed by the company in the name of
corporate culture. However, the arguments in this thesis have problematised the
assumption that the corporate values are shared, and instead suggested that only the
148
expressions of the values may be shared by the members in the company. Because
corporate management are also prone to share the expressions according to their
expedient advantages, management is in effect done by surveillance over 'expressions'
or the use of expressions. Accordingly, the accounts the members do present (Munro
and Mouritsen, in press) are central to the surveillance of the ways in which the
members use the expressions by circulating them in particular ways directed by
corporate management. Indeed, management is no longer to command or control
along the hierarchical line. What the management does is to check whether the use of
moral expressions is associated with 'profit' or 'all-embracing performances'. It is to
monitor over expressions whether they are timely and efficiently 'displayed'.
Surveillance is shifted from the more direct monitoring of daily work to the more
indirect medium of accounts. Because corporate core values are directing surveillance
through the medium of expressions, surveillance is mainly tied up with the expressions
of the corporate core values.
Such core values as 'profit' and 'quality' are certain to have great influence
upon the managers' ways of perceiving the reality and defining it, which in turn
constitute their own practices of managing. Because of the managers' middle status
entrapped in the labour process, their ethical subjectivity is bound to be complicated
notably in the process through which corporate strategic discourses are enacted in
their company. Bearing it in mind that such new managerialist strategies as 'Corporate
Culture' and 'Quality Agenda' imply a certain degree of moral and ethical problems, I
have put an emphasis on a distinction between 'shared values' and 'shared expressions',
which has been established as an analytic concept to explicate the managers' conduct
especially in the context of new managerial practices. To recapitulate the arguments
advanced in the previous chapters, two points need to be re-emphasised. They are
basically concerned with the different modes of responses to the tenet of shared
values, which are deployed by both corporate management and employees.
The first point concerns the ways in which corporate management deploy and
engineer the tenet of shared values. At face value, corporate management espouse an
ethos of shared values which are typically narrowed down to the corporate core values
and these core values are intended to direct the employees to identify with them. What
is at stake, however, is the method which the corporate management employ to enact
such core values. The argument to which the thesis adheres is that the corporate
management also employ a method of sharing 'expressions' of the espoused values.
This argument is indeed premised on the 'expedient' nature of corporate management.
That is, the corporately espoused ethos of shared values is vulnerable to the corporate
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management's opportunistic tactics especially when moral values are transfused into
the corporate values to be shared. Importantly, the effect of this expediency of shared
expressions is to manipulate morality to the extent that the moral values are detached
from their intrinsic nature and attached to such extrinsic purposes as 'corporate image',
'profitability', 'growth' and the like. The second point is concerned with the ways in
which employees respond to the imperatives of corporate strategy through which the
corporate core values are inculcated by virtue of the tenet of shared values. As was
discussed in the preceding chapters, it is likely that employees find themselves not in
favour of the corporately espoused values. But it is the employees' existential
condition in the labour process that makes them appear, at the least, to consent to
those core values in spite of their ambivalence or resistance. In this circumstance, they
are bound to deploy their strategic conduct of sharing 'expressions' in coping with the
imperatives of corporate strategy. As compared with this negative attitude of shared
expressions, the employees may take a more proactive attitude on shared expressions.
If then, they are understood to partake in a complicity of shared expressions with the
corporate management. Indeed, the thesis contends that a myth of shared values
should be debunked in the light of more realistic practices of 'shared expressions'
which are deployed by both corporate management and employees.
What is problematic with regard to the social conduct of sharing expressions
is its effects on the ethical attitudes of both corporate management and employees.
Given the possibility that the values are not shared; in other words, the subjects are
neither committed to a realisation of the values nor accountable to the unintended
consequences of shared values, the social conduct of sharing expressions cannot but be
conducive to its arbitrary use for corporate purposes. Consequently, the expressions
are apt to be directed and narrowed by both corporate management and employees.
They are also anticipated to function as 'obligatory passage' (Latour, 1987) in the
process through which corporate strategies are enunciated and enacted. Indeed, both
corporate management and employees participate in a complicity to direct and narrow
both the meaning and the circulation of expressions. A common result of this
complicity is to manipulate morality, which is perpetrated through the medium of
shared expressions.
It is appropriate to recognise that the conduct of sharing expressions tends
to be legitimated by a collective ethos of sharing itself. This ethos is in turn endorsed
at an institutional level in the name of 'corporate culture' which confers collective
meaning and binding force upon the conduct of sharing expressions. In recognition of
this close connection between the conduct of sharing expressions and its cultural
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legitimation, such cultural manifestations as were represented in the form of collective
sharedness among the members in Edinso were reflected in the part of empirical
illustrations. An appreciation of the managers' ambivalence was essential to debunking
the myth of shared values and identifying how morality was manipulated through a
dynamics whereby the conduct of sharing expressions was culturally legitimated. In
line with the argument on moral limits of the agenda for cultural change, the empirical
illustrations focused on how the managers in Edinso came to terms with, and
consumed, the cultural change agenda enacted in Edinso. The analysis was focused on
how a sharing of expressions was directed and narrowed in particular ways with a
residue ofmanipulated morality. In this vein, the thesis is understood as an attempt to
more firmly ground business ethics in the practical realities of everyday organisational
life in an insurance company.
Corporate Culture as Fragments ofMorality
The central argument in this thesis with respect to the discourse of corporate
culture is that the backstage features of corporate culture are a striking contrast with
the front features of corporate culture particularly when the tenets of corporate culture
espouse a moral ethos of shared values (even moral values). The objects to be shared
tend to be managerially determined and narrowed down to corporate core values. The
vagueness of a very concept of 'sharedness' culminates in the assertion that
philosophies are to be shared when Kilmann et al. (1985:5) conceptualises the
corporate culture as the "shared philosophies... that knit a community together".
However, it is not specific what philosophies can be shared and ultimately for whom.
Corporatism as philosophy? Shared philosophy for capital? As a result, employees'
competing views are bound to be marginalised and excluded out. Given that corporate
culturism as a managerial ideology zeros in on the use of normative power over
members who form a moral attachment (Etzioni, 1961; Kunda, 1992), infusing moral
values into the collective ethos of shared values is aimed at consolidating the 'strong'
corporate culture of a company. Indeed, the strong corporate culture movement is a
more pervasive, penetrating managerial ideology to shape employees' self-identity in
the corporate image.
It is an intriguing fact that the contents of corporate culture adopted by many
organisations contain the common moral tenets: A spirit of family - "We are all one
family"; Full admittance of the members' capacity as labour power - "People are
creative, hard working, self governing and can learn" ; Free enterprise - "Truth and
quality come from multiple viewpoints" (Kunda, 1992). As was shown in the empirical
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illustrations of Edinso, the moral tenets in Edinso's corporate culture were also
analogous to the ones mentioned above. As was indicated at Chapter 5, the corporate
management of Edinso engaged in a whole series of change initiatives of the type
associated with the 1980s and 1990s 'search for excellence' (Willmott, 1993). There
was found an explicitly formulated corporate culture which Edinso was trying to
engender with a whole series of 'progressive' management initiatives, ranging from
'total quality management' (or quality initiative in Edinso's unique terms) to 'team
briefing', 'family atmosphere' (based on family values), 'personal development
programmes', 'performance-related pay' (Activity-based Cost Accounting). Common
to this series of management initiatives is an attempt to manage the company through
values. However, the political and ethical implications of all this have to be confronted
directly: there is a clear manipulative potential in the notion of managing companies
through values and meanings, thus cultures (Watson, 1994:17). This is so because the
unity as a front feature of shared values is most likely to conceal the division as a
backstage feature of shared values.
The deliberate separation between the front feature and the backstage feature
of corporate culture may lead to a totalitarian attitude in members' everyday practices
in that they have to pretend to maintain the unity at the front despite the existence of
the division at the backstage. To the extent that only the expressions displaying the
front unity for the sake of corporate core values are permitted to the exclusion of
other competing views formed at the backstage, the corporate culture which is
characterised by this practice of deliberate separation is doomed to be totalitarian.
Accordingly, this totalitarian scheme of corporate culture seeks to enhance the level of
corporate effectiveness by means of an ethos of shared core values which are most
directly conducive to the expected level of effectiveness. The corporate strategy of
corporate culture is a means of managing the symbolic and affective domain of
employees and consequently enlarging the horizon of criteria for corporate
effectiveness, which are mainly attuned to a higher level of efficiency and performance.
However, Willmott (1993) warns against totalitarian practices when he criticises the
monolithic control ofCorporate Culturism:
"In the installation ofCorporate Culture/HRM/TQM programmes, every
conceivable opportunity is taken for imprinting the core values of the
organisation upon its (carefully selected) employees. To the extent that
succeeds in this mission, Corporate Culturism becomes a medium of
nascent totalitarianism."
Indeed, confining the scope of variously conceivable views to the managerially
selected and steered corporate core values is likely to paralyse the employees' practical
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autonomy which is ostensibly proclaimed for its nurture by corporate culturism. As
Kunda's (1992) critical study of 'strong corporate cultures' shows, the engineers of
corporate culture elicit the intense efforts of employees not by stirring their
experiential life, but, if anything, by degrading and perhaps destroying it. The
corporation does not necessarily "capture the soul", but systematically undermines the
foundation of the soul. This systematic totalisation was also effected in Edinso through
a mixture of intended and implemented strategies which were buttressed by the
legitimation of corporate cultural properties. As was discussed in the empirical
illustrations, such corporate cultural properties were justified on the ground of the
external environments Edinso had to face, and in turn legitimised the importation of
professional strategic discourses. Typically, the overall effects of the interactions
between corporate strategic discourses and corporate cultural properties were
characterised as 'rose and gun' (Watson, 1994). The rosy bluff of unity at the front of
sharing was in stark contrast with the gunned uncertainty of division at the backstage
of sharing. Whereas such moral values as 'family imagery', 'delegation', 'openness',
'teamwork', 'trust building' are characteristic of 'rosy unity',
'segmentalism' (Kanter, 1983) and 'insidiously reinforced bureaucracy' are the facets of
'gunned division'. Importantly, such an idealistic espousal of shared moral values is
expediently displaced by a more realistic tactic of shared expressions of morality,
which reinforces the facets of 'gunned division' like segmentalism and bureaucracy, in
particular.
I argued that such a tactic of sharing moral expressions was most likely to lead
to a manipulation of morality. The degree to which morality is socially manipulated
tends to be propelled by a totalising scheme of corporate culture. The more the
components of cultural properties are manoeuvred in the name of, and incorporated
into, the corporate culture, the more the problems are emerging from the totalisingly
interwoven components of corporate culture. Therefore, any attempt for cultural
integration should be questioned in terms of its 'logical consistency' and 'causal
consensus' so that it should not be denunciated as manipulated consensus (cf. Chapter
3). In consideration of the impossibility of an absolutely impeccable degree of internal
compatibility between the components of culture, the logical consistency is a matter of
relative degree. In fact, the degree of internal compatibility between the components of
corporate culture is a crucial issue in the assessment of ethical integrity which is
required even for securing 'strong' corporate culture. Even in view of a top-down
approach to improving the ethical climate of a company, the top management's ethical
integrity is vital to the maintenance of a high degree of logical consistency though it is
often perfunctory.
153
A salient example of questioning the degree of 'logical consistency' was found
to be the incompatibility between the collective ethos of sharing and the individuated
imposition of accountabilities both of which were effected by the managerial ideology
of'corporate culturism'. A representative instance of this incompatibility was the family
atmosphere in Edinso. As was revealed in the managers' accounts, the expressions of
family imagery were limitedly applied. They were paternalistically appropriated mainly
for the relationships between corporate management and employees. Indeed, the
paternalistic style of management was a cultural factor which has historically
influenced Edinso's identity as a mutual insurance society because its inception in the
sector of financial services may be historically traced back to the friendly society and
savings banks movement of the nineteenth century. As Kerfoot and Knights (1993)
argue, very prevalent throughout much of the twentieth century in both state
institutions and work organisations, paternalism facilitates a reduction of tension
surrounding management and individual masculinities by simulating typically
patriarchal, family-like relations where power is exercised for the 'good' of the
recipient. There is the obvious fact that the reduction of tension renders employees
more compliant and predictable and, therefore, the lives of those exercising the power
more comfortable. However, equally important is the sense in which adopting a
paternal role helps legitimise managerial prerogative both in the eyes of those who are
'protected' from the harsh reality of decision-making, and the decision-makers
themselves (ibid.; 665).
It was the Chief Executive who was suggested by the interviewed managers to
have played the paternal role in Edinso. According to all the interviewed managers'
evaluation of the ChiefExecutive, he was regarded as an exceptional leader in terms of
his caring for employees and his intellectual abilities such that most of the employees
liked him. Mr Claims Manager's account evidenced this:
"Yes, what he does also isput a lot of trust in people. He gives his
senior managers a job to do and he lets them go away and do it. He's
not choking them. He's got a good style ofmanagement, and the staff
all like him. This is very, very important, for it means they'll work
for him."
However, when the employees' discursive consciousness in terms of work
motive is formed around a predilection that they will work for him (group chief
executive); in other words, when the employees' work motive is induced by loyalty to
the Chief Executive, there might arise some conflicts between his charismatic
leadership and the claims for an ethic of a democratic process of decision-making.
When employees are blindly ordered to work by emotional loyalty to their boss, the
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sovereign creative powers of the employees — free to define situations according to a
range of more or less competing definitions and interpretations which are constituted
through their own experience at workplace — must also be constrained by, and
subordinated to, the Chief Executive's style of preference. Though it appeared that the
Chief Executive's leadership style was appealing to members to such an extent as to
show their loyalty, there were yet other competing voices which were sceptical about
the Chief Executive's leadership style. Mr Marketing Managers' biggest
disappointment in his recent times was suggestive;
"Indeed the majority of the attention that marketing department gets is
when the odd brochure goes out with a mistake in it or an article appears
in the press where somebody is quoted as saying something that somebody
upstairs doesn't like. You get very quick reaction to that andwe don't
always get obviouspats on the backfor doing things right." (emphasis
added.)
If only the preferences of 'somebody upstairs' are to be shared and other voices
are to be excluded, the employees' strategic conduct in relationship to their boss
becomes inevitably to share expressions which are 'chosen phrases' delivering an
implied consent to his preference of values. Consequently, the moral expressions of
family imagery are only hierarchically valid between the paternalistic leader and the
loyal followers with a residue of the lack of its relevance for lateral relationships
among the employees. The absence of intimacy between the departments in Edinso,
which should have been delivered by the so-called family atmosphere, was evidenced
by the managers' accounts showing their indifference to what was going on in other
departments. Indeed, family imagery as moral expressions is fractured following the
expediency of its users, and the fragment of family imagery is exacerbated when it is
deployed as a volatile strategy. For instance, once 'family atmosphere' in Edinso is
established as an internal strategy, it can work as a mechanism to constitute or
re-define problems arising out of a lack of affinity or cohesiveness among members
(e.g. disharmony between the departments in Edinso). However, when the disharmony
between the departments arose, in reality, from the struggles for resources rather than
from a lack of group cohesiveness, the ethos of 'family atmosphere' is possibly
deployed as a strategic tactic to cover up the inherent problems and consequently
induce a more staunch loyalty to the company. In this sense, the ethos of 'family
atmosphere' is indispensably adopted as an element of the better ingredients of
corporate culture as a corporate strategy. This is indicative of a case that a morality of
family value may be, to some degree, manipulated through its being adopted as a
strategic tactic.
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Segmentalism between departments furthers the manipulation of the family
imagery especially when the individual departments' group egoism is compounded with
their claim of expertise in the formation of corporate strategy. It is a real aspect of
modern business arena that a number of occupational or functional groupings are
competing to establish supremacy over the area of strategic discourse. In addition to
accountants, there are marketing people who claim expertise over assessing products
and market potential. There are also information technology experts who propound
the centrality of IT to organisational problem solving as well as arguing that
technological requirements are significant determinants of organisations' structures and
market opportunities. There are also increasingly 'human resource' professionals
stepping into the breach vacated by industrial relations and, to a lesser extent,
personnel management, with a view to linking these issues more directly with
'corporate strategy' (Knights and Morgan, 1991; 265). The formation of the supremacy
of each occupational expertise takes on a cultural characteristic because the members
of each group collectively have a firm belief in their supremacy of expertise and the
belief is discursively constituted through the generations and by the connections with
the external professional associations. And much of the expert's power lies in the
ability to pronounce on what can and cannot be seen (Munro, 1993;266). However, if
these groupings are done on the basis of supremacy of occupational ideology, it is
likely to bring about segmentalism (Kanter, 1983) which recognises a culture in which
'them and us' distinctions exist not just between senior and junior people, but between
members of different functions, departments, and genders (Watson, 1994; 145). As a
result, the moral expressions of family imagery are likely to be expediently used for
consolidating the group cohesiveness within individual departments, leaving the
relations between the individual departments separated. In short, segmentalism is
brought about as the effect of the individuated imposition of accountabilities, which is
effected by corporate culturism.
Another example of weakening the degree of 'logical consistency' was the
implementation of 'quality agenda' in Edinso. It was by means of the very 'quality
agenda' that Edinso tried to change 'a whole sort of culture quite significantly towards
serving the customer and getting things done right first time'. However, the legitimacy
of changing a whole sort of culture is confined to Edinso's core values like 'serving the
customer' and 'getting things done right first time'. A point threatening the degree of
logical consistency by the incorporation of quality into Edinso's corporate culture is
the quality's elusiveness to definition. As Munro (1995;30) puts,
Quality is a movable feast, which has the capacity to redefine itself
towards 'quality being free', at the Philip Crosby 'conformance' end of
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the spectrum, or towards a call for 'thriving on chaos', in the Tom
Peters emphasis on 'excellence'. Quality's elusiveness to definition
appears to be part of its resources.
However, I argued in the empirical illustrations that quality's elusiveness to
definition was quite expediently exploited by the members. In combination with the
quality's elusiveness to definition, such collective ethos as delegation, openness, team
work, team briefing was reinvigorated under the quality regime and was intended to
function expediently for corporate performance. As Kerfoot and Knights (1995) argue,
this restoration of some form of collective commitment and self-discipline among
individualised and often fragmented workforces is an important, if not consciously
directed, consequence of quality programmes. However, it is one thing to say that
some form of collective commitment and self-discipline was restored. And it is totally
another to confirm whether such form was practically moulded into concrete outcomes
of collective unity in a substantial sense. That is, an officially espoused front feature of
sharing - unity - is not consistently observed at the backstage of sharing; rather
'division' is performed. In the case of Edinso, an official espousal of sharing good ideas
through open door communication tended to bring about the effect that openness was
likely to be confined to those ideas which must be contributory to corporate core
values to the exclusion of any other competing views. A morality of openness was
seen to be fractured when it was delivered with an insinuation that the superiors' time
was money, and consequently amplified the distance between superiors and
subordinates. It was also found that the Team Briefing System in Edinso was
perceived by the members as only a structure-added form of organisational
communication which amounted to less than a lauded decentralisation of
decision-taking because it did not disseminate much important information which the
members anticipated to share.
The 'Q-tack advice' in Edinso was viewed by some managers to be a main
surveillance mechanism which exacerbated the members' estrangement from the
pretence of moral legitimacy the TQM seeked for. Given that surveillance path can be
constructed in the modern company around concepts of quality not costs (Munro,
1995), at stake is the degree to which the members feel a sense of moral cynicism
about the confounded logic of TQM for a cultural change. It was notable that the
managers in Edinso had a subjective interpretation of the 'Q-track advice', which was
contrary to the quality programmers' anticipation that it should be regarded as an
objective system. On the surface, the 'Q-track advice' looks like a fault-reporting
device. But, beneath the surface, it is a sort of comprehensive check-list of the
members' everyday work in Edinso. The significance of this checking device is
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accorded in that it is a consummate standard by which to measure the effectiveness of
all the moral emphases put through the new managerialist practices in Edinso. Such
moral expressions as 'family-imagery', 'delegation', 'openness', 'team work', 'team
briefing system' were intended to harness the members' motivating power to
accomplish a higher level of corporate performance. Given that, it is understood that
the 'Q-track advice' is a systematic control device to measure the degree to which
members devote to their work imbued with such moral expressions which are in turn
geared to corporate performances. As a technical version of the members' accounts,
the 'Q-track advice' is intended to serve the function of moral technology by which to
check when and where the members' use ofmoral expressions associated with 'quality'
and 'profit' is displayed. Though the content of Edinso's 'Q-track advice' does not seem
to directly convey the corporate management's intent to appropriate it as a moral
technology, their selective use of information gathered through the surveillance
technique enables them to intelligently monitor the distribution of necessary resources
among a list of moral expressions. The development and continued refinement of
surveillance systems using computer-based technology can provide the means by
which management can achieve the benefits that derive from expedient appropriation
of moral expressions while retaining authority and disciplinary control through
ownership of the superstructure of surveillance and the information it collects, retains,
and disseminates. In short, though moral values endorsed by TQM are enacted to
pioneer a cultural change in Edinso, they are simply degenerated into the fractured
moral expressions by being exploited as a means to more intelligently monitor the
ways in which the moral expressions are used by the members. The surveillance
mechanism is aimed at intensifying the individuated accountabilities whereas the team-
based practices of TQM are espoused by the collective ethos of sharing. Indeed, the
incompatibility is significant between the collective ethos of sharing and the
individuated imposition of accountabilities both of which are managerially intended by
the quality agenda. As a consequence, the logical consistency of Edinso's corporate
culture is weakened.
The notions of 'family atmosphere' and 'quality agenda' were the components
of Edinso's corporate culture at an internal level. In contrast, both Edinso's relations
with IFAs and Edinso's Ethical Unit Trust as its product were the mediators to convey
Edinso's internal manifestations of corporate culture to other stakeholders at an
external level. Under the guise of independence, the status of IFAs was very
demanding such that most of the managers in Edinso had to satisfy IFAs in ways that
pleased IFAs. The managers' ambivalence was captured in both their scepticism about
the authenticity of IFAs' independence and the corporate management's managerial
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intent to utilise the IFAs' assessments as objective indicators of the members' individual
performance. Because the IFAs' criteria for evaluating Edinso in terms of its
recommendatory suitability are mainly confined to Edinso's financial performances to
the exclusion of other non-fiscal performances accomplished by the members, it would
very likely be suspected that the corporate management's staunch support for IFAs
cannot be compatible with other components of Edinso's corporate culture. The
members may perceive a difficulty in approving of the compatibility between the
enactment of non-fiscal personnel policy like 'family atmosphere' and the
implementation of performance-related pay on the basis of IFAs' objective indicators
of the members' individual performance. As far as the degree of internal compatibility
between the different components of Edinso's corporate culture is questioned by the
members, the collective meanings and their binding force which are accorded
credibility by virtue of corporate culture come to decay because Edinso's corporate
culture loses its persuasive power in respect of its implied ethical integrity.
The context in which an ethic of independence was extensively appropriated
included the would-be policyholders who had to be given information only about
Edinso's financial performances. Information asymmetry like this is a stimulator for
inclinations to use moral expressions in a narrowly defined way. Even the
policyholders may come to restrict a scope of interpreting the ethicality of
independence in a financially advantageous way for themselves. This short-termism of
the policyholders cannot be laudable because their microscopic attitude not only cuts
off the opportunity for their own independent discretion by which to raise their own
views to Edinso's business practices, but also fosters the IFAs' tendency to overrule
Edinso by means of its proclaimed status of independence. Eventually, an ethic of
independence is socially and structurally manipulated through the process in which
independence as a moral expression is shared among IFAs, Edinso, and policyholders.
The mechanism that moral expressions are exploited by Edinso and its external
stakeholders in collusion was also embodied in one of the Edinso's products; Ethical
Unit Trust.
Edinso as an institutional shareholder was required to show as impeccable an
image as possible to the policyholders of the unit trusts not only because doing so can
attract a greater number of ethically conscious investors but because as the ratio of
concentration of institutional shareholdings becomes high, so the shareholder
responsibilities are at stake. For if the beneficiaries of pension funds, and the owners of
insurance companies and of unit and investment trusts, were more demanding in
respect of their property's performance, those institutions would in turn have to be
more responsible in their capacity as shareholders (Sternberg, 1994;208). However,
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my analysis of the ethical trust in the empirical illustrations argued that Edinso as an
institutional shareholder, responsible for the performance of the policyholders' funds,
was not genuinely committed to their supposedly indirect contribution to the
enhancement of ethical standards of ethically screened companies for investment.
Priority was given to the financial return through the channel of Ethical Trust rather
than to the confirmation of its relevance for a change in the invested companies' ethical
standards. This passive attitude was exhibited in the very passivity of the ethical
criteria themselves which were applied to the screening of companies. As is well
described in [Appendix 4], 'passive prohibition' rather than 'proactive encouragement'
is typical of the ethical criteria. Accordingly, the policyholders' ethical attitudes which
were identified were quite remote from genuine and proactive concerns with the
ethical standards of the companies invested. Moreover, a closer examination of
Edinso's Ethical Trust showed that Edinso's official proclamation to be an agent
capable of managing the policyholders' ethical commitment was itself ethically
problematic. Not only that the policyholders' ethical concerns fall short of their
integrity in that they are ignorant of their very agent company's internal status of
ethical standards, but that Edinso members' concerns with their company's ethical
product remain estranged to the extent that they share only its moral expressions.
Indeed, moralisation of the institution is one thing; but, adiaphorised actions are
another.
Given that Edinso's internal status of ethical standards is supposedly relevant
for accommodating the would-be policyholders' ethical aspirations, the logical
consistency of Edinso's corporate culture must have concerned the policyholders.
Evidently, however, such concerns seemed to be out of focus and there seemed to be
no questioning even on the part of the members in Edinso about the relevance of
Edinso's internal status of ethical standards for its qualification to handle the Ethical
Trust itself. Relatedly, Robertson and Schlegelmilch's (1992) findings about the
differences in ethical policy implementations between U.K. and U.S. are suggestive.
U.K companies are more likely to communicate ethics policies through senior
executives, and U.S. firms tend to rely more on the Human Resources and Legal
departments. U.S. firms are especially concerned with employee behaviour which may
harm the firm, while U.K. managers tend to be more concerned with external
corporate stakeholders than with employees. Given this tendency, the discrepancy
between Edinso's actual status of ethical standards and its officially professed status
for window-dressing is understandable to the extent that U.K. managers tend to be
relatively keen to the relationships with external corporate stakeholders rather than the
relationships with internal subordinate employees. As long as Edinso is more
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concerned with winning favour with external customers and in turn the policyholders
are more interested in the tax advantage gained by their engagement with the Ethical
Trust, what is missing is a concern about the logical consistency of Edinso's corporate
culture, which is to be perceived by the members in Edinso. In short, the ethical trust
is only a medium through which both Edinso and policyholders can attain the
purported financial gains in virtue of the moral expressions it conveys. In contradiction
to a pledge of corporate culturism to secure a moral fold from the moral vacuum of
society (Dahler-Larsen, 1994), Edinso's corporate culture is devoid of integrity both
by failing in the concerted management of cultural manifestations within Edinso and
exploiting them instead in pursuit of marketability of moral expressions which are
tapped from those cultural manifestations.
To recapitulate the arguments so far, it was understood that the cultural
components of'complexity' and 'competitiveness' were regarded as external constraints
upon Edinso and thus deployed as legitimate causes for the corporate management to
rationalise their prerogative in managing Edinso's corporate culture. It was also
reasoned that the members' incompetence to cope with the managerially legitimated
turbulent environment had recourse to the corporate management's paternalistic calibre
of managing the members' incapacity. The enactment of 'family atmosphere' and
'quality agenda' as a family resemblance to help with the members' incapacity resulted
in the reinforcement of their dependency upon Edinso and accordingly the pre-existing
corporate ideology like bureaucracy. When Edinso's corporate culture is manipulated
in this way, at stake is 'causal consensus' that is the degree of social uniformity
produced by the imposition of culture by one set of people on another through the
whole gamut of familiar techniques - manipulation, mystification, legitimation,
naturalisation, persuasion and argument (cf. Chapter 3). I suggest that a barometer for
measuring the degree of causal consensus is the members' ambivalence to the
imposition of Edinso's core values which were designed to be conveyed through the
corporate culture. The ambivalence was a part of the cultural effects in Edinso in that
the members were recognisant of the Janus-like fragments of morality which were
made by detachment of the intrinsic nature of morality towards an extrinsic
appropriation for corporate purposes. For instance, the family metaphor is an incisive
example showing the members' ambivalence which is antithetic to the causal
consensus. On the one hand, the family metaphor works to empower the creation of
space within the organisation that extends the scope for identity work. On the other
hand, identity is now that which is to be forged more completely within the work
space; the family metaphor is a space of representation which is being constructed to
make the notion of work more complete and, further, in expanding the forms of work,
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which has the potential to colonise the employees' identity work (cf. Munro, 1995).
Just like the dynamics of paternalism, an abuse of the family metaphor brings about a
residue of fractured morality which may threaten the conditions of possibility for
'causal consensus'.
On the face of it, 'causal consensus' can appear to be existing in respect of
behavioural uniformity apart from the members' cognitive ambivalence. This is more so
under the totalitarian regime as was incisively instantiated in the glaring case of
German Fascism where considerable behavioural uniformity could co-exist with both
substantial doctrinal inconsistencies and significant mental reservations in the
population (Archer, 1988:5). Significantly, the discrepancy between 'logical
consistency' and 'causal consensus' is even characteristic of corporate culture in terms
of fragmented morality. It is so complicated that the members are obliged to have
recourse to the totalitarian nature of corporate culturism because they are incapable of
coping with the complicated discrepancy between 'logical consistency' and 'causal
consensus' of corporate culture. Indeed, as was discussed in Chapter 4, the politics of
autonomy in line with a new managerialism's presumption on the postconventional
level of moral capacity of the members obliges them to choose a reliance upon the
more powerful authorities that can control the complicated dynamics of corporate
culture. Consequently, the totalitarian scheme of corporate culture is produced and
reproduced, being legitimated as a corporate sanctuary where the members'
helplessness caused by such a complicated discrepancy can be redeemed. Among those
members are the managers who may suffer more delicately from that helplessness
because the totalitarian scheme of corporate culturism obliges the managers as middle
groupings (cf. Chapter 4) to be brought into the labour process, exacerbating the
cultural effects of fragmented morality. As an account of a personal interview with a
manager in a telecommunication services company suggests (Watson, 1994:158) :
"There is a sort of disease here. And it could be the death of us. We
set out to do some really good things.(...) TQM seems to me the only
reasonable way to manage a high-tech operation. Team briefing's a
good idea, problem-solving teams are a good idea. But look at what we
do with all these things. We give them a fancy name, we hype them
up. We over-egg the pudding with launches and posters and pamphlets
and glossy brochures and pocket-cards. People expect the world. It is
as if the company grabs at every good idea that comes along and treats
it as if it were a magic fad, a new cure-all. If only we would take these
management good ideas to heart and incorporate into some basic hard
work. Then we would get there. Instead of that we keep chasing
rainbows; going through the motions without thinking out properly
what we are doing things for."
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Indeed, it is one thing to exaggerate the efficacy of all the management good
ideas by giving them a fancy name and hyping them up; however, it is questionable
whether those ideas really guide the managers to identify what they are doing things
for. The discrepancy embedded even in this duality of management ideas makes
managerial work more difficult.
Managerial Work as A Composite of Unity and Division
The arguments in this thesis focused on the managers as subjects who deliver
the messages of new managerialist discourses. As moral subjects whose dispositions
may influence, and be influenced by, the corporate management style, the managers'
middle status was highlighted with special reference to the labour process into which
they were brought. Ambivalence was seen to be the proper signifier to depict the
managers' dual characters. Their sceptical attitude to the imposition of corporate core
values pertains to their resistant side of ambivalence in the form of raising competing
views. Conversely, the existential need of maintaining membership in their company
obliges them to acquiesce to corporate demands. These two opposing sides of
ambivalence spark the managers' multilateral aspects of ethical subjectivity as was
discussed in Chapter 4. I suggested that the managers' strategic conduct of sharing
expressions is, on the one hand, congruent with their resistant aspect of ambivalence in
that it is intended to secure their identity work. On the other hand, their strategic
conduct of sharing expressions is construed to be congruent with their consenting
aspect of ambivalence to the extent that they partake in a complicity to appropriate the
use of expressions associated with the corporate core values like 'quality' and 'profit'.
The effect is that both ways of strategic conduct of sharing expressions are likely to be
conditions of possibility for the manipulation of morality.
Indeed, the conduct of sharing expressions does mediate the ways in which
morality is socially manipulated. In recognition of the managers' inevitable proclivity
towards consent to corporate management, their self-identity can be characterised as
'politician's wife'. Despite her realm of discretion for self-determined competing views,
she finds herself to be subjected to, and accustomed to, the political expediency which
would also lead to the manipulation ofmorality. This is more so in the business arena
because the power effects of corporate strategic discourse reflect and sustain a strong
sense of gendered masculinity for male management (Knights and Morgan, 1991;262).
Much evidence which shows the female managers' stronger attachment to ethical
standards (Whipple and Swords, 1992; Akaah, 1989) suggests how much injustice is
done in business dominated by the prevailing power relations and that ordinary
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managers are entrapped into the imperatives of corporate strategic discourses. Though
my arguments do not focally concern the feminine management discourses, this
metaphor seems appropriate in order to highlight the subservient destiny of managers
situated in the capitalist labour process.
The dual characters of managers, composed of 'part of capital' and 'part of
labour', mediate their alternate strategic conduct within the context of the corporate
strategic imperatives. The managers on the role of 'part of capital' were required to
take on corporate entrepreneurship. Pressing managers to develop new ideas was
occasionally encountered in the case of Edinso, too. Fulop (1991) provides a critical
review of a number of approaches to corporate entrepreneurship by focusing on the
role and fate ofmiddle managers as corporate entrepreneurs. First, entrepreneurship or
excellence is often made synonymous with rationalisations in labour, technology and
management structures occurring within large organisations and it is here that certain
non-entrepreneurial middle managers are considered victims of change. In the
'excellence' literature there is little room for anything else but an innovation-at-all-costs
ideology on the part of corporate leaders so there are few opportunities for non-
entrepreneurial managers to succeed. Second, the proponents of an innovation process
model, which uses a strategic planning approach to isolate the role of middle
management in instigating certain types of radical innovations, have been cautious
about positing an entrepreneurial role for the middle managers in large organisations.
Studies of internal corporate venturing (ICV) (Burgelman, 1983; quoted in Fulop,
ibid.) highlight the often vicious, paradoxical and devastating fates of many middle
managers as corporate entrepreneurs. Last, the resource mobilisation approach has
captured the middle ground on corporate entrepreneurship and has unambiguously
argued for middle managers as the vanguards of change and organisation-wide
innovations (Kanter, 1984; quoted in Fulop, ibid.). The resource mobilisation model is
premised on a normative view of power in which empowering middle managers is
advocated as a vital part of stimulating corporate entrepreneurship. (Fulop, ibid.;27).
Indeed, the status of the middle managers is so vulnerable that it is hard to see
possibilities for their sticking independently to their chosen values. This is understood
as a context which obliges them to stand comfortably with their strategic conduct of
sharing expressions. Insofar as their act of shared expressions is more likely to be
characterised as their resistance to corporate strategic discourses, this act of sharing
expressions is bound to convey their competing views. By contrast, if their attitude is
more of collaboration with the corporate management in respect of shared
expressions, such collaboration would make their own competing views marginalised
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or silenced. To be sure, middle managers must undertake tremendous challenges as
much from their internal subjectivities with which they should come to terms as from
the external environmental conditions. In this vein, the role of 'part of labour1 required
of managers is brought into prominence as their moral aspirations for alternative
meanings are restricted by the process in which they are obliged to share the
expressions in corporate ways which are bound up with the imperatives of corporate
strategies.
As was discussed in the previous section, the incompatibility between the
collectivising ethos of shared values and the individuating practices was a major reason
for bringing the managerial labour process into relief. As deliverers of the corporate
messages of shared core values, the managers are bound to urge their subordinates to
share the collective ethos of corporate values. In contrast, another co-existent
corporate practice of individuating accountabilities among different managers and
departments prompts the individual managers to apply it to both the management of
their subordinates and the management of their managerial province. Consequently, at
the backstage of sharing is the compelling imposition of intensified and individuated
accountabilities upon the managers and their subordinates. Though these two
supposedly incompatible methods to control employees to increase their performance
might deem to be effective, the side-effect is that the managers are left with a cycle of
moral cynicism and dependence because they have to recognise inconsistencies in the
moral discourse of new managerial practices.
I argue that the constitution of their moral cynicism tends to be structured
through their interactions with 'corporate codes of ethics' as organisational rules and
'new managerial discourses' as corporate strategy. These corporate rules and strategies
convey a dual nature of managerial performance towards a set of goal-oriented
activities; exploitative and emancipatory. At face value, these rules and strategies
endorse an orientation towards emancipation (autonomy, delegation, communal
relationship, integrity, openness, fairness and the like), but their implicit rationality
embeds an exploitative character (intensification of hierarchical accountability,
distancing, inequalities, bureaucracy). At the heart of the interactions between
managers and corporate rules as well as strategies, therefore, lies the assumption that
the managers' conduct is bound to take on the dual characters. Conveying their
ambivalent attitudes to the corporate imperatives of shared core values, the managers'
conduct is expediently taken upon those rules and strategies. Insofar as corporate
codes of ethics are projected to be advantageous for their managerial performances,
they appear to unite with the ethicised climate of the business practices (as was
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discussed in Chapter 3 with respect to the instrumentally ethical managers). However,
because unity is a precarious tactic rather than permanent commitment, it is only moral
expressions that are shared by the managers in their acquitting themselves in this
ethicised business practice. Moreover, their deportment to the new managerial
strategies also tends to be Janus-like. They may appear to unite with the collectivist
ethos of family resemblances and deliver the moral expressions contained in the
corporate strategies. However, they become sternly divisive when they have to secure
their province of expertise in the milieu that the pursuit of 'success' through their
expertise is indispensable to the security of their precarious employment conditions.
Distancing themselves from other competing views on their expertise reproduces the
bureaucratic practices within their managerial province, which the collectivist ethos of
unity, advocated by the new managerial discourses as family resemblances, is alleged
to resist.
As was discussed in Chapter 4, managers as the middle groupings in
particular are situated at a most vulnerable status. Their status is characterised as
expedient to the extent that their act of sharing (unite and divide) is flexible between
capital and labour. The implication of this 'undecidability' relating to the study of
culture in a company is that the process of creating a shared set of meanings for
managing culture within a company is always incomplete and continually resisted. It
follows that managers are rather prone to deploy a tactic of appropriating the
meanings in an expedient way and are detached from the authenticity of those
meanings. This act of detaching is congruent with the managers' strategic conduct of
sharing moral expressions in the milieu of their positions as accomplices with
corporate management. Their engagement with the complicity to exploit moral
expressions through corporate strategic discourses is calculated to provide them with a
rationalisation of their successes and failures. Constituting their subjectivity as
particular categories of persons who secure their sense of reality through engaging in
strategic discourse and practice brings about the power effect that it sustains and
enhances the prerogatives of management and negates alternative perspectives on the
company (Knights and Morgan, 1991: 262). However, the other side of the managers'
own ambivalence can never be negated at the same time.
Indeed, the managers' ambivalence is a big blow which is latent in their
discursive consciousness and is able to influence the outcomes of all the good
management ideas. The potential of their self-efficacy lies in their status of middle
groupings, in which they can expediently manoeuvre the strategic choice of unity and
division. The dynamics of unity and division was propelled and constituted by such
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new managerial strategies as corporate culture and TQM which were premised on the
ethos of sharing. To be sure, an appreciation of the labour process which managers are
brought into presents a stark contrast to the normative arguments held by the
stakeholder management theory (Freeman, 1984). Though the stakeholder
management theory holds a normative stance that managers should be accountable to
such stakeholders as shareholders, employees, suppliers, publics (Donaldson and
Preston, 1995), the managerial labour process is most apt to leave the managers
accountable to no-one in particular (Brittan, 1996). The mechanism of 'shared
expressions' under the totalitarian (or, bureaucratic) scheme of new managerial
discourses mediates this anarchic state of'rule by nobody'. This leads to a question of
where morality is directed at. Is it directed at the moral subjects' self-conscious
reflections ofmorality? Or is it directed at the "other"? Is the "other" typified by the
corporate appropriation of morality? Let me attract the reader's attention to these





Within the broad area of business ethics, most empirical studies have been
conducted with a relatively limited scope of interests. Following the American style of
behavioural research, the pattern is to adopt two or three variants to explain the
mechanism in which moral and ethical concerns influence business transactions. This
then opens the way to an almost inevitable slippage between correlation and causation.
In contrast, I have tried, in this thesis, to examine accounts in a way which avoids
reducing the complicated process of ethical contestations in modern business firms to
'variables'. My approach has been to draw on accounts as offering a 'thick description'
of ethical reflections on new managerial discourses. In this respect, my research forms
a contrast to most business ethics research which employs quantitative methods, such
as questionnaires but some additional limitations in my approach should be noted.
Every social research cannot but have some limitations in terms of its
research directions and capacities as well. This dissertation is no exception. First, in
limiting my study to managers, the research does not embrace the insights of the
lower-level employees like clerks; the managers' subordinates. This limitation seems
critical because the biting point of ethical conflicts or dilemmas is formed around
confrontations between the dominant interests of the relatively higher classes and the
competing interests of the lower classes. This said, attending to the discourse of
managers was part of a deliberate attempt to locate ethical dilemmas within the
practices of managers themselves. Nonetheless, further studies are required which
broadly investigate the differing levels of class interests in the light of ethical
contestations. These studies are expected to explore the ways in which the prevailing
power relations in companies are constituted and sustained in a discourse of 'sharing'.
Second, my research makes no claim to access managers' lived experiences. Though I
took an interest in ethnography as a qualitative method for business ethics research, I
was not able to conduct a method of 'participant observation' which was a vital
element for a more complete ethnographic study. In order to grasp the deep-seated
interactions in members' day-to-day practices, conducting a longitudinal study as a
member of the investigated organisation is very important.
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In spite of this limitation, the analysis ofmanagers' accounts tried to delve into
how the managers responded to new managerial discourses in their everyday practices.
To cross-check the accounts of the differing managers helped illustrate their
ambivalence on corporate management's endorsement of corporate core values by
virtue of new managerial discourses. Because the accounts convey the managers'
intent to justify their conduct, the accounts were considered by me to be displays of
perspective, or moral forms and offered me access to the 'forms of expressions' which
the managers used to 'move' each other in day-to-day activities. I also predicated the
accounts on the assumption that the sovereign creative power of the subject - free to
define situations according to a range of more or less competing definitions and
interpretations which are derived from a social vocabulary - must be seen as
constrained by and subordinated to the imperatives of corporate strategic discourses.
In consequence, it is important to emphasise that the subject is not the passive site of
consent to socially constructed discourses and knowledges, but is rather the site of
their rejection or transformation. Indeed, the merit of the managers' accounts is to
represent, from a diversity of perspectives, the practices that morality is corporately
appropriated. In drawing together the arguments advanced in the thesis, a summary is
now given to re-highlight a theme of how morality is corporately appropriated in the
context of new managerial discourses.
Chapter 1 introduced a preliminary context where increased moral concerns
in the business arena were thrown into shape within the fold of business ethics as an
academic discipline. Drawing upon Kohlberg's theory of moral development by way of
a classificatory scheme, I highlighted an evolutionary feature of moral issues in terms
of 'unethical behaviour', 'whistleblowing', 'corporate code of ethics', and 'corporate
social responsibility'. In recognising the confrontational positions of moral subjects
who concern the moral issues, the different classes of 'corporate management' and
'employees' were brought into focus. Importantly, I argued that the corporate
management are principal in taking the initiative of making up moral concerns and
handling them in a corporate way, rather than in a way that the moral concerns are
self-consciously reflected and criticised. The effects of this 'corporate moral leadership'
were found in parallel with the stages of moral measures taken in the discourse of
business ethics.
I pointed out in Chapter 1 that these corporate practices of moral measures
to monitor members' conduct were mainly directed at the other rather than oneself.
For instance, members might be, I suggested, reluctant to blow the whistle on their
own misconduct. Insofar as the members' reluctance is caused by their immediate
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wants to evade responsibility, this is illustrative of an effect of the corporate moral
leadership which is applied to the conduct ofwhistleblowing. The members' conduct of
whistleblowing is not based on their 'self-conscious formulation' of the ethical values
which should illuminate their own misconduct, too. The members' conduct of
whistleblowing is governed by their subjective wants deriving from the prevailing
system of whistleblowing in which their own misconduct is silenced. Therefore, their
actions of whistleblowing are bound to be directed only at the others' misconduct
which is proscribed by corporate rules guided by corporate moral leadership. The
authenticity of the corporate codes of conduct was also questioned in that the codes
were unlikely to be applied to the corporate management's conduct and rather oriented
to the protection of the firm from employees' conduct against the firm (Lefebvre and
Singh, 1992). I argued that the codes might be appropriated for corporate purposes in
virtue of the employees' consent to ethicality which is derived from the prevailing
system of ethical values which the employees take as given in the form of "ethical
codes". This is so when the ethical codes are intended both to avoid the disadvantages
of government regulation (Beauchamp and Bowie, 1979) and to control the
employees' compliant actions to fit with the corporate demands. Significantly, the
codes are peripherally directed at the other - protection of the firm from employees'
misconduct, avoidance of government regulation, and control of employees' compliant
action - and not centrally directed at improving ethical climate of a company. The
notion of corporate social responsibility was also connotative of an elfect of
corporate moral leadership which was conveyed chiefly by corporate management.
The corporate management's endorsement of corporate social responsibility is aimed at
securing their corporate image in conformity with socially desirable anticipations
which they take as socially given. However, their social conformity through endorsing
corporate social responsibility may intend to serve the window dressing for the
company's corporate image which conceals unethical practices within their company. If
it is the case, then such a corporate moral leadership embodied in corporate social
responsibility is self-deceptively directed at the other like social desirability and not
directed at the company itself. Indeed, the conduct of both corporate management and
employees, governed by corporate moral leadership, is doomed to appropriate
morality in a corporate way that is apart from an authentic level of self-reflections of
morality.
On the basis of these understandings, I argued that such new managerial ideas
as 'HRM', 'Corporate Culture', 'TQM' are also characterised by corporate moral
leadership and intended to provide corporate management with ways to overcome the
shortcomings which emerge from those moral measures. By presuming employees'
170
readiness to respond to ethic-relevant situations in an autonomous manner and
equipping them with a degree of discretionary autonomy, the new managerial ideas
seem attentive to nourishing employees' capacity for moral autonomy and reasoning.
The presumption is that employees' practical autonomy can contribute to a synergy
effect of reaping a higher level of effectiveness by means of the enacted ethos of
shared values. Moreover, the new managerial discourses are expected to be able to
elicit members' extra commitment to a company beyond a scope of engagement
manifested in the corporate codes of ethics. But, the new managerial discourses'
endorsement of the employees' moral autonomy and reasoning may disguise its implicit
intent. It is, I argued, calculatively intended to arouse the individual employees' moral
self-efficacy to detect their own misconduct which is considered harmful for the
company. In summary of the different arguments in chapter 1, morality in the business
arena was held to be very susceptible to corporate management's appropriation.
Accordingly, employees are also induced to partake in a complicity that appropriates
morality in a corporate way. The labour process which employees are brought into
may exacerbate the conditions of possibility for the corporate appropriation of
morality, distancing them from an authentic level ofmoral reflections. A recognition of
these points differentiates my position in the discourse of business ethics from the
mainstream normative stance to business ethics. Importantly, a moral critique of a new
managerialism is viewed to serve 'a thick description' of how morality is problematised
in the business arena.
Recognising that moral order is accomplished by collective agreement, the
new managerial discourses are premised on an ethos of shared values. In criticising the
managerial prescriptions, however, that which is disputed in this thesis is an
epistemological question of whether the corporately espoused values can be shared in
such a way as to meet the culture programmers' managerial intentions. Discussing the
literature which demonstrated the existence of "ambivalence" in the form of the
bottom-level employees' resistance, or a diversity of cultural manifestations like
differentiation, ambiguity and fragmentation (Martin and Meyerson, 1988), I
proceeded to question the ethos of shared values by contending that only the
expressions of the values can be shared. The importance of this contention is to spell
out a distinction between 'managerialist prescriptions' and 'descriptive ethics'. The
ethos of shared values as a tenet of corporate culturism seeks its legitimacy on the
ground of an ethical imperative of 'ought'. A crisis of 'meaning' in society
(Dahler-Larsen, 1994), market pressures and the like are the cues for legitimating the
culture programmers and practitioners' insistence that values, especially corporate core
values, could be shared and should be shared.
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But, beneath the corporate appropriation of the ethical imperative (the 'ought')
is a reality that employees' competing views are marginalised because they are
considered as standing in the way of implementing the corporate core values. This is
illustrative of a contradiction embedded in corporate culturism because marginalising
the employees' competing views against corporate moral leadership is itself in violation
of 'fairness' as a basic standard of corporate morality. Indeed, there is a serious
discrepancy between 'managerial prescriptions' and 'descriptive ethics'. Apparently, the
ethical import of the descriptive ethics is put on the categorical imperative (Kant,
1785) of 'is' in contrast with 'ought'. A descriptive understanding of how shared
expressions are used in the context of new managerial practices not only problematises
the moral prescriptions of a new managerialism but also helps recognise the extent to
which morality is manipulated through the medium of shared expressions. To be sure,
the descriptive ethics is aimed at providing a thick description of how the corporately
espoused moral values lead to other competing moral issues in parallel with both the
marginalisation of the members' competing views of morality and the use of moral
expressions in the context of new managerial practices. Understanding the use of
shared expressions in the context of new managerial practices requires some concepts
which are the effects of shared expressions. For this purpose, Chapter 2 discussed the
notions of 'fragmentation', 'distancing', 'detachment' along with the notion of 'social
manipulation ofmorality' as the effect of an over-insistence on shared expressions.
Initially, the notion of 'circulated phrases' was useful to develop the concept
of shared expressions. It was crucial to recognise that the phrases were bound to be
embroidered with mixed messages. The phrases convey employees' ambivalence on the
corporate imposition of corporate core values. Though some particular phrases can be
circulated to confirm the employees' aspirations that they have autonomy to define the
reality according to their competence, a divisive practice of sharing is also
accomplished through the circulation of phrases which are selected for validating
corporate core values. Thus, a conceptual finding in Chapter 2, believed to contribute
to a discourse of corporate culture, is an identification of double-meaning in the word
of'share'; that is, unity and division. Whereas 'unity' is the front feature of sharing and
officially espoused under the patronage of its implied managerial prescriptions,
'division' is the backstage feature of sharing and unofficially rendered to be existing in
want of a proper diagnosis with the guidance of descriptive ethics. The notion of
shared expressions is necessary and adequate for grasping the mechanism whereby
moral values connotative of 'unity' are actually divided and fragmented at the
backstage of sharing. To the extent that the expressions are directed and narrowed
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down in corporate ways and that only those expressions calculated to do good for
corporate core values are allowed for circulation, its effect is that morality is socially
manipulated through the medium of shared expressions.
What I attempted to explicate in Chapter 2 was the likelihood that corporate
management as the agent of corporate culture programmes were not authentically
committed to the engineered values. All they share with their employees are the
expressions of the values. This expedient use of expressions is most likely to lead to an
effect of detachment. That is, the properties associated with the values are
appropriated for managerial purposes through a process in which these properties are
detached from the authentic values and attached to corporate performance. Though
this detachment effect is morally questionable to a high degree, it tends to be
perpetrated by the managerial ideology of normative control which is legitimised in the
name of corporate culture. I argue that the more the corporate engineering of values
seeks its legitimacy by mingling them with moral norms (Kunda, 1992), the more the
sovereignty of corporate culture as the norms tends to take on an incipient
totalitarianism. Only such moral expressions as are considered to do good for
corporate core values will be accepted by the dominant corporate management. Thus
the tendency is for other competing views ofmorality to be excluded, giving rise to a
totalitarian aspect of corporate culture.
In Chapter 2 I discussed such concepts as 'fragmentation', 'distancing', and
'detachment' in order to explicate the effects of shared expressions which are used in
the context of new managerial practices. I pointed out that a crucial contradiction of
corporate culturism consists in the incompatibility of its espoused value of'wholeness'
with its resultant actuality of'fragmentation'. I also argued that the opposing actions of
'inclusion' and 'exclusion' mediate the constitution of a totalitarian scheme of corporate
culture. In recognition of a putative separateness of corporate culture companies from
a general society, their practices to appropriate moral norms are bound to be arbitrary
and selective by including corporately screened views of morality and excluding other
competing views. This practice of separation is penetrating the managers' province of
expertise in their relations with subordinates. The managers' expertise is celebrated in
the schemes of corporate culture and TQM where expertise is regarded as being
crucial to 'success'. However, drawing upon Bauman (1989), I argued that such
experts as senior managers and middle managers facilitate division rather than unity
which is espoused by the ethos of shared values, and their expertise legitimises the
divisive practices. Indeed, 'expertise' was argued to be a method to keep distance from
labour and simultaneously the effect of a corporately espoused ethos of shared values.
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Expertise is used to help legitimate the management's directing of the shared
expressions in particular ways that are in accordance with such corporate core values
as 'success' and 'quality'.
In line with the main thrust of the thesis to examine how morality is
corporately appropriated, the notions of'moral neutralisation' and 'moral manipulation'
in Chapter 2 were considered as the effects of corporate appropriation of morality.
Because the manipulation of morality is basically predicated on moral subjects'
expedient attitude to the authenticity of morality, it was important to explore more
tacit ways in which morality was marginalised and made absent in its due course of
presence. The techniques ofmoral neutralisation (Vitell and Grove, 1987) showed that
stakeholders developed and utilised arguments to exonerate themselves from self and
social criticism concerning 'unethical' business practices. Bauman's (1990)
complementary arrangements for moral neutralisation were more illuminative of the
ways in which morality was marginalised and made absent in its due course of
presence. The conduct of 'moral manipulation' suggested that morality was
intentionally 'engineered' and 'exploited' for corporate purposes. Greenberg's (1990)
distinction between 'being fair' and 'looking fair' was incisive to identify that fairness
was a socially constructed reality for corporate impression management. Drawing
upon Kunda's (1992) study of Tech corporate culture, I argued that the obligatory
force of corporate culture could be an impetus for manipulating moral values which
were generated within the company and preserved in distinction from a general society
(Dahler-Larsen, 1994). Indeed, morality is socially manipulated by the mechanism to
produce social conformity and obedience to prevailing power relations within the
company. The strategic conduct of sharing expressions was seen to mediate the
manipulation of morality because the expressions were vulnerable to arbitrary
appropriation. Eventually, morality is peripherally directed at the other like prevailing
power relations in the company and not centrally directed at moral subjects' authentic
level of self-conscious reflection of morality. This contradiction arising out of the
conflict between the 'unitary' feature of sharing and the 'divisive' feature of sharing
required a deep analysis of the notion of shared values, which was done in Chapter 3.
The arguments in Chapter 3 focused on the cultural effects which brought
about ethical problems due to a binding force of collective meanings justified in the
name of corporate culture. I referred to Marx's (1972) argument that 'What the
capitalist pays is the values of the separate labour powers of a hundred individuals, not
the value of their combined labour power' as a reason why corporate culture
protagonists are eager to deploy the consensual feature of culture. Criticising the
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definitions of organisational (corporate) culture in respect of their monolithic emphasis
on 'cultural integration', I argued for a need to dissect the myth of cultural integration
in the light of Archer's (1988) analytic concepts. The notion of'logical consistency' is
useful for assessing a logical order between the components of culture. And the notion
of 'causal consistency' is illuminating for the degree of social uniformity produced by
the imposition of culture by one set of people on another. Corporate culturism
purports to reap the benefit of collectivising the segregated labour power in virtue of
the attempted degree of social uniformity among employees. However, an ethical
problem remains regarding a divisive distinction between the subjects who are to
control the manoeuvre of shared values and the subjects who are to be responsible for
the outcomes of shared values. I argued that the incongruity between the moral
expediency of 'excellence' and a nominality of an ethos of shared values lead
employees to a state of moral anomie in that credit is attributed to the 'heroes of
excellence' but the blame is unjustly laid upon themselves. Most of the successful
companies in terms of gaining a huge amount of net profits ascribe their successes to
the 'strong' corporate culture. However, their proclaimed fairness as part of the
successful corporate culture contradicts the inequity evidenced both in the
overpayment to top management and the dismissal of employees in the name of
rationalisation. In short, the corporate culture company's mixed culture of 'guns and
roses' is tantamount to a crucial contradiction of corporate culturism.
Contradictions embedded in the discourse of corporate culturism were also
illustrated in the business ethicists' prescriptions to infuse morality into the tenets of
corporate culture. The premise that "good ethics is good business" is at the foreground
of cultural prescriptions of some business ethicists who contend that managers should
behave ethically to increase 'shareholder wealth' (Sternberg, 1994). However, I
discussed that these instrumentally ethical managers were agents who might behave
expediently according to the volatile nature of corporate culture as a corporate
strategy. Because the instrumentally ethical managers regard ethical values, infused
into the tenets of corporate culture, as attributes of the corporation, rather than beliefs
held by themselves, the instrumentally ethical managers are bound to comply passively
with the corporately espoused ethical values. Their passive comportment is inevitable
in the milieu that the corporate culture is something handed down from 'on high'. To
the extent that they are demanded to follow the prevailing system of ethical values that
they take as given from 'on high', the instrumentally ethical managers are conditioned
to lose their own competing views of morality. Indeed, morality is peripherally
directed at the other like the prevailing system of ethical values and not internalised
into the instrumentally ethical managers' self-conscious reflections. This circumstance
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that managers should succumb to the corporate demands conveyed by corporate moral
leadership brings into relief the labour process whereby managers are compellingly
confronted with corporate strategic discourses. This was discussed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4 was aimed at highlighting more strongly the effects of corporate
practices to appropriate morality in a corporate way. Because the focal subjects in my
fieldwork of interview were managers, my argument also focused on managers'
subjectivity and their managerial labour. I pinpointed that managerial prescriptions
based on an ethos of shared values is monolithic by silencing members' competing
views and bracketing the discourse effects of corporate strategy implemented in the
labour process. I also highlighted that when corporate culture is utilised as a corporate
strategic discourse, it may become a means to reproduce the prevailing power
relations rather than bestow practical autonomy upon members. The moral limits of
corporate strategy within the prevailing relations of inequality (Freeman and Gilbert,
1988) are conflated with, and magnified in, the discourse of corporate culture because
of a synergy effect delivered by the discourse of corporate culture. Given that the
corporate strategy of corporate culture is intended to bring benefits to capital through
the prevailing relations of inequality, its moral limits are escalated because the harms
are simultaneously brought to labour in ways that are outside their own control
(Hosmer, 1994: 19).
The corporate strategy to disseminate accountabilities among managers,
argued in Chapter 4, reinforces the prevailing power relations in which managers are
liable to constitute their subjectivity. Their subjectivity is mainly constituted revolving
around the discourse effects of corporate strategy to the extent that the managers are
demanded to sell their 'selves' (Knights and Morgan, 1991b). Indeed, the imperatives
of corporate strategies drive the managerial work into the labour process. The
managers' ways of consuming corporate strategies have an influence on the ways in
which their subjectivity is constituted. Whereas their seemingly active involvement in
the implementation of strategies constitutes a front side of their subjectivity, a
backstage side of their subjectivity is liable to be passive involvement in the strategies
to the extent that they share only the expressions of the corporate values imposed
upon them. The labour process in which they are compelled to deliver and re-present
the ethical mandates associated with the strategies is likely to exacerbate the
conditions of possibility for the corporate appropriation of morality. Importantly,
surveillance was central to recognising the burden of managers in the labour process.
In addition to the functions of translating the mixed messages of corporate strategy
(Watson, 1994), managers are assigned the task of surveillance as part of their
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managerial labour. The contribution of my argument concerning the surveillance
mechanism is to bring into relief its use of moral obligations. I argued that surveillance
is conducted on employees' accounts which are presumed to convey the degree to
which they expediently display moral expressions pertinent to the corporate values of
'quality' and 'profit'. Managing, whatever else is involved, is partly accomplished by a
surveillance over 'expressions' or the use of expressions through which morality is
conveyed in an ethos of sharing.
This understanding of managerial work implicates managers with the
complex ways of constituting their ethical subjectivity. On the one hand, they are
bound, as was argued in Chapter 4, to be powerless due to their undecidable status as
'part of labour' and 'part of capital'. On the other hand, the empowerment of individual
sovereignty deems to confer a sense of autonomy and self-determination on the
managers. However, the individuation of modern managers especially in the so-called
'excellent' companies (Peters and Waterman, 1982) elicits the managers' own
subordination and leaves the inequalities of power relations intact. This is suggestive
of a contradiction embedded in the discourse of corporate culturism; that is, the
incompatibility between the individuating effects of power on subjectivity and the
collectivist ethos of shared values. As a result, the managers are left with a sense of
ethical disorder such that they are conditioned to "relativise" the cause of unexpected
consequences relating to their involvement in the corporate strategies.
I also discussed that the managers' resistance may strengthen the prevailing
power relations in the labour process. Indeed, the individuation of modern subjects
produces those persons who are seemingly capable of autonomous action, yet who are
also acutely vulnerable because they are held individually responsible for their actions.
If they have to rely upon the more powerful authorities like their corporations by
unloading the heavy burden of responsibilities, it is eventually the case that such ethical
values as 'freedom' and 'responsibility' are manipulated for consolidating the conditions
ofmanagers' reliance upon the corporations, which produces and reproduces their own
subordination and leaves the inequalities of power relations intact. Although they may
address moral issues in their company, they are bound to be cautious such that they
share only the expressions of moral talk to the extent that their moral talk does not
threaten the organisational harmony, efficiency and their own reputation for power and
effectiveness (Bird and Waters, 1989). As a consequence, the managers partake in a
complicity to appropriate ^morality through the medium of shared expressions.
Importantly, morality is peripherally directed at the other - organisational harmony,
efficiency, managers' own reputation for power and effectiveness - and not internalised
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into the managers' authentic ethical subjectivity. In the end, the labour process into
which managers are entrapped intensifies their expedient attitude to the unintended
consequences and a cycle of moral cynicism and dependence as well. All in all, the
regime of 'strong' corporate culture located in the labour process facilitates such a
condition of possibility for the appropriation of morality, leaving the managers
estranged from an authentic level of moral reflections and transforming gradually the
climate of their company into being bureaucratic. A dynamic of sharing which is
characteristic of being bureaucratic was illustrated in the empirical site of Edinso,
which was explored in Chapters 5 and 6.
The dynamics of Edinso's corporate culture was constituted revolving around
the external pressures of'complexity and competitiveness' and the internal strategies of
'family atmosphere', 'quality agenda', and 'staunch support for IFAs' which were
accorded the import of Edinso's corporate core values. Characteristically, such moral
expressions as family imagery, staunch support for intermediaries' independence,
meeting the customers' needs through quality, were used to sustain the legitimacy of
Edinso's corporate core values which contain 'rapid growth in a short period',
'increased productivity', 'enhanced profitability'. However, the analysis of managers'
accounts evidenced the managers' ambivalence on the imposition ofEdinso's corporate
core values. Their ambivalence stemmed from the condition that the dominant official
culture, legitimated by corporate management, excluded the competing views arising
from their everyday practices. Therefore, I pointed out that such internal strategies as
'family atmosphere', 'quality agenda', and 'staunch support for IFAs' were directed at
enforcing the pre-existing bureaucratic hegemony. This bureaucratic scheme of
corporate culture was more likely to block the members' competing views which could
lead to an authentic level of moral reflections and 'self-conscious formulation' of the
values that orient their conduct.
The family atmosphere enacted by corporate management of Edinso was
found to intensify paternalistic dominion over members rather than encourage lateral
cooperation. The moral expressions of family imagery were only hierarchically valid
with a residue of the lack of its relevance for lateral relationships among the members.
Moreover, the enactment of family imagery was conducive to a surveillance path
through which intelligent monitoring was done to check when and where expressions
of family imagery were effectively displayed for 'quality' and 'profit'. As a penetrating
metaphor which underlies such family resemblances as 'corporate culture' and 'TQM',
the family imagery was vulnerable to corporate appropriation. Indeed, the family
atmosphere enacted in Edinso was directed at the other - paternalistic dominion -
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rather than internalised into members' communal sharing especially when it was used
to display Edinso's internal merit outwardly to IFAs and customers ultimately.
The quality-agenda was also seen to reinforce bureaucratic practices in and
around Edinso to the extent that the subcategories of quality like 'openness', 'team
briefing system' , 'quality-track advice' took on antinomy. The moral expression of
'openness' through open door communication was directed at the other - those ideas
which must contribute to corporate values. By being conflated with an insinuation that
the superiors' time is money, openness amplified the distance between superiors and
subordinates without internalising itself into such corporate culture as was prepared to
embrace openly the competing views, too. The collective ethic of 'team' was also
directed at the other - a structure-added form of organisational communication,
amounting to less than a lauded decentralisation of decision-making. The ethical
expression of advice for quality, assumed to be delivered by the 'Q-track advice', was
directed at the other. The advice served it for corporate management to retain
authority and disciplinary control through ownership of the superstructure of
surveillance and the information it collects, retains, and disseminates to the exclusion
of information which is advisory for improving the quality of ethical standards within
the company.
The staunch support for IFAs was identified to be used as objective
indicators by which to impose more accountabilities upon the members, exploiting the
surplus from labour. I argued that the members might be skeptical about the
compatibility between the enactment of non-fiscal personnel policy like 'family
atmosphere' and the implementation of performance-related pay on the basis of IFAs'
objective indicators of the members' individual performance. In short, the ethical
expression of independence was peripherally directed at the other - the objective
indicator of individual performance, rather than centrally directed at the IFAs'
comprehensive assessment ofEdinso as a recommendable company for customers.
Edinso as an institutional shareholder was required to show as an impeccable
image as possible to the policyholders of Ethical Trust. However, both Edinso and
their policyholders were characterised to be passive in their involvement with Ethical
Trust, whose main interest was not so much in upgrading the ethical standards of the
invested companies as in making money by means of it as a marketing strategy for
Edinso and as a tax advantageous insurance commodity for the policyholders.
Perversely, the members of Edinso were estranged from any potential effort to
scrutinise the congruity between their perception of Edinso's internal corporate culture
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and the Ethical Trust which is supposedly credited with the moral superiority of
Edinso's corporate culture. Indeed, the conduct of all agents surrounding the Ethical
Trust was peripherally directed at the other - marketing strategy or tax advantage -
and not centrally directed at genuine, proactive concerns with the ethical standards of
the companies invested.
Chapter 7 discussed the effects of a totalising use of as many cultural
elements as possible in the corporate strategy of corporate culture. This practice
without a proper process of self-reflection of the values embeds serious effects which
were mainly illustrated as inconsistencies among the elements of corporate culture. As
a consequence of these inconsistencies, morality which is espoused by an ethos of
shared values comes to lose its coherence and accordingly is fragmented. Significantly,
the fragmentation of morality is the most serious effect of new managerial discourses
as Bauman (1991) contends that modernity prides itself on the fragmentation of the
world as its most foremost achievement (cf. Chapter 2). Such effects may make
employees feel confused and demoralise their will to maintain moral capacity, and
consequently foster them to deploy the strategic conduct of sharing expressions to
cope with the demands of the corporate culture which is typified by inconsistencies.
On the basis of empirical illustrations in Chapters 5 and 6,1 discussed in Chapter 7 that
members' incompetence to cope with the managerially legitimated turbulent
environment had recourse to corporate management's paternalistic calibre of managing
their incapacity. The enactment of 'family atmosphere' and 'quality agenda' as a family
resemblance to help with the members' incapacity resulted in the reinforcement of their
dependency upon Edinso and the pre-existing corporate ideology of bureaucracy. This
collision between family imagery and bureaucracy was seen to weaken logical
consistency between the components of corporate culture. Moreover, the
incompatibility between the collective ethos of sharing and the individuated imposition
of accountabilities, effected by new managerial discourses, was also argued to weaken
logical consistency. Accordingly, the degree of causal consensus among the members
was doomed to be low and the members' ambivalence was viewed to be a barometer
for measuring the degree of causal consensus. Focusing on the managers' ambivalence
to the corporately imposed values, I brought into prominence the managerial work as a
composite of unity and division.
I highlighted the dual characters ofmanagers as being composed of 'a part of
capital' and 'a part of labour'. I argued that these dual characters mediated the
managers' strategic conduct of sharing expressions in the imperatives of corporate
strategies. The managers' conduct was argued to be bound to take on the dual
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characters; 'exploitative' and 'emancipatory' embedded in corporate rules and
strategies. Insofar as their conduct is to be controlled by the corporate rules and
strategies, their deportment to the rules and strategies are bound to be Janus-like for
their self-interests. They may appear to unite with the collectivist ethos of family
resemblances and deliver moral expressions contained in the corporate strategies.
However, they become divisive when they distance themselves from other competing
views on their expertise, reproducing the bureaucratic practices. In this context of new
managerial practices characterised as indeterminate and alternating, the managerial
work is liable to mediate and facilitate corporate practices in which morality is directed
at the "other" through the medium of shared expressions. Because morality is not
centrally directed at moral subjects, nobody is accountable even to the unintended
consequences of shared moral expressions. As Bauman (1990) argues (cf. Chapter 2),
moral subjects are exempted from the class of potential objects of moral judgment, of
potential 'faces'.
In light of this understanding, a basic problem of the ethicised business
practices (Quinn and Jones, 1995) coupled with moral prescriptions of a new
managerialism is that morality is peripherally directed at the other and not internalised
into the moral subjects' ethical reasoning and judgment. The internalisation of morality
is made possible by the moral subjects' commitment to moral autonomy and reasoning.
Thus, such a basic problem embedded in the discourse of business ethics is its failure
to provide the environment in which moral subjects' aspirations for 'self-conscious
formulation' of the values that orient their conduct can be realised. Though corporate
culturism seemingly grants employees practical autonomy (Peters and Waterman,
1982), the employees' autonomy is in turn subject to corporate management's control.
The corporate management control employees' autonomy in the labour process either
by predominantly celebrating the 'core' values to the exclusion of the employees'
competing views, or by directing and narrowing the shared expressions of the 'core'
values with a residue of repressing the members' aspirations for 'self-conscious
formulation' of the values. As Willmott (1993) argues, making a commitment to a
value-standpoint is not simply a matter of assessing whether a particular set of values,
such as the core values of a dominant corporate culture, is effective in fulfilling the
members' subjective wants. Rather, it is a matter of questioning whether these values
are worthy of their allegiance. The ability to develop a 'self-conscious formulation' of
the values that orient our conduct is conditional upon (1) access to knowledge of
alternative standpoints and (2) a social milieu in which their competing claims can be
critically explored. This questioning directs attention to the social construction of the
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forms of communication in which ambivalence in discord with the imperatives of
corporate core values can be ethically tested and accepted.
Given that such a social milieu can be constituted with the help of a rigour of
descriptive ethics, some advices deriving from this descriptive ethics seem to be due
both for corporate management and employees. In recognition of a guideline that the
principles of 'fairness and consistency' should be the guide to management action
(Clark, 1993;80, quoted in Storey, 1995;24), the efforts to keep consistency in the
implementation of managerial ideas are vital even for the democratic relationships
between corporate management and employees. The skills and capacities to
orchestrate a diversity of competing views and values towards a common good
desperately necessitate the 'ethics education' which is not corporately designed but
open for members' self-conscious formulation of the values that orient their conduct.
Importantly, both corporate management and employees are required to reflect upon
their own conduct in the light of descriptive ethics. To guide their reflective
competence, business ethicists should make every effort to develop ethical knowledge
in a more guiding way.
As a method to guide managers in navigating ethic-relevant situations, the
provision of a rigour of ethical descriptions is expected to contribute to enhancing
their capacity of ethical reasoning and judgement. Based upon correct and
comprehensive understandings of descriptive ethics, the call for ethical judgement
should put a primary emphasis on individuals' self-reflective capacities on
ethic-relevant concerns. To nourish these capacities is premised on the development of
democratic organisation of social institutions in which the virtues of competing values
are freely debated (Willmott, 1993). The positive power of the virtues of competing
values consists in the ability to critically reflect upon any way in which morality is
corporately appropriated. It should also criticise the ways that individuals are fallen
into a complicity to manipulate morality through a narrowing of shared expressions
such that they are subordinated to a circle of moral cynicism and dependence.
An incessant process of self-reflection on interpersonal and institutional
moral/ethical practices should be established in the programmes for microemancipation
(Alvesson and Willmott, 1992). In accordance with Alvesson and Willmott's agenda
for microemancipation, an incessant self-reflection should be done on the moral and
ethical activities, forms, and techniques that offer themselves as means of control. A
contribution of this thesis for the microemancipation agenda lies in reflecting on a
range of moral and ethical activities, forms, and techniques which are specified as
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'unethical behaviour', 'whistleblowing', 'corporate code of ethics', 'corporate social
responsibility', and 'new managerial discourses'. My arguments have focused on a
critique of how these moral discourses function as means of corporate control. I also
pointed out that these moral prescriptions are peripherally directed at the other. They
are not centrally directed at persons as moral subjects who were duly accountable to,
and responsible for, their actions. My emphasis on the labour process was vital to
highlight the capitalist relations of social production, which produce and reproduce not
only the prevailing system of inequalities but a morality which is peripherally directed
at the other. Thus, a surveillance mechanism by means of moral accounts can be
understood to bring members into the labour process in a tighter way. I hope to have
shown how the notion of shared expressions is significant for explicating ways in
which moral discourses are socially manipulated as a means of corporate control. The
social manipulation of morality, I have suggested, is mediated by a backstage feature
of the ethos of sharing. This was characterised as 'divisive' due to a conflict between
corporate management's imposition of corporate core values and employees' resistant
ambivalence. In giving a thick description of everyday practices in Edinso I was able to
illustrate the mechanisms by which morality is corporately appropriated in the
implementation of new managerial discourses.
It seems appropriate here to restate, albeit briefy, the main lines of argument.
Like others, I began with some doubt about the assumption of shared values. This
assumption is of interest in organisational culture approaches particularly in
considering attempts to develop, or manipulate organisational culture towards
corporate culture. In beginning a critique of this notion, I highlighted an
epistemological limit on this approach. As a point of knowledge, only expressions are
open to being checked; we have no means by which to check the values themselves,
far less their status as "shared". This limitation does not, however, suggest the
impossibility of phenomenon such as organisational, or even corporate, culture. Rather
it suggests the need for the researchers to focus on this limitation in particular.
Drawing on the notion of a circulation of expressions, I have recontextualised
corporate culture as that which is directed at a mobilising and narrowing of shared
expressions and examined "core values" and the like as being some of the various
devices by which this mobilising and narrowing of expressions can be accomplished.
Running alongside this argument, has been a development in my position. In
opening my discussion in Chapter 1, I considered the question of "the other" as the
target of a social manipulation of morality within the corporate sphere. I contended
that the corporate way of manipulating moral expressions - 'autonomy' and
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'responsibility (cf. chapter 4), 'family imagery', 'openness', 'teamwork' (cf. Chapters 5
and 6) - were peripherally directed at the other, leaving such moral subjects as
corporate management and employees estranged from any sense of authentic
accountability for their conduct and even the unintended consequences of their actions.
In order to prevent morality from losing its authenticity through the narrowed sharing
of moral expressions in the context of a bureaucratic scheme of corporate culture, the
positive power of the virtues of competing views of morality should be nourished as
part of an authentic organisational culture. The authentic capacity of a mature
organisational culture should encourage a climate in which the corporate appropriation
ofmorality can be freely and incessantly criticised and reflected on.
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[Appendix 1] The Version ofEthnographic Interview
1. Please tell me about the ROUTINE aspects which affect your day?
* What might interrupt this ?
* What makes it unusual ?
2. Who do you have frequent CONTACT with ?
* How do you find out what's going on ?
* What about up[down] the way ?
3. What about PRIORITIES ?
* What gets left out when it's too difficult to do
everything ?
* How have your priorities changed through experience ?
4. How do you deal with PROBLEMS ?
* What can go wrong ?
* How do you check that ?
5 What's critical for SUCCESS ?
* What aspect have you found most satisfying ?
* What was your biggest disappointment last year ?
[ Appendix 2 ] Group and Divisional Management in Edinso
Group strategy, Marketing & PR
< Group Services
Life & Pensions Division
Investment Managers Division International Division
Financial & Investment Services Division
[ Appendix 3 ] Edinso's dynamic business network
Government
Brokers(I.F.A) <Sales force>
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Ethical Investment Criteria
The guidelines we apply to the selection of companies in which we invest are
particularly stringent. Those not considered suitable for investment include:
Any company which manufactures armaments or nuclear weapons.
Any company with subsidiaries or associates in South Africa.
Any company involved in the production of nuclear fuels, or which supplies
the nuclear power industry.
Any company which donates more than 110,000 pa to any political party or
organisation.
Any company which h a s had repeated public complaints upheld against it by
the Advertising Standards Authority in the last two years.
Any company whose investment in betting shops, casinos, amusement arcades or
the fruit machine industry accounts for more than 10% of its total business.
Any company for which the brewing, distillation or sale of alcoholic drinks
accounts for more than 10% of its total budget.
As we are unable to obtain sufficient information on the companies,
organisation or institutions to which banks lend money, all banks are
excluded.
Any company which conducts any kind ol experiments on animals or which
manufactures or sells animal tested cosmetics or pharmaceuticals.
Any company for which the growing, processing or sale of tobacco products
accounts for more than 10% of its total business.
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